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Over the past decade, cities have passed an unprecedented number of laws seeking to 
drive undocumented immigrants from their jurisdictions.  At the same time, however, large 
numbers of cities have passed policies seeking to incorporate recent immigrants into local civic 
and social life, regardless of immigration status.  What explains why similar cities have 
responded so differently? 
Quantitative analysis tests the explanatory power of theories of political opportunity 
structure, labor market competition, demographic changes represented as threats, and the 
exclusionary tendencies of homeowners in predicting the passage of exclusionary and 
inclusionary ordinances in cities nationwide.  The predictors of the passage of exclusionary 
ordinances are consistent with the salience of political opportunity structure, demographic 
changes represented as threats, and the exclusionary tendencies of homeowners.  The predictors 
of the passage of inclusionary ordinances are most consistent with theories of political 
opportunity structure and the relative absence of the exclusionary tendencies of homeowners in 
cities with lower levels of owner-occupied housing.  
Case studies in two sets of paired cities that passed diverging ordinances examine the 
social and political processes on the ground.  This qualitative research finds that residents in 
exclusionary cities expressed anxieties over the effects of demographic change on home values 
and neighborhood character.  Diverging processes of framing and mobilization emerge as central 





Network analysis of the connections between local civil society organizations in each of 
the four case study cities identifies the architecture of local civil society networks as a significant 
factor correlated with the divergent responses to demographic change. The networks in 
exclusionary cities score highly on measures of density, clustering, and closure, suggest that the 
network is broken into cliques and that local elites are isolated both from recent immigrants and 
from non-elite, native-born residents.  The high levels of network closure facilitate the creation 
of rigid group boundaries, the high levels of clustering reinforce pre-existing beliefs within those 
groups, and the network density aids in the enforcement of sanctions against those who deviate 
from group norms.  By contrast, the networks in inclusionary cities are characterized by multiple 
organizational bridges between immigrant and native-born communities that facilitate the 
creation of relationships necessary to craft inclusive policies and a sense that local resources can 
grow with the population. 
The research suggests that the local laws seeking to drive out undocumented immigrants 
are an example of a broader category of exclusionary property laws.  The linked social and 
spatial processes involved in the enactment and enforcement of these laws are one way in which 
categorical inequalities, such as socio-economic disparities by race, ethnicity, immigration status, 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
On July 13, 2006, the City Council of Hazleton, Pennsylvania enacted the “Illegal 
Immigration Relief Act Ordinance.” The ordinance was explicitly designed to drive 
undocumented immigrants from its jurisdiction by prohibiting the rental of housing units to 
undocumented immigrants and by revoking the business permit of any entity employing, 
“aid[ing], or abet[ting]” an undocumented immigrant (Hazleton 2006a).  Extending its effects 
more broadly from undocumented immigrants to any who do not speak English as a first 
language, the law also declared English the official language of the City of Hazleton and 
mandated that all official city business, forms, and signage be written in English only (Hazleton 
2006a).  Declaring “[t]hat illegal immigration . . . destroys our neighborhoods and diminishes our 
overall quality of life,” this law was enacted after 15 years in which the city’s population had 
gone from being 98 percent white non-Hispanic to being one-third Latino. 
The very same week that Hazleton enacted its Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance, just 
50 miles south, in Easton, Pennsylvania, an economically similar city experiencing a comparable 
demographic shift, the City Council created a Human Relations Commission “to make it a reality 
that Easton is a town [where] diversity is spoken” (Ford 2006).  The ordinance extended 
protections beyond race, color, and religion to include national origin and sought to ensure that 
every Easton resident would be “afforded equal opportunities for employment, housing and the 
use of public accommodations” (Easton 2006). 
Similarly, on June 21, 2010, after two years of intense local conflict, voters in Fremont, 
Nebraska approved, by popular referendum, a law nearly identical to Hazleton’s, explicitly 
intended to drive out undocumented immigrants (Zavadil 2010).  Fremont’s popularly enacted 





businesses to enroll in the federal E-Verify program to confirm the work authorization of all 
employees (Fremont 2010). 
 But just a short drive west down I-80, in Grand Island, Nebraska, doctors at the hospital had 
volunteered their time to create a free clinic to serve all residents without insurance, the police 
declined to cooperate with Immigration and Customs Enforcement in its raid on a local meat-
processing plant, the school system created a welcome center to help orient new immigrant 
families, and the city supported the creation of a local non-profit organization intended to “serve 
new immigrants . . . and develop multicultural leaders” (Multicultural Coalition 2011). 
What can explain these diverging responses of elected officials and voters to immigration 
and demographic change?  What are the social and political processes at work that led to such 
different choices?  How do these policies define some residents as belonging while excluding 
others from neighborhood or city amenities?  The answers to these questions are particularly 
important because local laws targeting immigrants broadly, and undocumented immigrants in 
particular, are just one form of a broader category of spatial policies, such as exclusionary zoning 
or selective annexation, that shape access to valued resources—to parks, schools, neighborhoods, 
or even cities.  To the extent that these laws, intentionally or unintentionally, serve as a proxy for 
race or ethnicity, excluding not only undocumented immigrants but Latinos more broadly, they 
are also an important mechanism through which inequality and race or ethnicity become 
intertwined.  Analysis of the dynamics through which spatial policies contribute to the creation 
and perpetuation of durable social categories of inequality, such as race or gender, is an 
important and enduring topic of planning research that continues to evolve as the nature of 





This puzzle as to why elected officials and voters in similar cities responded in divergent 
ways to rapid demographic change and the ramifications of those different responses are 
questions I sought to answer in the research reported here.  Academic and popular commentary 
on the topic has emphasized perceived competition between native and foreign born workers as a 
driving factor in hostility towards immigrants, both documented and undocumented (e.g. Borjas 
2001; Camarota 2009).  In regression analyses based on national data and in qualitative case 
studies allowing a close up look at processes on the ground, I found that laws seeking to exclude 
undocumented immigrants are not correlated with measures of job competition as is often 
speculated, but instead are associated with issues that are at the core of traditional planning 
concerns—housing, neighborhood change, and local quality of life.  Nationwide, cities with 
higher homeownership rates and larger increases in the Latino population were more likely to 
enact exclusionary local policies, while cities with lower homeownership rates and rising home 
values were more likely to enact inclusionary local laws.  These findings suggest that the role of 
homeowners and particularly their concerns over property values in the context of demographics 
change are salient factors in the social processes that contribute to the enactment of local 
inclusionary or exclusionary laws. 
But, of course, all cities with high homeownership rates and large increases in the Latino 
population did not enact exclusionary laws, while all cities with low homeownership rates and 
rising home values did not adopt inclusionary policies.  To better understand the political, 
economic, and social processes at work on the ground that led to these diverging forms of 
collective action, I conducted case studies of two similar cities in Pennsylvania and two similar 
cities in Nebraska. One city in each pair passed an inclusionary law while its neighbor passed an 





particularly important factors contributing to the enactment of diverging policies.  The findings 
from the case studies also suggested that local civil society organizations and the ties among 
those organizations played an important role.  The structure of these network ties provides a 
window into how power is distributed and exercised locally, how boundaries of participation in 
local civic and political life are drawn, and how conflicts arising from the intersection of 
demographic change and concern over property are managed differently.   
The networks in exclusionary cities scored highly on measures of density and clustering. The 
high clustering score indicates that the network is broken into cliques.  In these particular cities, 
the cliques coincide with the isolation of local elites both from recent immigrants and from non-
elite, native-born residents.  High levels of clustering in these contexts reinforce pre-existing 
beliefs within fragmented cliques, while the density of the sub-networks aids in mobilization 
among clique members to achieve shared policy goals and to enforce sanctions against outsiders 
or those who deviate from group norms.  By contrast, the networks in inclusionary cities were 
characterized by multiple organizational bridges between immigrant and native-born 
communities as a result of continuing efforts by immigrant groups to obtain representation.  
These bridging organizational relationships represent a blurring of boundaries between native 
born residents and recent arrivals and created local capacity to craft inclusive municipal policies 
and collective local identities as demographics changed. 
The social processes at work in the passage of these local exclusionary laws are especially 
important to planners and planning theorists because they are an example of a category of spatial 
policies that contribute to urban fragmentation and economic polarization, and through which 
long-lasting categories of inequality are created and perpetuated.  As urban diversity and 





elected officials respond to increasing heterogeneity.  The research can also help scholars and 
policymakers make sense of exclusionary housing and land use policies.  Finally, the research 
reported here highlights the tension between democracy and discrimination in local governance 
by exploring how localities across the country, by referendum or by representative decision-
making, democratically enact policies discriminating against certain categories of residents and 
entrench racial inequality.   
 
1.1 Statement of Purpose 
In spite of the comparatively modest goals of contemporary urban planning practice 
(Fainstein 2009), writing in planning theory and social movements on the ground have created 
new momentum around concepts of the Just City (Fainstein 2010), the Right to the City (Purcell 
2002; Carpio, Irazábal, and Pulido 2011; Brenner, Marcuse, and Mayer 2012; Harvey 2012), and 
the practice of critical planning (Marcuse 2010).  All three of these concepts share a focus on 
urban political economy, and particularly on equity.  This focus on equity is especially salient 
given the dramatic rise in economic inequality in the United States over the past half-century.  
Fainstein’s work on the Just City (2009; 2010) has advanced compelling theoretical and 
philosophical justifications for a redefinition of planning priorities around justice and has 
developed principles that support “a distribution of both material and nonmaterial benefits 
derived from public policy that does not favor those who are already better off at the beginning” 
(2010: 109).  Drawing on the theory of justice articulated by John Rawls (1971) and the 
capabilities approach elaborated by Amartya Sen (1999) and Martha Nussbaum (2000), Fainstein 
(2010) emphasizes the primary importance of the freedom to achieve well-being, understood as 





essential in terms of planning practice, then, is the distribution of opportunities to realize those 
capabilities, through access to education, health care, and political and material control over 
one’s environment.   
This emphasis on equity and access to the opportunities necessary to realize one’s 
capabilities is especially vital at a time when the distribution of wealth and income in the United 
States has become increasingly skewed.  This growing economic inequality threatens not just 
equity but also values of democracy and diversity (Fainstein 2010).  Democracies must always 
wrestle with the danger of domination by economic and political elites, and the growing 
concentration of wealth exacerbates these dangers by facilitating efforts to influence the public 
perception of the fairness of that inequality and simultaneously to limit government policies that 
promote redistribution or mitigate disadvantage.  Rising income inequality is also associated 
with a widening racial gap in wealth that threatens to further solidify the U.S. racial caste 
structure.  The wealth of the median white household in 2013 ($141,900) was 13 times greater 
than the wealth of the median black household ($11,000) and ten times greater than the wealth of 
the median Latino household ($13,700) (Federal Reserve 2014).  The black-white wealth gap is 
currently the widest it has been in 25 years and the Latino-white gap is the largest in more than a 
decade. 
In analyzing economic inequality, planning scholars have focused largely on the 
macroeconomic shift from Keynesian economic policies and capital-labor relations in the 
decades following Bretton Woods to the laissez-faire, neoliberal mode of regulation that has 
characterized the past four decades (e.g. Brenner and Theodore 2002; Jessop 2002; Weber 2002; 
Hackworth 2007).  This macro analysis, however, leaves undertheorized the micro and meso 





with persistent inequality, as well as the variation in that association across time and place. In 
other words, how are categorical inequalities formed and how do they change?  What role do 
place and spatial processes play in the creation and maintenance of these categories of 
inequality? 
By investigating the local spatial policies that urban residents and elected officials are 
enacting in response to immigration and demographic change, this dissertation explores the 
processes through which categories of inequality are formed and altered.  Current growth of the 
U.S. Latino population and ongoing debate about where Latinos fit in the U.S. racial hierarchy 
(e.g. Rodriguez 2000; Massey 2009; Frank, Akresh, and Lu 2013) further justify studies of 
racialization, a process that continues to affect all U.S. residents. 
To understand the processes that contribute to policy divergence, this dissertation brings into 
dialogue three areas of scholarship that have remained relatively separate until now: literature 
from planning, law, and political science on immigration and local government responses to 
immigration; a sociological literature on the repeated social processes that shape the creation of 
inequality and the mobilization of collective action; and a planning and sociological literature on 
networks.  Given rising levels of urban inequality, the increasing diversity of city residents, and 
the fragmentation of metropolitan regions, a richer understanding of the processes that reproduce 
categorical inequalities, lead to public policies and institutional practices that entrench these 
inequalities in social structure, and contribute to inequality in opportunity and disparities in well-
being are particularly important for planners. 
1.1(a) Inequality 
The share of the national income received by the top one percent of residents in the United 





1976 to more than 22.5 percent (including capital gains) in 2012 (Alvaredo, Atkinson, Piketty, 
and Saez 2014).  The average annual income for the top one percent of households in 2012 was 
about $1.3 million, as compared to the median household income of $51,371 (Alvaredo et al. 
2014; American Community Survey 2012). 
 
Figure 1.1: Share of national income received by the top one percent of earners, 1913-2012. 
  
Data source: Piketty and Saez (2007).  
 
During the three decades following the Second World War, the United States witnessed rapid 
upward mobility because productivity and wages grew together and gains were relatively evenly 
distributed over the income scale. Since the 1970s and 1980s, however, productivity has 
continued to grow (increasing by 78 percent between 1980 and 2009) yet median wages have 
stagnated (Levy and Kochan 2012).  In the 30 years between 1982 and 2012, the median 





Rising productivity and stagnant median wages force one to ask where the economic gains went.  
The top one percent has claimed a growing share of the economic gains from increased 
productivity after 1980. 
From 1993 to 2012, the incomes of the top one percent grew by 86 percent while the incomes 
of the remaining 99 percent grew by just 6.6 percent (an annual growth rate of only 0.34 percent) 
(Saez 2013).  Thus, the top one percent captured over two-thirds of the overall national income 
growth between 1993 and 2012 (Saez 2013).  This disparity has only grown since the recession.  
Looking only at the time period since the economic recovery began in 2009, fully 95 percent of 
all of the national income gains went to the top one percent (Saez 2013).  






Data source: Piketty and Saez (2007).  
 
This rise in inequality since the 1970s has been associated with a broad shift in dominance 
from the Keynesian economic policies and embedded liberal capital-labor relations that 
characterized the first decades of the post-war era to more laissez-faire and supply-side economic 
policies that began with the stagflation crisis and deindustrialization in the United Kingdom and 
the United States (Stiglitz 2003; Brenner and Theodore 2003).  This neoliberal shift has 
promoted institutional reforms to privatize public goods and services, discipline organized labor, 
deregulate the financial sector, and further strengthen private property rights (Harvey 2005; 
Prasad 2006).  The experience of deindustrialization in U.S. cities through the second half of the 
20th century was one component of the decentralization of economic activity internationally, and 
was paralleled by the concentration of control and services complexes and a rise in the 
prominence of the finance, insurance, and real estate sectors (Sassen 1988; Fainstein 1994).  The 
increase in highly-skilled, specialized jobs was accompanied by a larger expansion of low-wage, 
unskilled positions in both consumer services and in downgraded manufacturing sectors.  For the 
majority of the labor force, the shift to a service economy and a manufacturing regime of flexible 
accumulation has meant the growth of part-time and temporary positions, as well as sub-
contracting, along with the resurgence of the informal economy.  This reorganization of capital-
labor relations has also been characterized by polarization in the income distribution of the labor 
force and a general retreat by states in the provision of social welfare (Hacker 2004; Brenner, 
Peck, and Theodore 2005).   
It is a longstanding pillar of faith among the American mainstream that regardless of where 
one starts out, one has the opportunity to do better than one’s parents.  Yet recent research by 





adults is strongly correlated with how much their parents earned.  While there is indeed still 
some mobility across classes, the majority of children retain an economic status similar to that of 
their parents—more than 60 percent of those children who grew up in families with incomes in 
the top fifth of income earners remain in the top two-fifths, while more than 60 percent of those 
children who grew up in families with incomes in the bottom fifth remain in the bottom two-
fifths (Chetty et al. 2014).   
One of the most surprising findings in the research by Chetty et al. (2014) is that 
intergenerational mobility varies substantially by metropolitan region.  The probability that a 
child from the bottom fifth will end up in the top fifth of income earners is only 4.4 percent in 
Charlotte, North Carolina but nearly three times higher in San Jose, California—12.9 percent 
(Chetty et al. 2014).  A child whose parents’ earnings were in the 20th percentile ends up, on 
average, in the 45th percentile in Salt Lake City, Utah but only the 35th percentile in 
Indianapolis, Indiana (Chetty et al. 2014).  In short, the geographic location where one grows up 
matters significantly for where one ends up economically as an adult.  The significant variation 
by place highlights the importance of local and regional policymaking in supporting economic 
mobility or, alternatively, reinforcing class hierarchy. 
In analyzing the economic mobility data, Chetty et al. (2014) found that higher levels of 
racial residential segregation within a metropolitan region were strongly correlated with 
significantly reduced levels of intergenerational upward mobility for all residents of that zone.  
Segregation by income, particularly the isolation of low-income households, was also correlated 
with significantly reduced levels of upward mobility.  These findings are especially worrisome 





income (Reardon and Bischoff 2011) and the continuing concentration of poverty (Jargowsky 
2013). 
It is not the average income of the metropolitan region that matters—children in the 
commuting zones with the lowest mean incomes (around $21,900) reach the same percentile of 
the national income distribution at the same rate as those in the commuting zones with the 
highest incomes (around $47,600).  What matters for the mobility of all residents of the 
metropolitan region is the level of racial and income segregation within that region.  Building on 
the insight that enduring neighborhood inequalities create a “durable spatial logic that mediates 
social life” (Sampson 2012), these findings suggest that residential segregation is a crucial 
mechanism in the reproduction of inequality. In the U.S., income inequality and income 
segregation have historically had a strong correlation with race (see Pattillo-McCoy 1999; 
Sharkey 2013). 
1.1(b) Categorical inequality 
From before the Constitution’s three-fifths compromise, race has been a social category 
along which power, wealth, and rights in the United States have been distributed.  The socially 
constructed category of race has been used to justify the expropriation of land (see e.g. Johnson 
v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1843)) and the exploitation of people (see e.g. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 
60 U.S. 393 (1857); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)).  The justifications put 
forth for racial categories themselves, however, have shifted over time, grounded at some 
moments in religion, at others in science, and at others in culture and “common-sense” (Haney-
López 1997). 
Despite changing justifications, significant racial disparities in access to opportunity and in 





residents.  For instance, wide gaps in infant mortality (Rossen and Schoendorf 2014), the quality 
of local public schools (Steil, Ellen, and De la Roca 2015), exposure to violence (De la Roca, 
Ellen, and O’Regan 2014), wages (Fryer, Pager, and Spenkuch  2013), and life expectancy 
(Olshansky et al. 2012) all persist (see Lawrence, Sutton, Kubisch, Susi, and Fulbright-Anderson 
2004).  The challenging question that these disparities pose is what are the mechanisms that 
create and recreate this recurrent pattern of social inequality.  Despite the contemporary 
widespread expression of support for non-discriminatory principles, how are racial hierarchies 
produced and reproduced daily?  
Current disparities are undoubtedly related in part to historical disparities. For generations, 
millions of African-Americans were deprived of liberty, dehumanized, denied rights, prohibited 
from formal education, and could not accumulate capital because they were considered the 
capital of others.  Even after the abolition of slavery, segregation and income inequality were 
perpetuated through a combination of both public and private actions, from the enactment of 
Black codes to agricultural reliance on sharecropping and the convict lease system, from racial 
zoning to white mob violence against integrated neighborhoods and successful black commercial 
districts, from racially restrictive covenants to the discriminatory loan-underwriting standards 
created by the Federal Home Owners Loan Corporation and almost universally used by the 
banking industry, from racially targeted urban renewal to contemporary reverse redlining 
(Massey and Denton 1993; Squires 1994; Sugrue 1996; Thomas 1997; Brooks and Rose 2013).  
The same or similar policies applied equally to Mexican and Mexican-American populations, 
especially in the Southwest (Irazábal and Farhat 2008).  These past public policies and private 
actions contributed to the vast racial disparities in accumulated wealth that continue to 





discrimination also perpetuate racial inequality (Omi and Winant 1986; Bonilla Silva 1997).  
Facially neutral policies with a racially disparate impact—such as public exclusionary zoning 
policies (Pendall 2000; Rugh and Massey 2014), private policies such as reliance on yield spread 
premiums for mortgage broker compensation that encourage discriminatory lending (Engel and 
McCoy 2003; Steil 2011), or the complex mix of individual and collective decisions throughout 
the criminal justice process, from arrest to prosecution to sentencing (Western 2006; Alexander 
2010)— widen social and economic disparities.  The social psychological categories people 
create to organize the world and attendant conscious and unconscious biases also exacerbate 
these gaps (Fiske 1998; Greenwald 1998; Lane, Kang, and Banaji 2007; Pager and Shepherd 
2008).  Statistical evidence of discrimination by employers in hiring, for instance, is consistently 
well documented, with white callback rates 50 percent to 240 percent higher than callback rates 
for equally qualified black applicants (e.g. Bendick et al. 1994; Bertrand and Mullainathan 
2004).  A recent study found that not only were black applicants half as likely as equally 
qualified whites to receive a callback or job offer, black and Latino applicants with no criminal 
record fared no better than white applicants just released from prison (Pager, Western, and 
Bonikowski 2009).  Paired testing also found that black and Latino home seekers are shown 
fewer homes nationwide, are told more often that advertised rental units are “not available,” and 
are offered fewer incentives to rent a unit than comparable whites, limiting black and Latino 
housing and neighborhood options (Turner et al. 2013). Prospective black and Latino borrowers 
face higher rates of denial and are offered less favorable mortgage terms than whites with similar 
credit characteristics (Ross and Yinger 1999).  When compared to white borrowers with similar 
credit histories, loan-to-value ratios, personal characteristics, and residential locations, African 





higher cost ratios, prepayment penalties, and balloon payments (Quercia 2007; LaCour-Little and 
Holmes 2008; Immergluck 2009).  These historic inequities, continuing disparate impacts, and 
contemporary discrimination set the foundation for unequal opportunities. 
Recent research in the social sciences has highlighted in particular the role that 
neighborhoods can play in shaping access to opportunity (e.g. Ellen and Turner 1997; Briggs 
2005; Sampson 2011; Sharkey 2012; Sharkey and Faber 2014).  Some of the mechanisms 
through which neighborhood conditions or characteristics may influence individual outcomes 
include the levels of mean human capital in the neighborhood (Borjas 1995; Wilson 1997; 
Cutler, Glaeser, and Vigdor 2007), the quality of local services which residents receive (Collins 
and Williams 2001; Schwartz 2010), the density and quality of local institutions or businesses 
(Marwell 2007; Small 2009), exposure to crime and violence (Sharkey, Schwartz, Ellen, and 
Lacoe 2014; Harding 2009), physical isolation from employment and other opportunities (Kain 
1968; Kasarda 1989), and the levels of environmental hazards to which residents are exposed 
(Agyeman, Bullard, and Evans 2003).  
In the 20th Century, the Great Migration transformed the United States as millions of African 
Americans left the rural South and remade the nation’s cities. The growth of the U.S. Latino 
population is provoking a similar transformation in the 21st Century.  Between 1970 and 2010, 
the Latino population grew from 8 million to more than 45 million, settling primarily in the 
nation’s cities and suburbs. During the Great Migration, both de jure and de facto segregation 
policies severely constrained the options of African-American migrants, steering them into 
segregated housing and labor markets and contributing to what the Kerner Commission in 1968 
described as a nation “moving toward two societies, one black, one white—separate and 





levels, they remain high, and evidence suggests that segregation continues to produce separate 
and unequal access to resources, such as schools or jobs, and exposure to hazards, such as 
violence or environmental risks.  As the Latino population continues to increase, Latinos seem to 
be inheriting many of the same segregated urban structures experienced by African Americans 
and earlier generations of Latinos (Irazábal and Farhat 2008; De la Roca, O’Regan, Ellen 2014).  
Although Latino isolation (that is, the share of Latino residents in the neighborhood where the 
average Latino lives) has risen less rapidly than Latinos’ quickly rising share of the population, 
average levels of Latino isolation have still risen substantially and matched average levels of 
African American isolation in 2010 at a score of 0.46.  Black-white segregation measured 
through the dissimilarity index in 2010 (0.594) still surpassed Latino-white dissimilarity (0.496), 
but the difference (0.098) was less than half what it had been three decades earlier (0.213) (De la 
Roca, Ellen, and O’Regan 2014).   
The increasing levels of isolation in Latino neighborhoods raises the question of the extent to 
which Latinos are being racialized into an underclass in part through a combination of liminal 
legal status, low wages, and segregated neighborhoods (Massey 2009; Massey and Pren 2012).  
But generational disadvantages for the large portion of the Latino population that is foreign-born, 
such as lack of citizenship or work authorization, limited fluency in English, and low levels of 
educational attainment in home countries present the possibility that barriers to social and 
economic equality are more temporary.  The increasing diversity of the United States population 
also means that the society that immigrants and their native-born children are joining is a rapidly 
changing one, with a shrinking white majority and increasing economic inequality.   To what 





who has access to crucial social resources such as neighborhoods, schools, and jobs as customary 
group positions change? 
1.1(c) Spatial dimensions of inequality 
The focus on neighborhood effects in recent social science literature and Chetty et al.’s 
(2014) work on the regional variation in economic mobility both highlight the spatial dimensions 
of inequality as well as broader processes of geographical inclusion or exclusion.  
Neighborhoods, for instance, are valuable, especially where they are bundled with access to other 
vital institutions, such as schools, and are associated with relevant social characteristics, such as 
relative safety, environmental quality, or economic status.  So too, regions, states, and nations are 
all associated with differential access to resources and to rights.  In short, territory at both the 
macro and micro scale is associated with economic resources, political rights, and collective 
identities (Williams 1973). 
The connection between territory, identity, and rights is most visible in the context of 
nation states and immigration. At its root, immigration law serves to shape how we conceptualize 
space and where people belong in space.  Who “belongs” in a particular national space is not 
self-evident.  As Leti Volpp (2012) has noted, within the same physical place, presence can be 
seen as a right (for citizens), as a privilege (for legal permanent residents), as a trespass (for 
undocumented individuals), or as a fiction (for parolees).  Rights are contingent and depend on 
both who you are (status) and where you are (territory).  Usually, the rights of a non-citizen are 
understood to change on account of residence in the territory of another sovereign, but in the 
cases of Fremont and Hazleton a non-citizen’s rights may vary by local, municipal territory as 
well.  On the ground, these conflicts over the organization of and access to space are transposed 





This accepted significance of territory for rights and political identities, however, is a 
relatively recent development, depending as it does on the technology of cartography and the 
ability to fix locations in space and control borders.  Richard Thompson Ford traces the shift 
from legal authority based on status to legal authority based on territorial jurisdiction, 
highlighting the way in which jurisdiction itself comes to produce identities, both political and 
social: “The jurisdictional boundary does more than separate territory; it also separates types of 
people: native from foreign, urbanites from country folk, citizen from alien, slave from free” 
(Ford 1998: 843).  Territorially based relations are sometimes represented as voluntary contracts, 
as in Charles Tiebout’s (1956) representation of freely chosen municipal “sorting.”  But because 
of the relationship between jurisdiction, resources, and identities, mobility is more constrained 
than is often assumed. Indeed, Ford (1998) argues that territorial identities increased in 
importance at the same time as, and as a substitute for the formal role of status based identities in 
maintaining power and privilege.  Ford (1998: 902) notes that “private social groups,” such as 
neighborhood associations, “used jurisdiction in order to maintain status hierarchies based on 
race and national origin, and because the groups were not part of a formal state apparatus, the 
practices were defended as free association and the exercise of a right to contract.”  These private 
practices were reinforced by government action that encouraged or even required homebuyers to 
enter into racially restrictive covenants as a condition of mortgage insurance.  Through the 
purchase of suburban homes with federally subsidized mortgages, white homebuyers created 
new markets and “came to accept as natural the conflation of whiteness and property ownership 
with upward social mobility” (Self 2003: 16). 
Local restrictions on the availability of housing or access to municipal resources continue 





with the aspiration that membership in jurisdictions be freely chosen.  Hence, territorial identities 
are in an important sense remnants of the era before the modern hegemony of contractual social 
relations…Like the social positions of the family, they are largely involuntary relationships of 
status” (Ford 1998: 845).  And these status relationships are increasingly intertwined with the 
creation of collective identities as homeowners, and suburban homeowners in particular, who 
despite differences in occupations, incomes, and political loyalties often in the post-war period 
came to be united on issues of property taxation and racial segregation (Self 2003).  Indeed the 
segregated structure of urban growth embeds inequality in space at the same time as it obscures 
the reasons for the disparities: “[r]acisms become institutionally normalized in and through 
spatial configuration, just as social space is made to seem natural, a given, by being conceived 
and defined in racial terms” (Goldberg 1993: 185).  As suburbanization swept the United States 
after the Second World War, “the detached, single-family home had been elevated in popular 
culture as the preeminent symbol of both independence and assimilation. Together, markets and 
culture—and later, electoral politics—encouraged homeowners . . . to identify property 
ownership first and foremost in terms of their own individual financial interests” (Self 2003: 99).  
Property and neighborhoods were transformed from being primarily a home into financial and 
moral value for homeowners as well as profit for developers and taxes for public officials (Self 
2003).    
Cities and neighborhoods have long been sites of struggle over the distribution of 
economic growth across space and across social groups.  The power to set taxes and to allocate 
infrastructure and public services is a power to set the terms of investment and the distribution of 
its benefits.  In setting those terms, municipal boundaries become not only political boundaries 





In reflecting on the production and transformation of space, Henri Lefebvre (1991: 26) 
emphasized that space is both a product of social relations and productive of them, that space 
“serves as a tool of thought and of action” in addition to being in some sense “a means of 
production” and also a “means of control.”  Recognizing that “social classes are hierarchized as 
they are inscribed into space” (2014: 205), Lefebvre highlights the need for a simultaneous focus 
on the significance of everyday life and of the state in relations of power, all seen through a 
spatial lens.  This dissertation attempts to identify some of the processes through which social 
categories are constructed and hierarchized through differential access to space. 
 
1.2 Overview 
To understand the role that processes of geographical inclusion and exclusion can play in the 
construction or transformation of durable categories of inequality, this dissertation analyzes how 
and why similar local governments responded differently to rapid immigration.  Chapter 2 
outlines the relevant literature, reviewing the history of local immigration regulations, the 
emergence of new immigrant destinations since 1965, and theoretical tools to useful in analyzing 
the relationship between these local laws and categorical inequality.  Chapter 3 presents the 
methods used in this dissertation: logistic regressions to identify correlates of inclusionary and 
exclusionary ordinance passage; case study research to understand the processes at work on the 
ground in cities that led up to the passage of inclusionary and exclusionary local policies; and 
social network analysis to measure the extent to which the structure of local organizational 
networks may have contributed to the diverging local responses.  Chapter 4 presents the findings 
of the quantitative results, which, on the one hand, highlight the association between local 





policies, and, on the other hand, identify the relation between local homeownership, rising wages 
and home values, and the passage of inclusionary local policies.  Chapters 5-8 present findings 
from the case studies, detailing the processes of boundary formation through framing, and 
mobilization in each city.  Chapter 9 presents the findings from the network analysis, which 
indicate that the structure of connections between civil society organizations in cities that passed 
exclusionary laws have higher levels of clustering and higher levels of density than the networks 
in the cities that passed inclusionary laws, which instead are characterized by high levels of 
bridging across structural holes in the network.  Chapter 10 concludes, by exploring how 
enactment of local laws seeking to exclude or include undocumented immigrants should be 
understood as spatial processes that can perpetuate or mitigate categorical inequalities, such as 
race, ethnicity, immigration status, or gender. 
 
1.3 Conclusion 
As ever larger numbers of people live outside the country of their birth and the world is 
increasingly urbanized, cities across the globe are becoming increasingly diverse.  More than one 
third of the residents of New York, Toronto, London, and Singapore are foreign-born.  But the 
rapid growth of immigrant residents is affecting smaller cities as well, from Minneapolis to 
Marseille, Baltimore to Birmingham, Atlanta to Auckland.  The increasing immigrant population 
presents opportunities for local governments, but also presents challenges of social and political 
incorporation.  Urban uprisings by immigrants in and around London, Paris, Stockholm, and 
Singapore in the past decade have brought international media attention to the challenges of 
immigrant integration.  At the same time, anti-immigrant riots in Moscow, Johannesburg, Calais, 





populations.  The increasing heterogeneity of cities presents the real possibility of exacerbating 
already increasing urban fragmentation and entrenching categorical inequalities based on race, 
religion, or national origin.  Nevertheless, cities have long been comparatively more diverse and 
inclusive than their respective nation-states, spaces where marginalized groups have created 
spaces of refuge and of empowerment.  Building on conceptions of a cosmopolis (Sandercock 
2003) and ideals of cosmopolitan ethics (Appiah 2007; Anderson 2011), some have suggested 
that we “conceive of the city as a political space inside the territorial nation-state where 
multicultural and transnational identities can be more freely articulated” (Bauböck 2003: 142).  
The challenge is to understand how urban policymakers can ensure that even in times of 
economic uncertainty and rapid demographic change cities can become both more inclusive and 







Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 The 40 million foreign born residents of the United States in 2010 comprised roughly 13 
percent of the U.S. population, the highest level since the sustained period of immigration that 
existed between 1870 and 1920, when 13 percent or more of the population was recorded as 
foreign-born in every decennial census.  Whereas the majority of immigrants historically have 
been from Europe, more than half (53.1%) of current foreign-born residents are from Latin 
America (43.8%) and the Caribbean (9.3%), while more than one-quarter are from Asia (28.2%).  
The foreign-born are increasingly moving away from the traditional gateways in New York, 
California, Texas, Florida, and Illinois to a broad range of states.  According to the 2010 Census, 
more than five percent of the population of 31 of the 50 states was foreign-born.  Public 
discussion of immigration generally focuses on national policy issues, but of all levels of 
government, immigrants interact most with local governments, and immigrants’ access to 
opportunity, like that of the native-born, is profoundly shaped by urban policies.  In response to 
growing numbers of immigrant residents, local governments are creating innovative policies both 
to support recent immigrant arrivals and to discourage migrant settlement.  
 To understand this municipal immigration policymaking, the literature review below 
introduces first the history of local immigration regulations and their relation to federal policy.  
The shift in immigration since 1965 is then described, followed by a summary of recent local 
policies targeting immigrants and a review of the urban planning scholarship on local housing 
and employment policies directed towards the foreign-born.  The literature on local immigration 
policies in urban studies, political science, sociology, and public policy is sparse.  The majority 
of the available literature takes a quantitative approach and there are no extensive field studies 





qualitative study, this literature review lays the groundwork for a theoretical orientation focused 
on the mechanisms and processes through which boundaries and categories are constructed as 
well as the networks of relations that can weaken or reinforce those boundaries. 
 
2.1. Immigration and Citizenship Literature 
Given the dual identity of the United States as “a nation of immigrants and a gatekeeping 
nation” (Lee 2004: 121), immigration policy has long been a contested topic in national politics.  
When asked whether “the growing number of newcomers from other countries threaten 
traditional American customs and values” the U.S. population is almost evenly split—46 percent 
agree and 48 percent disagree, a result that has remained consistent over the past decade (Pew 
Research Center 2012).  At the same time, the percentage of the U.S. population that is foreign-
born has increased from 5 percent in 1970 to 13 percent in 2010.   
Throughout the past century, the policy debate over immigration has occurred primarily at 
the federal level, as relatively established political blocks favoring the restriction or expansion of 
immigration have waxed and waned (Higham 2004; Freeman 1995; King 2000; Tichenor 2002; 
Zolberg 2008). Over the past decade, however, a wave of local immigration laws unprecedented 
in the post-war period has swept across the country. Some cities have passed laws aimed at 
driving out undocumented immigrants, while other cities have enacted policies trying to support 
foreign-born residents regardless of their immigration status. States have also joined the fray, and 
these state and local efforts have generated bitter political disputes and intense legal battles, such 
as the Supreme Court’s 2012 consideration of Arizona’s immigration enforcement law. What 
















Although much research focusing on immigration legislation has analyzed congressional 
policymaking (Freeman 1995; Tichenor 2002; King 2000; Jacobson 2000; Ngai 2004; Zolberg 
2008; Wong 2006; Newton 2008), comparatively few studies have considered the adoption of 
local immigration laws (but see Varsanyi 2010). 
2.1(a) Immigration 
2.1(a)(1) Early municipal immigration regulations 
Although many take for granted the federal government’s exclusive responsibility for 
controlling immigration, for the first two centuries of U.S. history, states and localities were the 
only sources of immigration regulation.  City governments in the 18th and early 19th centuries 
issued travel documents and the relevant boundaries were not so much national ones as the 
borders between states and the borders among cities. State and local laws regulating movement 
were not targeted primarily at nationality but instead were focused on wealth and race, focusing 
primarily on excluding the poor and free blacks.  The most widespread form of migration 
regulation came to be the bonds that ship owners in many states and cities were required to post 
to cover the care of the lame and infirm and others seen as likely to become a public charge, 
determining also who they would let board and thus who could travel (Parker 2008: 168-69; 
Neuman 1993: 1833-34). 
While these widespread bonding requirements led to debate over the extent to which 
states could tax new arrivals, courts generally perceived cities and states as having “that power of 
self-preservation which must be inherent in every organized community. They may guard against 
the introduction of any thing which may corrupt the morals, or endanger the health or lives of 
their citizens” including “lunatics, idiots, criminals, or paupers” as well as free blacks. 





were so intertwined that any exclusive federal power over international and interstate migration 
would have proven a profound challenge to the institution of slavery (Neuman 1993: 1889; 
Parker 2008). 
States and cities creating migration policies in the mid-19th century were not trying to 
exclude most immigrants, however.  They were trying to attract them.  Beginning in 1845, nearly 
every state appointed immigration agents or created boards of immigration to entice immigrants 
from abroad. In the 1860s and 1870s twenty-five of the thirty-eight states took further official 
action to attract immigrants, with South Carolina going so far as to offer a five-year tax 
exemption on real estate bought by immigrants (Higham 2004:18). In 1875, 22 states and 
territories permitted non-citizens to vote.  
Only after the Civil War, as discrimination against the Chinese created pressure for 
immigration restriction at the national level did Congress begin to create federal regulations of 
immigration. Growing nationalist and imperialist sentiments combined with rising discrimination 
against those of Chinese origin in Western states led Congress to pass the Chinese Exclusion Act 
in 1882 and contributed to the Supreme Court’s justification of plenary federal immigration 
power as an aspect of national sovereignty (Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 
(1889); Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 
149 U.S 698 (1893)).   Through the 18th and most of the 19th centuries there had been no federal 
department concerned with immigration, but soon after the passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act 
the federal government created the Bureau of Immigration within the Treasury Department. 
  Despite the increasing federal involvement in the regulation of immigration, state 
governments continued to pass laws regarding immigrants.  Economic upheaval, widening 





which states passed laws prohibiting non-citizens from employment in state and local public 
works projects, barring private corporations from hiring aliens who had not declared their 
intention to become citizens, and instituting taxes on the wages of all alien workers (Higham 
2004: 72). 
In the first two decades of the 20th century, increasing migration from Southern and 
Eastern Europe changed the composition of the immigrant population and coincided with a shift 
of immigrant settlement to new destinations, primarily cities (Higham 2004: 159).  Several state 
legislatures responded by prohibiting non-citizens from working in increasing numbers of 
occupations, ranging from attorneys to barbers, accountants to private detectives (Higham 2004: 
161-162).  Pennsylvania barred aliens from possessing shotguns, rifles, or dogs of any kind, 
while Wyoming forbid aliens to possess any “dangerous or deadly weapon” (Higham 2004: 162, 
268).  Xenophobic sentiments in this period took an increasingly racial tone, with Western states 
passing laws prohibiting alien ownership of land and calling for the exclusion of Japanese 
immigrants, while Southern and Eastern states protested the immigration of Southern and 
Eastern Europeans and cried out, in the words of Senator Simmons of North Carolina, for the 
preservation of Anglo-Saxon civilization against “the degenerate progeny of the Asiatic hoards 
which, long centuries ago, overran the shores of the Mediterranean” (Higham 2004: 165).  
Congressman Martin Dies of Texas similarly stated: “I would quarantine this Nation against 
people of any government in Europe incapable of self-government for any reason, as I would 
against the bubonic plague. . . . I will admit the old immigration of the English, Irish, Germans, 
Scandinavians, and Swedes, the light-haired, blue-eyed Anglo-Saxons, or Celts” (Hing 2004: 





This rising nativism culminated in the Quota Act of 1921 and ultimately the Johnson 
Reed Immigration Act of 1924, which instituted national origins quotas in an effort to return the 
U.S. to the racial and ethnic composition that existed in 1890.  These acts represented a 
tremendous shift in U.S. immigration policy, transforming the primary bases for exclusion from 
individual qualities (such as poverty, disability, or criminal history) to group qualities 
(specifically regional or national origin). Even more significantly, the 1924 Immigration Act 
transformed U.S. immigration from a regime in which an individual was presumed admissible 
unless proven otherwise, to one in which an individual was presumed inadmissible unless one fit 
within a particular quota.  As Mae Ngai has described, the 1924 Act created “the illegal alien as a 
new legal and political subject, whose inclusion within the nation was simultaneously a social 
reality and a legal impossibility—a subject barred from citizenship” (Ngai 2004: 4-5). 
The principle of immigration restriction also led to a widespread understanding of 
boundaries of immigrant inclusion and exclusion as central to the creation of a desirable 
population, a “nation by design,” that continues today (Zolberg 2006; Hing 2004).  Conflicts 
over what constituted a desirable population frequently overlapped with contestation over who 
was “white” and thus eligible for naturalization (Burnett 2005; Haney-Lopez 1995; Ozawa v. 
United States, 260 U.S. 178 (1922); United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204 (1923); In re Ah Yup, 1 
F. Cas. 223 (C.C.D. Cal. 1878)).  The 1924 Johnson-Reed Act resolved some of these conflicts 
by excluding Chinese, Japanese, Indians, and all other Asians from immigration on the grounds 
that they were racially ineligible for naturalized citizenship (Ngai 2005).  At the same time, new 
visa requirements transformed the experience of both Mexicans and Americans on the Southern 
U.S. border and contributed to the creation of “Mexican” as a new racial category in the 1930 





Gutierrez 1995).  Immigration and citizenship policies, then, have long been significant for the 
formation of group identities and the delineation of boundaries as much on the local level as the 
national scale (Bosniak 2000). 
The national origins quotas, together with the Great Depression reduced immigration to 
its lowest level in decades, where it remained until after World War II.  From 1860 to 1920, the 
foreign born percentage of the national population fluctuated between 13 and 15 percent of the 
total, but it began a steady decrease after the 1924 Act, falling to 11.6 percent in 1930 and 
continuing to a record low of 4.7 percent in 1970 (Gibson and Jung 2006).  Perhaps the most 
significant legacy of the national origins quotas is the creation of the illegal alien as “an 
‘impossible subject,’ a person who cannot be and a problem that cannot be solved,” “a caste that 
lives and works outside of citizenship” and thus poses fundamental challenges for a liberal 
democratic society (Ngai 2004: 4-5). 
2.2(a)(2) The New Destinations 
After the Second World War, the activism of the Civil Rights Movement revealed the 
white supremacist legacy underlying the 1924 national origins quotas and led to pressure for 
their repeal.  When President Lyndon Johnson signed the Hart-Celler Immigration Act in 1965, 
he nevertheless emphasized that it was “not a revolutionary bill” as it shifted to an immigration 
policy based primarily on family reunification and employment needs.  Though the quota system 
had reserved the majority of entry visas for England, Ireland, and Germany, Congress expected 
little change in the overall flow of migrants as a result of the Hart-Celler Act since the majority 
of the foreign-born already in the U.S. were of Western European origins.  Despite Congress’s 
expectations, however, the U.S. experienced a dramatic increase in migration from Latin 





million new immigrants have settled in the U.S. and 13 percent of the U.S. population (40 
million people) is foreign born, an increase from the record low of 4.7 percent (9.6 million) in 
the 1970 census. Eighty percent of immigrant arrivals since 1965 have come from Latin 
America, the Caribbean, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. 
Exploring this transformation in immigrant arrivals, Saskia Sassen (1988) challenged 
accepted migration theory, complicating traditional explanations emphasizing poverty in sending 
countries by adding a new focus on the role of foreign direct investment and foreign policy in 
linking immigrant sending and receiving nations.  Building on Immanuel Wallerstein’s (1979) 
world systems theory, Sassen points out that global capital depends on its ability to operate on a 
scale beyond the control of any one political entity.  National borders are not impermeable 
barriers but “mechanisms reproducing the [world economic] system” and enabling the 
simultaneous existence of both labor shortage and unemployment worldwide through the 
division and specialization of labor (Sassen 1988: 36).  Sassen suggests that the increase in direct 
foreign investment in developing countries after the Second World War and its concentration in 
export agriculture and export manufacturing led to the formation of pools of unemployed 
workers, to their conceptualization of migration as a viable option, and to new transportation 
networks that enabled their emigration.  Simultaneously, the disaggregation and dispersal of 
global production required the centralization of management and control in globally connected 
cities. According to Michael Piore’s (1979) segmented labor theory, the attendant polarization of 
global cities’ specialized service economies created markets for the low-wage foreign labor that 
had been displaced by international investment’s disruption of traditional labor markets in 
sending countries.  Together, these linked changes in the economies of “developed” and 





be regarded as one of several flows, including capital, goods, services and information” (Sassen 
1988: 3). 
Together with John Friedmann’s research on the development of world cities (Friedmann 
and Wolff 1982; Friedmann 1986), Sassen helped set the tone for the study of urban 
development and immigration as interlinked processes within a global economic system and it 
contributed to the rise of the study of world city networks and hierarchies (e.g. Sassen 1991; 
Knox and Taylor 1995; Taylor 2004).  The focus on global cities has also generated an analysis 
of the “rescaling of statehood” and the increasing salience of the urban scale of governance as 
national states carve out place-specific forms of administration and regulation and invest in city-
regions seen as globally competitive in order to attract mobile capital (Harvey 1989; Jessop 
1994; Brenner 2004). While the study of migration policy increasingly recognizes the 
significance of supranational actors (e.g. Sassen 1996; Soysal 1994), it remains focused on the 
scale of the nation-state and largely ignores the significance of sub-national actors that frequently 
determine immigrant incorporation and even work to attract or deflect immigrants (e.g. Light 
2006).   
While the federal government has been the dominant force for the past century in 
regulating U.S. immigration, states and localities have arguably always had the primary 
government role in integrating immigrants into economic, social and political life. The state and 
local role in immigrant integration is reinforced by the reality that the spatiality of immigration is 
uneven and immigrants have long been concentrated primarily in cities in California, New York, 
Texas, Florida, Illinois, and New Jersey.  Indeed, more than one in four residents of Los Angeles, 





Though the New York and Los Angeles metropolitan areas still accounted for more than 
one-third of all foreign born residents in the U.S in 2000, post-World War II economic 
restructuring, the growth of employment in suburban areas, and increased migrant mobility after 
the 1986 IRCA legalization has contributed to the emergence of new immigrant gateways 
(Singer 2009; Waters and Jimenez 2005).  More foreign born U.S. residents now reside in 
suburbs than in central cities, and the cities with the fastest growing foreign-born population are 
smaller localities in new destinations such in the Southeast and Midwest (Passel and Suro 2005: 
9; Singer 2009). 
The recent increase in local immigration lawmaking may be related to the rapid 
demographic change occurring unevenly in cities across the country. Over the past decade, the 
percentage of immigrants living in traditional gateway areas with the largest foreign-born 
populations continued to decline, as immigrants moved to new urban, suburban, and rural 
destinations. For the first time in 2010, a majority of immigrants lived in suburbs as compared to 
central cities (Wilson and Singer 2011).  The culture, economy and political structure of 
traditional gateway cities such as New York have been shaped by decades of immigration 
(Mollenkopf 1999) and immigrants in these cities have created an infrastructure of educational 
institutions, civic associations, legal aid organizations, health clinics, bilingual service providers, 
unions and employment networks to foster immigrant incorporation (Waldinger 1996; Foner 
2000; Cordero-Guzman 2005; Kasinitz, Mollenkopf, & Waters 2008).  Many more recent 
destinations in suburban and rural counties, lack this same breadth of institutional infrastructure 
and depth of historical experience (Zuniga and Hernandez-Leon 2006; Waters and Jimenez 2005; 
Carpio, Irazábal, and Pulido 2011).  Those metropolitan areas experiencing the largest increase 





Scranton, PA (140%), Cape Coral, FL (137%), Little Rock, AR (124%), Indianapolis, IN 
(117%), Birmingham, AL (115%), Jackson, MS (111%), Knoxville, TN (110%), Nashville, TN 
(102%), and Louisville, KY (101%) (Wilson and Singer 2011). 
With the increased federal focus on regulating who could enter the United States and the 
terms on which they could remain in the early 20th Century, states and cities ceased passing laws 
determining who could enter their jurisdiction (“immigration laws”), although states continued to 
pass some laws that treated citizens and non-citizens within their jurisdiction differently 
(“alienage laws”), most often laws restricting access to public assistance or particular kinds of 
licenses (see Higham 2004; Ngai 2004; Motomura 2006). In the past decade, however, localities 
and states have increasingly sought to pass legislation that blurs the boundaries between 
“alienage” and “immigration” laws by conditioning access to basic necessities on immigration 
status in an often explicit effort to drive undocumented immigrants out of their territory. 
 
2.1(b) Immigration and Planning 
Of all levels of government, it is local governments that interact most with immigrants, as 
with all residents.  Local governments are responsible for addressing issues crucial to the 
inclusion of newcomers, such as facilitating integration into the workforce, reducing the social 
and residential exclusion of groups seen as outsiders, and constructing inclusive, responsive, and 
equitable local governance structures (Sandercock 2004; Ray 2003). Municipalities also organize 
and regulate the everyday activities that are often the points of conflict or cohesion between 
immigrants and the native-born.  Basic issues such as the licensing of small businesses, the 
enforcement of housing codes, the availability of public transportation, the design of streets and 





significant impact on the shape of immigrant integration and are squarely within state and local 
governments’ traditional powers.  Housing and employment are two areas of everyday life in 
which local governments can play a particularly strong role in immigrant integration. 
2.1(b)(1) Housing 
Housing policy is particularly salient in shaping immigrant incorporation since the 
location, quality, and tenure of housing significantly impact educational and economic 
opportunities as well as health and well-being (Galster 2012; Briggs 2005; Goering 2007; Carr 
and Kutty 2008; see Alterman 2002 and Dell’Olio 2004 for a focus on the immigration context).  
Discrimination against particular groups of immigrants in housing markets continues, and 
attempts to limit access to housing have been at the core of a number of local government efforts 
to discourage immigrant settlement. (See U.S. v. Cicero, IL; U.S. v. Waukegan, IL; U.S. v. Bound 
Brook, NJ; Lozano v. Hazleton; Martinez v. Fremont; Vasquez v. Farmers Branch).  Immigrants 
often face multiple barriers to accessing housing, ranging from persistent discrimination by 
landlords to unequal enforcement of housing codes to legal exclusion from particular housing 
markets (Dell’Olio 2004).  Immigrants’ ability to access housing has significant effects on their 
integration into their new city, particularly through its impact on their ability to access jobs, 
accumulate wealth, and make the most of educational and other social resources (Ray 2003). 
2.1(b)(2) Employment 
The manufacturing jobs that previously helped propel lower-skilled workers, many of 
whom have been and continue to be immigrants, up the social ladder are no longer as common, 
stable, or remunerative as they once were. Some local governments have responded by seeking 
to support the integration of lower-skilled immigrants into the workforce.  For instance, local 





migrants and the native-born through initiatives that help small entrepreneurs access finances, 
navigate legal requirements, and find affordable commercial space (Waldinger 1996; Waldinger 
2005).   
Many immigrant groups in the U.S. have responded to discrimination in local housing 
and labor markets by forming residential and economic ethnic enclaves in which “ethnic ties 
suffuse an otherwise ‘bare’ class relationship with a sense of collective purpose” and ties of 
ethnic solidarity lead employers to provide training, skills and upward mobility in exchange for 
initially lower wages (Wilson and Portes 1980; Light and Bonacich 1988; Portes and Bach 1985: 
343; Logan, Alba, and Zhang 2002).  For entrepreneurs, ethnic enclaves can simultaneously 
create a market for ethnic goods, a readily available pool of committed labor, and access to co-
ethnic sources of capital (Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993).  Group members with low levels of 
human or financial capital can, in theory, find employment more easily in enclaves despite low 
levels of English proficiency or formal education, and those with higher levels of education may 
be able to find jobs that are more commensurate with their skills or more easily access capital to 
start their own business than in mainstream labor and capital markets.  Through this mutual aid, 
ethnic enclaves have long provided key stepping stones for many immigrants towards 
equalization of economic opportunity, but these economic niches also have the potential to 
become spatial and occupational traps in situations where the hoarded opportunities are declining 
or overcrowded, when segregation within the niche separates members inside it from better 
opportunities outside, or when the gains of production within the niche are all delivered to 
entrepreneurs (Tilly 2005: 165).   
Indeed, scholars have critiqued the enclave thesis on various grounds, including pointing 





capital and co-ethnic labor, enclaves may not benefit workers who end up exploited by co-ethnic 
employers and trapped in low-paying jobs (Sanders and Nee 1992; Logan, Alba, and Stults 
2003).  Still, existing research provides some support for the notion that residence in an enclave 
can improve labor market outcomes, even for unskilled immigrants (Edin, Fredriksson, and 
Åslund 2003; Portes and Shafer 2007). 
2.1(b)(3) Placemaking 
There is a rapidly growing literature within planning on Latino urbanism and place-
making (Valle and Torres 2000; Arreola 2004; Irazábal and Farhat 2008; Diaz and Torres 2012; 
Rios and Vazquez 2012).  Although attention in planning to the urban experience of Latinos is a 
relatively new development, Latino urbanism and place-making have a long history, extending to 
the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and before (Irazábal and Farhat 2008).  At that point, 
Mexican-Americans, suddenly finding themselves on the other side of the U.S. border, were 
subject to repeated legal and extra-legal efforts to disenfranchise them of their property in order 
to facilitate their incorporation into the pool of wage-laborers for white-owned agricultural 
businesses (Zamora 1993; De Leon 1993; Gutierrez 1995). 
Latino urbanism before the Civil Rights Movement was profoundly shaped by public and 
private policies explicitly designed to create geographically separate and socially unequal 
neighborhoods through municipal ordinances restricting Mexican-American settlement 
(Montejano 1987), private racially restrictive covenants prohibiting Mexican-American home 
purchases in certain neighborhoods (Rosales 2000), and federal underwriting guidelines that 
disfavored mortgage lending to Mexican-Americans (Light 2010).  In the Southwest, this 
segregation frequently led to the emergence of what Arreola (2002) has called “dual towns,” in 





Partially out of this context of spatial and social hierarchies that limited Mexican-American 
access to white municipal resources, Mexican-American residents created spatial practices such 
as social uses of semi-public spaces, including porches and front yards, or patronage of small, 
local, ethnically-focused businesses, that many continue to associate with “barrios” and Latino 
urbanism today (Arreola 2002; Irazábal and Farhat 2008).   
After the Second World War, barrio residents in the Southwest, in Northern cities, and 
elsewhere played an important role in struggles for civil rights, against racially targeted urban 
renewal, and for economic justice.  For example, the struggle to protect Latino neighborhoods 
and their residents from rezonings and urban renewal in Chicano Park in Barrio Logan in San 
Diego (Cockcroft and Barnet-Sanchez 1993) mobilized residents, created a vibrant community 
park that is still a neighborhood resource, and forced the city and state to recognize the rights of 
Latino residents.  Similar struggles took place in cities across the country, increasingly organized 
by the Chicano movement and by groups such as the Brown Berets and the Young Lords Party 
(Vigil 1999; Pulido 2006; Enck-Wanzer and Morales 2010; Montejano 2010; Diaz and Torres 
2012).  These urban struggles built on prior legal efforts to secure Latino equality under the law 
(e.g. Mendez v. Westminster School District of Orange County, 161 F. 2d 774 (9th Cir. 1947); 
Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954)). 
The rapid post-war suburbanization, especially in the Southwest, solidified a suburban 
political identity that conflated homeownership, whiteness, and social status (Self 2003; Avila 
2004; Irazábal and Farhat 2008).  Increasing suburbanization of poverty together with the 
increasing diversity of suburbs has led to intense conflicts over demographic change, what 
Carpio, Irazábal, and Pulido (2011) (building on Lefebvre) have described as the struggle for the 





Whether in suburbs or cities, the experiences of Latinos have been shaped by continued 
political struggles over immigration and the continued criminalization of immigrants.  The 
employer sanctions created in the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, it has been 
argued, “increased discrimination against Hispanics in U.S. labor markets, lowering their wages, 
depressing the returns to human capital, and closing off long-established pathways of upward 
mobility” (Massey 2009).  A decade later, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996 rhetorically shifted the representation of immigrants from laborers to 
criminals and drastically increased penalties for unauthorized presence in the United States while 
simultaneously seeking to prohibit local policies supportive of undocumented immigrants and 
empowering local governments to enter into agreements with the then Immigration and 
Naturalization Service to enforce federal immigration laws locally.  The Personal Responsibility 
and Work Opportunity Act of 1996 withdrew federal benefits from numerous classes of 
documented immigrants and largely prohibited state and local governments from providing their 
own public benefits to undocumented immigrants, while the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996 drastically increased the immigration consequences of criminal violations by 
documented immigrants and required the mandatory detention of all non-citizens convicted of a 
wide range of offenses.  Combined with the increasing militarization of the border in the ensuing 
decade, this trio of 1996 laws has made the status of non-citizens, both documented and 
undocumented, increasingly precarious.  The limited avenues for legal entry from Latin America 
since 1965 together with the militarization of the border have decreased levels of out-migration 
and contributed to the growth of the undocumented population as a de facto guest worker class, 





rights (e.g. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board, 535 U.S. 137 
(2002)) have heightened the precarity and attendant exploitation of undocumented workers. 
Sandoval (2013, 2014) has highlighted the significance of these developments for 
immigrant integration in a rural community highly dependent on a single employer whose 
business model relies on the exploitation of undocumented labor.  Adapting a concept of 
“shadow places,” Sandoval (2014: 4) highlights the interconnected roles of the state in 
criminalizing undocumented workers while simultaneously withdrawing from the provision of a 
social safety net, employers in exploiting vulnerable workers, and undocumented immigrants 
themselves who internalize the risks inherent in this system.  In the context of this precarity and 
exploitation, immigrant participation in planning and place-making processes is particularly 
challenging (Maldonado and Licona 2014; Irazábal and Dyrness 2010; Sandoval 2014).  
Undocumented immigrants in new destinations that are small or rural may enact a “hyper-
invisibility” in an attempt to protect themselves against deportation (Maldonado and Licona 
2014).  Further, the national attention on “illegality” may exacerbate “spatial containment” of 
immigrants in an effort to seek safety (Nelson and Hiemstra 2008: 325).  Irazábal and Dyrness 
(2010: 356) have described the similar phenomenon of “spatialities of restricted citizenship” and 
suggested that the uses of public spaces for religious worship may allow for temporary, visible 
reclaiming of the public sphere.  Other recent work has highlighted the importance of local 
sociohistorical considerations (McConnell and Miraftab 2009) and regional political economy 
(Nelson and Hiemstra 2008) in understanding how smaller cities respond to relatively rapid 
immigration.  
The current context of the heightened criminalization of undocumented immigrants and 





state.  On the one hand, Irazábal and Farhat (2008: 208) note “the marked retreat of government 
today through devolution and deregulation may jeopardize the prospects of Latino integration” 
given their finding that “the socially proactive role of the federal government in previous 
periods, whether through the New Deal programs of the prewar city or the Great Society 
programs of the postwar city, was an overall boost to the fortunes of urban Latinos.”  On the 
other hand, the current tenor of federal government involvement in immigration is most visible 
in the unprecedented, and continually rising, pace of deportations over the past decade that have 
separated families and further increased the insecurity of migrant workers.  In this context, local 
governments have an increasingly important, and challenging, role to play in seeking to diminish 
migrant “hyper-invisibility” and to support immigrant integration.  Recognizing both the long 
history of Latino urbanism and the dynamic evolution of Latino identity in the U.S. as 
immigration from Latin America continues, planners must bring an understanding of urban space 
as an important, dynamic, and contested sphere for the expression and development of cultural 
identity and simultaneously as a crucial factor in the development of social and economic 
equality.  The participation of Latino leaders, both native-born and foreign-born, in multiracial, 
multiclass coalitions will be essential in efforts to shape a more just urban environment in U.S. 
cities in the 21st Century (Irazábal and Punja 2009).  
2.1(c) Contemporary local immigration policies 
The role of local governments in relation to immigration has gained increasing urgency 
with the growing migration of recent arrivals to “new gateways” in suburban and rural areas that 
have had little previous experience with large immigrant populations (Alba et. al. 1999; Alba et. 
al. 2000; Suarez-Orozco et. al. 2005; Zuniga and Hernandez-Leon 2005; Anrig and Wang 2006; 





past three decades and immigrants have increasingly landed in new locations, some 
municipalities have attempted to use local housing and land use policies to support immigrant 
incorporation while others have attempted to use this same local policy realm to “deflect” 
immigrants seen as imposing social or fiscal costs.   
The recent surge in local involvement in immigration issues has generally taken one of 
three primary forms: 1) the assumption of delegated federal immigration authority, either 
through a) entering into agreements to cooperate with the Department of Homeland Security in 
enforcing federal immigration laws through section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality 
Act (enacted as part of the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act) 
or b) determining immigrant eligibility for federal benefit programs such as Medicaid and TANF 
(enacted as part of the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act); 
2) the assertion of inherent authority to enforce federal immigration laws, or; 3) the enactment of 
local laws disproportionately affecting non-citizens, including a) exclusionary or punitive 
measures, such as those penalizing businesses that knowingly hire undocumented employees or 
rent to undocumented tenants, or b) inclusionary or integrative measures, such as laws providing 
in-state tuition for unauthorized migrants or laws issuing municipal identification cards to all 
residents (Wishnie 2002; Huntington 2008). This dissertation focuses primarily on the third type 
of local involvement, that regarding the enactment of local alienage laws, as it is the most 
common, most varied, and most debated type, and because it is the form of engagement that 
raises the most pressing questions for spatial and social exclusion or inclusion.  I divide these 











Delegated Federal Immigration Authority Delegated Federal Immigration Authority 
Opting into the “Secure Communities” program Opting out of the “Secure Communities” program 
Restricting immigrant access to benefits/services Increasing immigrant access to benefits/services 
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Local Laws and Policies Local Laws and Policies 
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Requiring rental permits based on immigration status Police non-cooperation with ICE 
English only Making translation services accessible 
Restrictions on day laborers soliciting work Providing day laborer centers 
 Municipal ID cards 
 Local non-citizen voting 
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2.2(c)(1) Exclusionary Ordinances 
In April of 2005, a formerly unknown group, the Minuteman Project, organized 
approximately 200 volunteers to come to the U.S.-Mexico border in Tombstone, Arizona to 
serve as a “citizen border patrol militia” and to draw attention to illegal immigration.  The small 
mobilization quickly became a national media spectacle that spawned the establishment of local 
Minuteman chapters across the country seeking local anti-immigrant policy changes. 
In March 2006, as action on immigration in the U.S. Senate seemed imminent, hundreds of 
thousands of immigrants, their families, and their supporters marched in Chicago, Los Angeles, 
Phoenix, Houston, and Las Vegas to call for comprehensive immigration reform and to oppose 
Representative James Sensenbrenner’s bill, passed in the House as H.R. 4437, that would have 
criminalized undocumented presence in the United States.  These mobilizations grew in strength 
and spread throughout the country from April and into May. Though the unprecedented 





The marches also arguably contributed to increased recruitment by groups such as the 
Minuteman Project, as well as a proliferation of local efforts to challenge immigrants’ growing 
political engagement. This wave of municipal laws largely began with the Illegal Immigration 
Relief Act passed by the City Council of Hazleton, Pennsylvania in July 2006.  The rapid 
increase in exclusionary laws beginning in 2006 (see Figure 1) represents the proliferation of 
local ordinances seeking immigration “enforcement through attrition,” most commonly by 
requiring that local businesses use the national E-Verify database to check the work 
authorization of potential employees. Other common local exclusionary efforts include “English-
Only” or “Official English” ordinances, restrictions on soliciting work in public places (to drive 
out migrant day laborers), restrictions on non-citizens accessing county or city benefits and 
services, and laws designed to discourage immigrants from accessing housing. A growing 
number of cities after 2008 also applied to participate in the 287(g) program, which allows state 
and local law enforcement agencies to enter into agreements with the Department of Homeland 
Security to designate certain local officers to perform limited immigration enforcement 
functions. 
While the Illegal Immigration Relief Acts are ostensibly targeted only towards 
undocumented immigrants, the justifications given for their passage suggest they are aimed at 
Latino immigrants more generally.  Proponents of the ordinances have consistently blurred the 
distinctions between undocumented migrants and newer Spanish speaking arrivals. For instance, 
ordinance supporters frequently rely on the increased spending by school districts for English as 
a Second Language (ESL) classes (which may be used by non-English speaking legal residents 
and citizens just as easily as by undocumented immigrants) as evidence of the rise in the 





Relief Acts also passed “English Only” ordinances, which make accessing city services harder 
for those for whom English is not their first language regardless of their immigration or 
citizenship status.   
2.2(c)(2) Inclusionary Ordinances 
A number of cities have implemented policies to facilitate immigrant incorporation.  A 
diverse range of 68 localities from Chicago to Tucson have implemented “sanctuary” policies 
assuring immigrants that local government employees will not inquire about immigration status 
or report unauthorized immigrants to the Department of Homeland Security unless they are 
accused of a crime, encouraging immigrants to make the most of city services and to report 
crimes (Ridgley 2008).  Cities such as New Haven have issued local identification cards to 
migrants in order to encourage access to municipal resources such as libraries, beaches, and 
parks, as well as to ease interactions with police, enable immigrants to access banks, and protect 
them from crimes that may be fostered because of a lack of documentation.  Integrating 
immigrants directly into electoral politics, six U.S. municipalities permit resident non-citizens to 
vote in local elections, a practice that was common nation-wide until the 1920s.   
Several municipalities have also created laws or directed financial support towards day 
laborers’ centers.  Others have passed laws making wage theft a local crime and encouraging 
local police to investigate reports of non-payment of wages, a practice most commonly 
perpetuated against workers in the immigrant day labor industry.  Several cities have worked to 
increase immigrant access to health care, by maximizing enrollment of those already eligible for 
health insurance and also by expanding eligibility for local public programs.  Other laws and 
policies may be more broadly beneficial but intended to benefit recent immigrants.  Among these 





country also offer technical assistance and financial support to immigrant community based 
organizations which advocate for immigrant interests in municipal level political discussions 
(Cordero-Guzman 2005). 
Other cities, city agencies, and community organizations have taken less official, but no 
less important steps to support immigrant residents and foster immigrant participation in social 
life.  For instance, in Midwest towns shaken by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) 
raids, a number of local school systems created plans to support students if parents were caught 
in future crackdowns.  In other cities, civic associations and church groups have worked together 
to create English teaching programs, multicultural fairs, and other events designed to foster 
interaction between native-born residents and recently arrived neighbors.  
The steady rise in the number of inclusionary laws from late 2001 to early 2006 (see 
Figure 1, representing the cumulative number of ordinances passed nationwide) reflects the 
growing number of cities that have passed inclusionary policies, most commonly ordinances 
instructing city employees not to ask about immigration status. When considered individually, 
many of these policies may seem insignificant.  Together they confer meaningful social, 
economic, and political rights for immigrant residents, facilitate equal incorporation, and 






Figure 2.2: Local immigration laws enacted between 2000 and 2013 
 
 
2.1(d) Literature on Local immigration Ordinances 
There has thus far been limited analysis of the factors associated with the passage of both 
local inclusionary and exclusionary laws.  Nevertheless, several quantitative studies have 
considered the correlates of the introduction of a local anti-immigrant ordinance.  
Analyzing municipalities that considered an anti-immigration ordinance between 2000 
and 2006, Hopkins (2010) finds that individuals who live near larger proportions of immigrants 
do not exhibit more negative attitudes towards immigrants, but that cities with faster-growing 
immigrant population are more likely than others to consider these ordinances. He describes his 
results in terms of a “politicized places” hypothesis, arguing that it is “when faced with a sudden, 
destabilizing change in local demographics, and when salient national rhetoric politicizes that 
demographic change, people’s views turn anti-immigrant” (Hopkins 2010: 56). Hopkins points 





























































































































































56) and his study makes clear that a better understanding of the framing of local demographic 
changes and the construction of grievances is essential to understanding the passage of these 
laws.   
While Hopkins relates local demographic changes to political discourse at the national 
level, Ramakrishnan and Wong (2010) focus in more detail on partisanship at the local level. 
Analyzing the introduction of both pro and anti-immigrant municipal laws, they find that 
political factors are more important than demographic ones in accounting for ordinance passage, 
and they argue that the ideological and partisan leanings of governing institutions and the 
electorate are the crucial factor in ordinance passage. By highlighting the significance of local 
partisanship and politicization, their work makes clear that a broader analysis of local political 
contexts is necessary in order to explain the rapid rise of these local laws and the differences 
between those municipalities adopting pro and anti-immigration ordinances.  
Walker and Leitner (2011) extend the local focus advanced by Ramakrishnan and Wong 
(2010) but suggest that it is the history of social relations in particular localities that are most 
central to the framing of local interactions. Analyzing municipalities that proposed either a pro- 
or anti-immigrant ordinance prior to February 2009, they find that community characteristics 
such as type of municipality influence the passage of both pro and anti-immigration policies. 
Walker and Leitner’s work indicates that we need a richer understanding of local social relations, 
for instance the role of local associations or social structure. 
Writing from a more theoretical perspective, Monica Varsanyi (2011: 295) has attributed 
the passage of local exclusionary laws to working class resistance to neoliberalism, “as locally 
scaled acts of contestation to neoliberalizing policies that are formulates at the national and 





immigration.”  Others have suggested that they arise from middle class resistance to what 
Caroline Brettell and Faith Nibbs (2010: 1) have described these laws as arising out of the 
perception that “immigrants are . . . a threat to middle class status and American identity.”  
Taking note of the frequent focus among supporters of exclusionary ordinances that they are 
merely defending law and order against illegality, Brettell and Nibbs (2010: 1) suggest that the 
rule of law “becomes a weapon in the fight for middle class status and the status quo” that can be 
invoked as “a platform for legislating a certain quality of life, and de-Americanizing those who 
do not fit their conceptualization of what it means to be an American.” 
The existing literature illuminates relevant factors in the passage of exclusionary 
ordinances such as the local social and political structure as well as the significance of local 
partisanship and local framing processes.  It also reveals some conflict over the class origins of 
hostility towards immigrants in general and undocumented immigrants in particular. Existing 
studies have not examined, however, the ordinances that actually passed, using instead available 
and arguably incomplete information on lists of those ordinances that were proposed.  Only one 
study has taken a comparative perspective, looking both at inclusionary and exclusionary 
policies.  More importantly, the existing scholarship has paid limited attention to the actual social 
processes occurring on the ground.  The studies have generally been conducted at a distance, 
either through quantitative analysis or through review of online articles or city council meeting 
notes, and have not engaged in extensive field work to observe the processes as they are 
occurring or to interview participants and residents. To understand more fully the actual 
processes at work on the ground, the research presented below combines quantitative analysis 
with qualitative fieldwork and network analysis, informed by a relational approach to the 






2.2 Theoretical Approach 
 To better understand the processes that facilitated the passage of these local inclusionary 
and exclusionary laws, it is useful to take a step back to survey more theoretical literature in 
planning and sociology that can inform analysis of urban social and political events. 
2.2(a) A Relational Approach 
 Scholarship in planning theory has increasingly fallen into two normative clusters, a 
communicative theory cluster focusing primarily on the proper process for planning and a 
political economy cluster focusing primarily on the appropriate ends towards which planning 
should aim.  With the intense debate over what urban planning and policy should be, there has 
been less attention in planning theory on how we can most effectively understand and analyze 
the social and political processes that give rise to current urban policies.  While planning 
scholarship has analyzed in-depth macro-scale questions such as the effects of neoliberalism on 
urban development (e.g. Weber 2002; Brenner and Theodore 2005) and micro-scale questions 
such as deliberative practice by planners (Forester 1999) or the role of emotions in planning 
(Hoch 2006), less attention has been dedicated to the meso-level of urban politics, where 
repeated individual or institutional interactions concatenate into identifiable social processes and 
ultimately urban policies. 
 A rich literature in sociology, however, has emerged focusing on this meso-level of 
repeated social processes and highlighting the significance of relational theories of inquiry, 
taking the interactions between individuals, groups, and institutions as the starting point of 
analysis and examining events largely as outcomes of those interactions (e.g. White 1992; Gould 





presents a theory of politics and collective action that has relevance for planning, starting with a 
focus on the role of identity, boundaries, and social ties. This approach begins with the premise 
that identities are fundamentally relational and that individuals simultaneously hold multiple and 
shifting identifications.  These identifications, combined with definitions of boundaries and 
claims about inequality, Tilly argues, are the essence of political processes.  Political institutions 
incorporate and reinforce certain identities (e.g. citizen, homeowner), while political struggles 
often involve conflict over which identities are recognized and what rights and obligations they 
are afforded.  
For planning, a combined emphasis on the role of identities and boundaries brings to the 
fore important questions about the relationship between social and spatial borders in the study of 
urban social organization and political mobilization.  A methodological concern with 
transactional or relational accounts also contributes to the current analysis of urban political 
economy a richer understanding of the dynamics of collective action and in particular of the 
repeated social processes through which categorical inequalities are created and reinforced.  One 
drawback of many pluralist accounts of urban politics is the assumption of static, self-evident 
interests or motivations (Young 2001).  A relational approach highlights attention to the 
importance of interactions with others in shaping our decisions and actions (along with our 
intentions), and how those interactions occur through social networks shaped by social and 
political boundaries. 
This relational analysis draws heavily on the sociological concepts of social mechanisms 
and processes. Robert Merton (1968: 43) described social mechanisms as a series of events or 
interactions “having designated consequences for designated parts of the social structure” and 





conditions under which particular mechanisms come into being.  Adding further detail, Arthur 
Stinchcombe (1991: 367) explained mechanisms in a theory as “bits of theory about entities at a 
different level (e.g., individuals) than the main entities being theorized about (e.g., groups), 
which serve to make the higher-level theory more supple, more accurate, or more general.”  
Mechanisms can be understood as interactions that produce similar rearrangements of social 
elements (individuals, networks, organizations) across a wide range of circumstances (Tilly 
2005).  Like the cogs that make up a gear, these mechanisms can be grouped into processes, 
which are “frequently occurring combinations of or sequences of mechanisms” (Tilly 2005: 28). 
2.1(a)(1) Categorical Inequality 
The relational approach to understanding social processes is particularly relevant for 
understanding social stratification.  As Tilly points out, categorical differences in outcomes 
among human beings are much larger and more enduring than individual differences in 
attributes, preferences, or performances, suggesting that more individualistic analyses of 
inequality are missing an important part of the story. 
Categorical inequality, Tilly suggests, arises out of a process of recurring “asymmetrical 
relations across a socially recognized…dividing line between interpersonal networks” that results 
in an unequal distribution a particular resource (Tilly 1998: 8).  The maintenance of categorical 
inequalities is not necessarily the express goal of any particular individual, but occurs “because 
people who control access to value-producing resources solve pressing organizational problems 
by means of categorical distinctions” and in the process establish “systems of social closure, 
exclusion, and control” that create categorically unequal access to those resources or to other 
valued outcomes (Tilly 1998: 7-8).  Tilly identifies exploitation and opportunity hoarding as two 





when individuals control resources from which they extract profits by coordinating the labor of 
others who are excluded from the value added through their effort (see also Marx 1867).  
Opportunity hoarding occurs when members of a group control a valuable resource and exclude 
others from its benefits (see also Weber 1922).  The extraction of profit through either the 
coordination of others’ labor or through their exclusion from valued resources creates pressing 
organizational problems, including “how to maintain distinctions between insiders and outsiders; 
how to ensure solidarity, loyalty, control, and succession; how to monopolize knowledge that 
favors profitable use of sequestered resources.” (Tilly 1998: 11).  Relying on categorical 
boundaries can help solve these problems, and in the process entrench inequality along 
categorical lines that renders the boundary between groups more visible and serves as a 
justification for the border between them and the inequality that separates them.  
This relational approach to the study of categorical inequalities as a crucial aspect of 
social stratification has been emulated by Douglas Massey (2007) in his book Categorically 
Unequal, which relies upon the mechanisms of exploitation and opportunity hoarding to 
understand the institutional processes that make particular categorical inequalities more or less 
enduring.  Drawing on work in social psychology, Massey (2007: 244) draws attention to what 
he calls “boundary work”: 
Boundary work involves actions and behaviors undertaken to differentiate people 
socially; they are publicly labeled as members of an in- or out-group who thus 
embody the social traits associated with that category of people. Labeling may 
occur through informal mechanisms such as gossip, ridicule, shaming, ostracism, 
praise, or harassment that serves to ‘put people in their place,’ or it may be 
effected formally through regulations and laws such as the one-drop rule and the 
anti-miscegenation laws enacted throughout the South before the civil rights era.  
Boundary work distinguishes people from one another socially by highlighting 
inter-personal differences across categorical lines. 
This boundary work provides convenient shortcuts for categorizing individuals and 





through formal public policies and informal private actions.  Massey (2007) suggests that 
diminished inequality along one categorical boundary is often associated with increased 
inequality along others.  For instance, the decline in class inequality from the 1930s to the 
1970s was associated with increased inequality along lines of race and gender, while 
declines in gender inequality from the 1970s to the present have been associated with 
increased inequality along class lines.   
Categorical inequality is visible at the macro-scale in individual wage and income 
reports through survey and census data, but generally the more fine-grained the data is 
with regard to the organizational context the more visible inequality may be (Voss 2010).  
Studies drawing from a relational perspective of categorical inequality to examine in 
more detail disparities in specific work places have found further support for the theory.  
For instance, separate studies examining wage disparities between managers and 
production workers in multiple work-places in the United States, Australia, and Japan 
have found that, when categorical distinctions such as gender, race, or first language, 
coincide with hierarchical role differences in the work place, wage disparities are greater 
(Tomaskovic-Devey, Avent-Holt, Zimmer, and Harding 2009; Avent-Holt and 
Tomaskovic-Devey 2010).  Few studies, however, have applied the theories of 
categorical inequalities outside of the workplace to resources such as geographical access 
or local belonging or membership, as is relevant in the research below.     
2.1(a)(2) Collective Action 
The analytical tools of relational sociology are also relevant to the study of collective 
action, both by dominant and marginalized groups. Mancur Olson (1965) famously argued that 





generate collective action towards a common goal given the costs of participation and the 
potential for free riding.  So what can explain successful mobilization for collective action?  How 
do members of a group identify common interests, come to identify themselves as a group or 
class and make the leap to collective action in their interest?   
An oft-studied urban social movement, the Paris Commune of 1871 has fostered 
numerous analyses seeking to explain its dramatic emergence, and, in so doing, the dynamics of 
collective action more broadly.  The Paris Commune holds particular interest for planners, as this 
urban revolution took place immediately following the world’s largest experiment with urban 
planning in an industrial city up to that point, Hausmann’s redevelopment of Paris between 1853 
and 1870 at the behest of Emperor Louis-Napolean Bonaparte.  Examining this redevelopment, 
David Harvey (1985; 2003) constructs a theory of Paris at the intersection of capital and 
modernity, in which structural financial crisis precipitates state intervention in land markets to 
absorb surpluses of capital and labor power and create a spatial fix for capital overaccumulation.  
Hausmann’s redevelopment restructured the city, partially along class lines, and Harvey argues 
that the connections formed among working class residents of newly segregated neighborhoods 
set the stage for the 1871 communard mobilization.  Inspired partially by the analysis of the 
Situationist International, Lefebvre (1965) and Castells (1983) emphasize not the implications of 
a spatial fix for capital but instead interpret the commune in terms of a revolution against the 
imperialist urban meaning imposed through Hausmann’s planning projects and as a 
quintessentially municipal revolution, calling for grassroots, urban democracy and a right to the 
city for inhabitants instead of real estate speculators and landlords.   
Adding rich empirical detail about the participants in the Commune, Roger Gould (1995) 





sense of shared interests to concrete collective action.  Defining mobilization broadly as the 
process through which members of a group identify common interests, come to identify 
themselves as a group, and take some collective action to advance those perceived interests, 
Gould is effectively studying the mobilization process of the Commune.  Gould argues that 
Hausmann’s redevelopment rearranged networks of social relations among the working class and 
drew clear boundaries around neighborhoods, and that these changes combined with the 
emergence of a neighborhood based club movement to create an organizational structure that led 
to the creation of meaningful neighborhood based collective identities.  Measuring mobilization 
during the commune, Gould (1995) finds that in the Commune, unlike the 1848 Paris uprising, 
the class composition of neighborhoods was only weakly correlated with mobilization and that 
there was no association between the relative size of the working class population in a 
neighborhood and levels of collective action.  What was most significant was the strength of the 
organizational foundation created by the vibrancy of the local, neighborhood based meeting 
movement that preceded the Commune.  Arrest and death rates among the communards indicate 
that levels of resistance were also shaped by the social ties created by overlapping enlistments—
each district’s resistance was significantly influenced by the levels of resistance of other districts 
in whose Guard units its residents were enrolled (Gould 1995: 185-186).  
From this analysis of mobilization in the Paris Commune, Gould elaborates on the 
importance of collective identities that support participation, which he sees as shaped by 
individuals’ social ties or patterns of interaction and by movements’ ideology or framing of 
injustice.  Framing and social ties are interrelated because “the persuasiveness of movement 
ideologies to real people is constrained by the patterns of their social relations” (Gould 1995: 





identity that it invokes classifies people in a way that plausibly corresponds to their concrete 
experience of social ties to others” (Gould 1995: 18).   
In order to successfully mobilize participants, a movement must “convince potential 
participants that, given their social situation, they are both likely to benefit from and, as a result, 
are obligated to contribute to the collective effort” (Gould, 1995: 14).  Social ties or networks 
enable the recognition of both shared interests and shared obligations, since “regardless of how 
plausible a conceptual map of oppression may be to one person, he or she will see little hope for 
change in the absence of direct contact with others whose lives are similar in relevant respects 
and who may consequently respond affirmatively to mobilization efforts” (Gould 1995: 18).  
One way in which isolated collectivities, limited informal social networks and 
foreshortened identifications expand into functional social movements is through the networks of 
formal organizations that link otherwise disconnected informal social ties and expand members’ 
sense of collective identification.  Formal organizations then influence “the scale at which group 
identities are convincing to potential participants in collective action” and create a context for 
recruitment (Gould 1995: 21; McAdam 1988).  Networks of organizations and institutions create 
the potential to link previously isolated collectivities, each with its own group identity, to each 
other and create social ties that encourage the recognition of commonalities on a broader scale 
than would informal social networks alone.  Indeed, effective mobilization depends on the ability 
to move a base of people, either by creating a new organizational vehicle or, more likely, by 
transforming an existing one into an instrument of contention (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 
2001: 47; Sampson et al. 2005: 679). 
Movements do not merely reflect the grievances of their members, they actively interpret and 





1986; Gamson 1992; Klandermans 1997; McVeigh, Myers, and Sikkink, 2004).  To be effective, 
framing must convince potential supporters that change is necessary (diagnostic framing), that 
change can be effective (prognostic framing), and that participation is required (motivational 
framing) (Snow et al. 1986; Gamson 1992; Klandermans 1997).  To effectively mobilize 
supporters, frames must be credible and must resonate with potential adherents (Snow and 
Benford 2000).  In Gould’s (1995:16) terms, framing “provide[s] a conceptual, ‘reduced-form’ 
account of the world that (1) identifies key types of social relations that are crucial for 
understanding a set of grievances, and (2) assigns individuals to collectivities based on the 
similarity of their position in the system of social relations.” 
Formal and informal public meeting places can create “centers of sociability” that are 
crucial for mobilization, both because they create contexts in which social ties are formed and 
because they constitute environments in which issues can be framed as threats or opportunities.  
In Paris, working class wineshops were important sites of public discourse and mobilization that 
contributed to the more formal meeting movement. In the Polish solidarity movement, churches 
were essential organizing locations that connected individuals and legitimized dissent.  
Mobilization can also be spurred by critical events that help rearrange priorities and identities, 
such as impending changes in political rights or property rights that “generate confluences of 
interest among people who may have preexisting, though relatively inactive, social ties to one 
another”(Gould 1995: 19). 
2.1(a)(3) Gaps in the Relational Approach 
One branch of this relational approach highlights the importance of repeated interactions 
between individuals in facilitating collective action while another focuses on the role of repeated 





emerge from repeated interactions together with the framing of events or conflicts shape the 
creation of collective identities that are crucial for participants to believe that collective action is 
necessary and likely to succeed.  In the second branch of research, recurring asymmetrical 
relations across a socially recognized boundary lead to unequal distributions of resources across 
that boundary and eventually to categorical inequality.  Little, however, has been written about 
the intersection of these two related processes. How do interactions between individuals, or 
between individuals and organizations, contribute to the creation of collective identities and to 
mobilization that can not only press shared demands on the state but simultaneously either 
entrench categorical inequalities or challenge them?  The majority of the research on collective 
action, and especially on social movements, has focused on proactive or progressive movements 
seeking to expand rights or seeking a more equal distribution of resources.  The many social 
movements that are reactive mobilizations in response to the real or perceived loss of power or 
resources have received relatively little attention in comparison to proactive mobilizations (but 
see McVeigh 1999, 2004; Van Dyke and Soule 2002; Soule 2004; Frick 2013; Steil and Vasi 
2014).  To what extent do the collective identities forged in proactive and reactive movements 
cement or destabilize existing categorical inequalities?  Are the dynamics at work in these 
movements different? 
To measure these interactions between individuals and to the formation of collective 
identities, relational analyses in sociology have increasingly turned to tools of social network 
analysis.  Despite extensive discussion of networks in the urban planning literature, however, 
very few planning studies have actually used social network analysis measures.  What can 






 Partially inspired by Manuel Castells’s (2000) theorization of the “information age,” 
scholars in planning theory have considered networks primarily at the macro-scale in terms of 
the “network society” and the “space of flows” between cities.  Out of Castells’s work and 
Walter Powell’s (1990) earlier conceptualization of network organization as a viable pattern of 
economic organization distinct from the familiar structures of both hierarchy and market, some 
planning theorists have argued that “network governance” is a deliberative democratic advance 
(Hajer and Wagenaar 2003; Booher and Innes 2002).  Castells’s (2000) representation of a 
dramatic break in the mode of production and regulation created by the “network society,” 
however, is arguably overstated and the advocacy of “network governance” frequently confuses 
a normative claim about the virtues of “networks” as a form of governance with the rigorous 
analysis of networks as social structures.  In short, there are valid critiques of both theoretical 
formulations of networks, as discussed below, but the actual empirical analysis of networks 
which is rarely conducted in planning scholarship nevertheless holds out the potential for 
relevant insights for planning practice and theory. 
2.1(b)(1) Network Society? 
Networks have been most frequently discussed in planning theory in the context of 
Manuel Castells’s theorization of the “information age” and attendant “network society.”  
Castells argues that the dramatic economic and social changes that have taken place since the 
early 1970s cannot be reduced to a Marxian economic analysis, but that they instead result 
fundamentally from the revolution in information technology.  This technological revolution, 
Castells contends, has spawned a new mode of development, informationalism, and a new social 
structure, the network society, both of which have been shaped by the concurrent, but he claims 





output and economic growth, informationalism, he suggests, is “oriented towards technological 
development, that is toward the accumulation of knowledge and towards higher levels of 
complexity in information processing” (Castells 2000: 17).   
Though Castells avoids using the term, he rephrases many of the arguments about 
“flexible accumulation” (Piore and Sabel 1984; Harvey 1987; Sassen 1988) with an emphasis on 
the knowledge economy, which he describes as an “agglomeration of core networks, and global 
networking of these cores, and of their dispersed, ancillary networks…”(Castells 2000: 415).  
The primary innovation in Castells’s analysis is a focus on “flows”: “our society is constructed 
around flows: flows of capital, flows of information, flows of technology, flows of 
organizational interaction, flows of images, sounds and symbols” (Castells 2000: 442).   
  While attention to the movement of people, capital, resources, or ideas is certainly 
important, Castells arguably overstates claims of a definitive break with prior economic or social 
structures. For instance, Castells writes that in the network society “the real social domination 
stems from the fact that cultural codes are embedded in the social structure in such a way that the 
possession of these codes opens the access to the power structure without the elite needing to 
conspire to bar access to its networks” (Castells 2000: 446).  These cultural codes, however, 
existed long before the network society and seem to have changed little with its advent.  Castells 
goes on to claim that “this networking logic induces a social determination of a higher level than 
that of the specific social interests expressed through the networks: the power of flows takes 
precedence over the flows of power” (Castells 2000: 500).  He gives the structure of flows itself 
power, almost anthropomorphizing the network.  But how separable is the power of flows truly 






the network morphology is also a source of dramatic reorganization of power 
relationships.  Switches connecting the networks (for example, financial flows 
taking control of media empires that influence political processes) are the 
privileged instruments of power.  Thus, the switchers are the power-holders. 
  
(Castells 2000, 502). Has there really been a “dramatic reorganization of power?”  Though 
finance, media, and politics may be more closely intertwined than in the past, the shift in power 
hardly constitutes a dramatic reorganization.  The same parties are largely in power in the 
industrialized world and similarly situated elites continue to dominate political and economic 
policy.  Castells’s description places the emphasis on the “switches” without clarifying exactly 
what the switches are, besides “connection points,” and fails to clarify who the “switchers” might 
be.  Power has long been exercised through networks of privilege and wealth.  Those who 
connected layers of old party machines and their patronage, those who served as a link between 
industries and government, or those who acted as a tie between labor and business have long 
been key “power brokers,” perhaps what Castells would now call “switchers.”  While the 
increasing interconnection of global circuits of information and of capital may stir up established 
hierarchies, it does not create a sea-change. 
Although the increasingly rapid flows of information, capital, and people in 
contemporary society do indeed suggest the need for closer attention to the structure of networks 
and flows, they do not mean that contemporary society is characterized by a fundamentally 
different economic structure or distribution of power.  The combination of the information age 
and the network society may not be the key to understanding a profound social change so much 
as “simply another manifestation of capitalism’s remarkable capacity to change while remaining 
the same” (Teitz 2006).  Networks, like pairs or hierarchies, are just one way of representing 
relationships and are applicable in diverse contexts, from the configuration of a 





composition of roles in an apiary to the structure of exchanges in a financial system.  Presenting 
networks as synecdoche for society as a whole arguably obscures as much as it reveals.  
2.1(b)(2) Network governance? 
 Some planning theorists have used networks only slightly more narrowly, essentially as a 
synecdoche for governance.  These scholars have presented “network governance” as a “more 
hybrid democracy. . .that expands practical democratic deliberations rather than restricts them, 
encourages diverse citizens’ voices rather than stifles them, directs resources to basic needs 
rather than to narrow private gain” (Albrechts and Mandelbaum 2005: 3).  In this view, public 
decision making increasingly involves coordination and collaboration among multiple, 
independent actors, not only elected officials or government entities, but also non-profit 
organizations, organized interest groups, private industry, and other stakeholders (Ansell 2000; 
Booher and Innes 2004).  This collaborative decision making among independent actors holds 
out the promise of a more deliberative democratic process, where interactions are not vertical, 
hierarchical, and coercive, but instead horizontal, egalitarian, and discursive (e.g. Kickert, Klijn, 
and Koppenjan 1997; Kettl 2005).   
 Much of the scholarship on network governance engages in a shift from conceptualizing 
networks as an empirical, analytical tool to representing a network form of governance as a 
normative goal justified by its purported association with more participatory processes, openness 
to a broader group of actors, and increased flexibility (e.g. Ansell and Gash 2008; Provan and 
Kenis 2007; Van Wezemael 2008).  The shift to normative claims about the benefits of networks 
in governance raises a number of questions. First, it is not clear how different network 
governance is from traditional processes of public decision making, which, as pluralist (Dahl 





pointed out has long been influenced by non-state actors.  Second, the extent to which increased 
participation by citizens and other non-state actors actually meaningfully shapes decision-making 
as compared to cloaking continued dominance by political and economic elites is subject at the 
very least to significant variation (Davies 2002).  Relatedly, actors within governance networks 
bring varying levels of power and independence to collaboration, creating the likelihood of 
continued hierarchy even within more participatory processes (Jones and Evans 2006).  Third, 
while the participation of non-state actors raises the potential for broader participation in 
decision making and more participatory democracy, it also presents the reality of a loss of 
democratic accountability as unelected and unrepresentative groups are officially included in 
policy making processes (Sorenson and Torfing 2007).  As Erik Swyngedouw (2005: 1991) has 
put it, “[w]hile enabling new forms of participation and articulating the state–civil society 
relationships in potentially democratising ways,” to the extent that “new governance 
arrangements rearticulate the state-civil society relationship, they also redefine and reposition the 
meaning of (political) citizenship and, consequently, the nature of democracy itself.” While the 
focus on networks may be important in better understanding the relative shift towards greater 
formal and informal participation by non-state actors in public decision making, it seems 
premature to present “network governance” as an unalloyed benefit or advance it as a normative 
goal.  
2.1(b)(3) Network Analysis 
 Although it may be overstatement to declare the uniqueness of a new network society or 
the incontrovertible benefits of network governance, the usefulness of network analysis as one 
tool in understanding social structure and social process should not be thrown out with the 





 At its most fundamental, network analysis is a set of tools to measure the structure of 
interactions or “ties” between “nodes” or actors in the network.  Where more traditional 
quantitative analyses in the social sciences generally arrange data in rows of observations (often 
individuals) and columns of variables (often attributes of individuals), network data in its 
simplest form consists of an array of the same observations (often individuals) in both the rows 
and the columns, with the data in each cell describing an aspect of the relation between one 
observation (or individual) and another.  In this way, where more traditional analysis focuses on 
each individual independent of another and the similarities or differences in various attributes of 
those individuals, network analysis focuses on the connections between individuals or nodes.  
Those connections can be analyzed either from the perspective of a given node or individual 
actor (e.g. how a given actor is embedded in relationships with others, what position an actor has 
in the network) or from the perspective of the structure of the network overall (e.g. how dense 
the connections are across the network, how evenly distributed those ties are). 
 One salient application of network analysis has been the analysis of social structure in 
terms of the embeddedness of actors and their actions in a social and economic context.  
Granovetter (1985) has framed this attention to embeddedness as a way of avoiding both an 
undersocialized and oversocialized conception of human action.  The undersocialized conception 
implies an atomized, utilitarian economistic perspective of individuals as motivated solely by a 
rational pursuit of their own self-interest, essentially independent of broader social norms or 
obligations.  The oversocialized conception suggests that the influence of social structure is so 
influential that once the requisite social location and class position are identified an individual’s 
responses can be accurately predicted because each person is so strongly socialized into a set of 





a focus on agency and on structure by placing purposive individual action in the context of 
concrete, ongoing social relations.  Actors exhibit agency, but are constrained in the choices 
available to them by their social network and the norms held by those in their network, while at 
the same time the structure of the network and the nature of its constraints is shaped over time by 
the actions of its members, the connections they form, and the decisions they make.  Georg 
Simmel (1903) in some sense identified this centrality of interaction and exchange in social life 
that is at the core of social network analysis. Considering social embeddedness, Simmel (1903) 
noted that one of the defining characteristics of modern urban life is the potential to 
simultaneously belong to multiple distinct networks, to hold multiple loyalties and benefit from 
multiple, mutual obligations.   
There is some danger at this point that use of the network metaphor in empirical analysis 
can contribute to further confusion about the distinction between network measures and 
normative claims about network governance.  For instance, “[o]veremphasis on the role of 
interpersonal relations and trust in institution building,” can “obscure[] the role of structures and 
institutions” and lead to an idealization of the network as organizational form (Moulaert and 
Cabaret 2006).  Though this risk exists, I would argue that network tools used rigorously in 
conjunction with other techniques of critical analysis can contribute much more to our 
understanding of the way power is formally and informally exercised in and through institutions 
and social and political structures than it obscures.  From the perspective of empirical analysis, 
the “network” as an organizational form cannot be idealized because “the network” does not 
have a set form—networks can be more or less dense or diffuse, centralized or fragmented, 





fundamentally on the social context and the theories of political economy that inform the 
analysis of that context.  
In the urban planning literature there is a dearth of studies actually applying empirical 
network analysis measures.  For example, one of the leading volumes considering the role of 
networks in planning, “The Network Society: A New Context for Planning?” edited by Louis 
Albrechts and Seymour Mandelbaum (2005) does not include a single quantitative measure of 
network structure in its 347 pages.  Given the potential for quantitative network analysis to add 
to our understanding of the power relations at work in the adoption of municipal policies, the 
processes through which urban collective action occurs, and the dynamics of interest and identity 








Chapter 3: Methodology 
3.1 Research Strategy 
This research investigates the conditions under which local political and civic leaders as 
well as the citizen electorate will act to exclude immigrants as compared to the conditions under 
which they will act to make them welcome.  To advance our understanding the processes that 
contribute to the passage of local policies attempting to include or exclude immigrants, the 
research presented here seeks to answer a series of related questions.  First, what are the 
characteristics of cities nationwide that enacted these laws and what quantitative factors are 
associated with ordinance passage?  To what extent are measures of job competition correlated 
with the passage of exclusionary ordinances and to what extent are measures of economic growth 
associated with the passage of inclusionary laws? Second, what are the social and political 
processes that take place on the ground leading up to the passage of these laws?  How are local 
boundaries drawn delineating who is seen as belonging and who is not?  How do processes of 
framing and mobilization in support of particular local policies contribute to the delineation of 
those boundaries?  Third, what role do local civil society organizations play in shaping boundary 
formation?  Does the structure of connections between these local organizations affect local 
framing, mobilization, and policymaking? 
Answering these questions requires a mixture of methods. Different research methods 
have different strengths and weakness and should be deployed to answer the particular questions 
for which they are best suited.  Quantitative research is useful for identifying average 
characteristics of large groups and for revealing associations between quantifiable characteristics 
or events.  Case study research is appropriate to identify the mechanisms or processes that may 





meanings that actors give to events, relationships, and actions (Small 2009).  Network analysis is 
designed specifically to understand the structure of connections between individuals or groups 
and thus can quantify characteristics of those connections overall, such as the density of ties, and 
the locations of particular nodes in the network, such as the centrality of a particular actor in 
relation to the others. 
To answer the questions presented above, three general approaches were employed. First, 
statistical methods were used to estimate characteristics of cities that enacted these laws and 
identify the correlates of the passage of these ordinances nationwide.  I build on previous 
research and use nationally publicly available data to test four hypotheses about the passage of 
local immigration laws—the significance of local political opportunity structure, labor market 
competition, demographic shifts framed as threats, and the concerns of homeowners about home 
values. Second, building on the quantitative analysis, four qualitative case studies were 
conducted in pairs of similar cities that responded differently to rapid demographic change in 
order to better understand the social and political processes that took place on the ground leading 
up to the passage of the local immigration ordinances.  The qualitative research focuses on how 
demographic shifts were framed by local civic and political leaders and how particular groups 
were mobilized and collective identities formed in support or opposition to immigration.  Third, 
network analyses of the connections among civil society organizations in the four case study 
cities were conducted to map the extent to which the structure of organizational relations could 
be quantitatively identified as a factor framing, collective identity formation, and mobilization.   
The interview protocol and analysis was approved by the Columbia University 






3.2 Logistic Regressions 
Two series of logistic regressions were conducted: one on the passage of pro-immigrant 
ordinances between 2000 and 2013 and the other on the passage of anti-immigrant ordinances 
between 2000 and 2013.  The total number of observations is all cities, towns, and census 
designated places in the United States with populations greater than 500 (approximately 16,370) 
and the dependent variable is passage of a pro-immigrant ordinance (N=127) or anti-immigrant 
ordinance (N=108).  Independent variables included 1) basic controls (population size and 
educational attainment); 2) measures of the political opportunity structure (levels of local 
agricultural employment, the percentage voting for the Republican candidate in 2004, Latino 
local elected officials, the size of the naturalized foreign-born population able to vote); 3) 
economic characteristics related to the impact of economic restructuring (change in the white 
unemployment rate, change in the median household income); 4) measures of demographic 
change (change in the percentage of the population that is foreign born or Latino); and 5) 
measures of local housing and tenure characteristics (the owner occupancy rate, change in the 
median home value). 
3.2(a) Dependent variables 
To create the database of dependent variables, I collected data about the passage of local 
immigration policies between 2000 and 2013, a period of largely unprecedented municipal 
lawmaking with regard to immigration.  I initiated the search for inclusionary policies with a 
database compiled by the National Immigration Law Center in 2008 of local laws limiting 
immigration enforcement.  I confirmed the accuracy of that data and added additional policies 
found through an extensive search of municipal codes available online and also of local, 





prohibiting local officials from inquiring about immigration status except with regard to those 
convicted of a crime, providing for local non-citizen voting, creating municipal identification 
cards, opting out of the Secure Communities program (before the Department of Homeland 
Security made participation mandatory), instituting boycotts of Arizona in protest of SB 1070, 
and other substantive laws in support of immigrants’ rights.  To identify municipal laws 
implementing these policies, or otherwise supporting immigrants, I searched for articles since 
2000 referencing “ordinance” and simultaneously “alien/s,” “immigrant/s,” “immigration,” 
“immigration status,” “municipal ID/identification,” “non-citizen voting,” and “Secure 
Communities.” In addition to searches of Lexis Nexis, I also used Google’s “Advanced Search” 
function to search domains that house municipal codes (e.g. www.municode.com, 
www.generalcode.com, www.codepublishing.com, www.amlegal.com). 
I began the search for exclusionary policies with information compiled by the Fair 
Immigration Reform Movement (FIRM), the Mexican-American Legal Defense and Education 
Fund (MALDEF), and the Puerto-Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund (now LatinoJustice 
PRLDEF).  After adding to that data information on which laws had actually been enacted as 
opposed to those that had been only proposed and subsequently tabled or rejected, I added 
additional laws through a search of municipal codes and newspapers available in Lexis-Nexis,  
searching for laws: requiring the use of E-Verify, seeking to limit undocumented immigrants’ 
access to housing, mandating the use of only English in official city business (or naming English 
the official municipal language), restricting the solicitation of work in public places, and other 
substantive local laws seeking to discourage settlement by undocumented immigrants.  To 
identify municipal laws targeting immigrants, I searched for articles since 2000 referencing 





English,” “English only,” “day laborers,”  “rental permits,” or “occupancy license.”  In all cases, 
if a city ordinance was identified in the search of municipal codes, it was cross-checked with a 
focused search of newspaper articles and city council meeting minutes (where digitally available) 
to identify the date and circumstances of its adoption.  If a city ordinance was identified in the 
search of newspaper articles, it was cross-checked with a focused search of the municipal code 
and city council meeting minutes (where digitally available) to confirm its adoption.   
The research identified 108 cities that adopted anti-immigrant policies and 127 cities that 
adopted pro-immigrant policies.  The total number of local immigration ordinances adopted (see 
Figure 1) is larger than the number of cities adopting them, since multiple cities have adopted 
more than one law.  Other studies of local immigration policymaking generally use previously 
available databases of cities that considered a municipal immigration ordinance (Hopkins 2010; 
Ramakrishnan and Wong 2010; Walker and Leitner 2011).  In contrast, this database includes 
only those localities that actually passed these laws, based on the belief that, while the 
introduction of an ordinance may represent the views of one particular councilmember, the actual 
passage of a law demonstrates a significant and meaningful level of local support for the policy. 
3.2(b) Independent variables 
  The degree to which the municipal political opportunity structures are favorable to 
inclusionary or exclusionary policies is estimated using four measures. First, political 
opportunity structures are operationalized using partisan voting data (Snow et al. 2005).  Data 
about the political orientation of the community was obtained from David Leip’s Atlas of U.S. 
Presidential Elections—levels of partisanship were measured as the percentage of votes for the 
Republican Party candidate during the 2004 elections.  Some studies have found a statistically 





respondents are more likely to want to decrease the number of legal admissions to the United 
States (Chandler and Tsai 2001; Esbenshade and Calhoun 1993).  Other studies have found that 
where elderly residents and the school-age population are different from racial groups there is a 
decrease in support for inter-cohort distribution of public resources and a reduction in public 
educational spending (Poterba 1996; Myers 2007).  Accordingly, a variable from the 2000 U.S. 
Census measuring the percentage of the population that is white non-Hispanic and over 65 years 
of age is included to measure a potential sector of the population that has in some contexts been 
found to see a rise in the young, non-white population as generational competition in the 
allocation of public sector resources.  Third, to measure the presence of elite allies for immigrant 
friendly policies, the existence of Latino elected and appointed officials in the local government 
was obtained from the National Directory of Latino Elected Officials (Santoro 1999; Martinez 
2008; Okamoto and Ebert 2010).  A score was created for the year 2000, by giving different 
weights to different local government positions. Assuming that mayors are more important allies 
than vice-mayors, and vice-mayors are more important allies than councilmembers, the highest 
value (3) was assigned for Latino mayors, followed by vice-mayors (2), and other elected 
officials (1). All values were then summed.  Finally, to measure the strength of the potential 
immigrant electorate a variable was created from Census 2000 data of the share of citizens who 
were naturalized citizens, indicating both foreign born residents who are eligible to vote and also 
potentially those who have a greater desire for political involvement (Jones-Correa 2001; 
Pantoja, Ramirez, and Segura 2001). 
 Information about change in the white unemployment rate and change in the median 
household income and change in median home value were obtained from the U.S. Census 





growth was also obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau and measures the change in the percent 
of the population that self-identified as Hispanic between 1990 and 2000.  Immigrant population 
growth was also measured using data from the U.S. Census Bureau regarding the change in the 
percent of the population that was foreign-born between 1990 and 2000.  Finally, the owner 
occupancy rate for each city was measured in 2000 using data also from the U.S. Census Bureau. 
I used control variables from the 2000 Census, including population size (as the natural 
logarithm, to stabilize skew) and education (measured as percent of people with a B.A. degree or 
more). To gauge whether local economies are dependent on local immigrant labor 
(Ramakrishnan and Wong 2010), I used a measure of the percentage of local workers employed 
in agriculture from the U.S. Census Bureau.  
3.2(c) Estimation 
The dependent variables in the two series of regressions are binary variables representing 
the adoption or not of exclusionary or inclusionary ordinances, making a logistic regression 
model appropriate.  A logistic regression model is well-suited to measuring the relationship 
between a dichotomous dependent variable and continuous independent variables, as is the case 
here.  
Because the cities enacting both inclusionary and exclusionary ordinances are larger than 
the majority of places in the dataset, it makes sense to compare the cities to other cities of similar 
sizes using a fixed effects model for several size categories (500-5,000; 5,000-10,000; 10,000-
25,000; 25,000-50,000; 50,000-100,000; and 100,000 and larger).  The use of these fixed effects 
for city size allows a richer analysis of factors in addition to population size that are associated 





State-level political factors are likely to play a role in the passage of these laws, for 
instance structural factors making it more or less difficult for localities to enact similar policies at 
all or partisan factors setting a certain political climate.  Many of these statewide factors would 
be difficult to measure directly, but the incorporation of state level fixed can effectively control 
for unobserved state level factors by essentially comparing cities in one state that enacted an 
inclusionary or exclusionary law with cities in the same state that did not. 
The independent variables in the regression are continuous variables, and the coefficients 
in the results can accordingly be interpreted as the natural logarithm of the odds of a city with the 
hypothetical value of a particular independent variable of zero enacting a local immigration law, 
holding the other independent variables constant.  
 
3.3 Case Studies 
The case studies together form the basis for a “comparable-cases strategy in comparative 
research” (Lijphart 1975: 159). In A System of Logic (1843), John Stuart Mill advances this idea 
of experimental inquiry, which he calls “the method of difference,” suggesting that “by 
comparing instances in which the phenomenon does occur with instances in other respects 
similar in which the phenomenon does not,” researchers can gain insight into those 
circumstances or processes linked to a particular outcome.  The strategy in this approach is to 
choose cases that are as similar as possible, except for the variance in terms of the dependent 
variable (in this case the passage of immigration ordinances), in an effort to isolate the remaining 
differences that are relevant to this divergence.  Each case and its pair in this dissertation are 





structures.  Analyzed in the context of these underlying shared foundations, the dissertation uses 
the common features of the cases to focus on those differences that actually make a difference.  
Case study methods are well suited to explanatory questions such as this one seeking to 
understand the reasons for complex social phenomena (Yin 2009: 4).  Qualitative research is also 
well suited to examine data that has not been captured in surveys or quantitative forms, such as 
how local institutional actors responded to conflict over immigration, how boundaries were 
drawn, and how local collective actors mobilized.  Case studies also allow for the introduction of 
a full variety of evidence including documents, observations, and interviews. 
This approach to “small-n” analysis can combine the advantages of single-case analysis 
(in that it retains rich, nuanced data about each case) while at the same time allowing for 
comparisons that can test arguments in ways that are impossible with a single case (Abbott 2004: 
22).  As Bent Flyvbjerg ( 2001: 71) has argued, “the case study produces precisely the type of 
context-dependent knowledge which makes it possible to move from the lower to the higher 
levels in the learning process.”  Case study analysis involves a careful iterative process in which 
“case study evidence is examined, theoretical propositions are revised, and the evidence is 
examined once again from a new perspective” with attention to rival explanations (Yin 2003: 
122). 
Case studies are commonly used to understand urban politics.  For instance, Manuel 
Castells (1983) studied urban social movements in four cities to understand local collective 
action in The City and the Grassroots. Similarly, in his study of collective ownership and 
community control of development, James DeFilippis (2004) compared collective control in 





organizations in structuring urban life and access to resources, Nicole Marwell (2007) compared 
four different types of organizations in two Brooklyn neighborhoods. 
Small-N case studies, of course, do have limitations.  Critics have raised valid concerns 
regarding the internal validity of the research method, questioning the ability to accurately draw 
causal connections between events given the multiple other variables that a researcher may not 
observe that could actually be responsible for any observed connection.  This criticism 
legitimately cautions against making strong causal claims from a limited number of cases but 
does not diminish the value of the method in exploring complex social phenomena and processes 
that cannot be effectively measured quantitatively.   
Small-N case studies are also subject to criticism regarding their external validity or 
generalizability. Given the small sample upon which case studies are based, it is difficult to 
claim that findings are directly representative of the experiences in another place or time.  Unlike 
samples used in quantitative analysis, which are chosen specifically for their representativeness 
of a given population, case studies are not chosen for their representativeness but to “discover 
previously unknown practices or processes” (Small 2009: 227).  Case studies are intended to 
“generalize to theory rather than to populations” (Bryman, 2001: 283).  The logic behind case 
studies is particularly appropriate to “discover how and why processes or practices take place (for 
uncovering mechanisms), especially if they are largely unknown” (Small 2009: 227). 
3.3(a) Case Selection 
The case study cities (Hazleton and Easton, PA; Fremont and Grand Island, NE) were 
chosen on the basis of a “comparable-cases strategy in comparative research” (Lijphart 1975: 
159). The selection follows Flyvbjerg’s criteria for the identification of comparable “critical 





the general problem.”  Each case here has taken a significant local action with regard to 
immigration.  Hazleton, Pennsylvania was the first city in the nation to pass an “Illegal 
Immigration Relief Act Ordinance” and Fremont, Nebraska was the most recent to pass a similar 
law explicitly designed to drive out undocumented immigrants at the time this research began.  
The two cities both represent clear examples of local laws enacted with an express intent of 
shaping immigration policies and the lives of undocumented immigrants.  Easton, Pennsylvania 
and Grand Island, Nebraska are less well known but passed local policies seeking to support or 
welcome immigrant residents. Immigrant respondents within their respective states identified 
them as having comparatively welcoming reputations and they are similar in important respects 
to their within state pair.  The cases thus also follow Mill’s difference method with the two cases 
in each pair representing divergent phenomena when many other background characteristics are 
otherwise similar.   
 Each case and its pair (Hazleton and Easton, PA; Fremont and Grand Island, NE) are 
geographically proximate and share a similar historical development and political structure, but, 
as discussed, one of the paired cities enacted an exclusionary ordinance while its complement 
passed an inclusionary policy.  In each pair of cities chosen for the case studies, the cities are 
approximately the same size, they had a similar proportion voting for Bush in 2004, they 
experienced significant growth in the recent immigrant population since 1990, and they have a 
similar proportion of the population working in agriculture.    
Each pair of case studies represents a different region that has emerged as a “new 
gateway” as well as a different economic base.  The new gateways represented consist of 
agricultural or meat-processing cities in the Midwest and post-industrial rust-belt cities in the 





affecting the likelihood of passing an inclusionary ordinance (Ramakrishnan and Wong 2010).  
Regional characteristics also exhibit some level of covariance with political and cultural 
characteristics, thus representation of two different regions ensures similarity within pairs and 
variance across them. 
The composition of local employment has also been found to have an impact on 
likelihood of passage, specifically high levels of local employment in agriculture is associated 
with a decreased likelihood of passage of exclusionary ordinances (Ramakrishnan and Wong 
2010). The paired case studies represent similar compositions of local employment within pairs 
and a variety among them, from cities with significant meat-processing sectors in Nebraska to 
light manufacturing and logistics in Pennsylvania.   
3.3(b) Case Analysis 
 The case analysis data reported here comes from fieldwork conducted over the course of 
six years, from March 2007 through November 2013.  Over that time period I made multiple 
trips to each city generally for several weeks at a time.  The objective was to conduct archival 
research to document the events preceding the passage of the relevant local immigration policy, 
to conduct interviews to record how participants in each city understood the processes leading up 
to the passage of these laws, and to conduct participant observation at local civic events and 
meetings to observe aspects of the local social and political structure in action.  
3.3(b)(1) Interviews 
The bulk of the research consisted of semi-structured interviews with key actors and 
knowledgeable informants (Weiss 1994) regarding the events leading up to the passage of the 
ordinances. The interviews were focused particularly on the structure of local policymaking, the 





collective identities were formed and how local boundaries were drawn.  These questions about 
the processes involved in the passage of immigration ordinances as well as the meaning local 
residents gave to the ordinances are the kinds of questions that qualitative research is best suited 
to answer, and ones for which observation and interviews are particularly appropriate.  The semi-
structured interviews enabled respondents to identify issues of importance to them within an 
established research frame.  The interviews were based on two similar standardized guides, one 
for the exclusionary cities and one for the inclusionary cities, to ensure both consistency and 
appropriateness to each context (see Appendix 1).  Additional questions were added to the guide 
prior to each specific interview based on expectations of the respondents’ unique knowledge 
from their particular local role.  Further questions were added during each interview as 
respondents raised issues requiring clarification or calling out for further elaboration, exploring 
the “markers” provided by respondents (Weiss 1994). 
The questions in the two interview guides began by probing respondents’ connection to 
immigration issues and asked about local changes residents had witnessed in the past decade.  
These questions also sought to identify respondents’ feelings about economic change or 
insecurity and to illuminate how respondents drew boundaries and categorized the city’s 
changing population. The interview guides then asked questions intended to elucidate aspects of 
the local social and political power structures both generally and specifically with regard to 
immigration. They also asked questions intended to elicit answers that could illuminate, the 
absence, presence, and nature of connections among local institutions.  Another series of 
questions elicited a narrative of the mobilization process related to local immigration policies.  





immigrant residents interacting and asked about residents’ hopes for or concerns regarding the 
local policies. 
Potential interviewees were not a random sample but were chosen to be a representative 
sample of knowledgeable informants including elected representatives (mayors or city 
councilors), relevant municipal employees (police chiefs, school superintendents, city managers, 
etc.), civic association and religious leaders, advocates on both sides of the issue, and leaders in 
the immigrant community.  Interviewees were identified initially through study of media articles 
and local documents listing local organizations and their leaders, and subsequently also through 
“snowball sampling.”  Interviewees were not chosen aiming for representativeness but for 
saturation and each interview was informed by prior interviews. The interviews in each city were 
conducted generally until comparatively little new information was being revealed.  
 
Table 3.1: Number of interviews by respondent’s primary role 
  
Mayors or former mayors 5 
City councilors 4 
Police chiefs 3 
City attorneys 2 
School superintendents 4 
Other city or state officials 10 
Religious leaders 6 
Civic leaders 25 
Exclusionary ordinance proponents 5 
Exclusionary ordinance opponents 11 
Immigrant residents 15 
Other residents 8 
Total 98 
 
Respondents who were public employees or civic or religious leaders were generally first 
contacted and asked to participate in person, at their place of work.  Other respondents were 





planning from Columbia University in New York and asked if I could interview them about how 
the city had been affected by immigration.  Approximately 90 percent of those contacted agreed 
to participate, and interviews averaged an hour in length, usually conducted in a respondent’s 
office or home or in a local coffee-shop or restaurant.  The majority of interviews were 
conducted in English.  Respondents with limited English fluency who spoke Spanish as a first 
language were offered their choice of language for the interview and six interviews were 
conducted in Spanish. 
The in-depth, semi-structured interviews were audio-recorded and detailed 
contemporaneous notes were taken.  These notes were checked against the audio-recordings and 
then systematically coded to identify recurring themes.  The coded transcripts were then 
compared and analyzed.  Coding categories included major topics: economics; race; social or 
political structure; organizations or institutions; identities or boundary construction; grievances, 
threats, or opportunities; reinforcement of commitment; perceived neutrality; housing and 
neighborhood change; framing; tensions, fear, or trust; interactions between native born and 
recent immigrants; and services.  Each of these main categories was also broken down into more 
precise categories.  For example, the larger category of grievances, threats, or opportunities was 
broken down into various types of threats or opportunities that respondents regularly mentioned 
in the context of local immigration and demographic change: racial threats, political threats, 
crime threats, resource competition, cultural opportunities, economic opportunities, and other 
opportunities.  The coded data revealed common themes that serve as the basis for the theoretical 
claims made in Chapter 5.   





In addition to interviews, I conducted participant observation in each of the case study 
cities. I observed city council meetings in each city, and where possible attended council 
meetings related to local immigration issues. I also attended other community meetings such as 
town-hall meetings conducted by senators or congressional representatives.  I participated in 
church services in each city, where possible in both English and Spanish.  I also attended general 
social and civic events in English and Spanish that were taking place while I was in each case 
study city, such as local sports events, activities at local fairgrounds, and meetings of local 
groups such as the Rotary Club.  Wherever possible I attended public meetings that were held 
regarding the ordinances, including meetings by ordinance opponents in Hazleton and Fremont.  
I also conducted multiple ride-alongs with the police in Grand Island to get a sense of officers’ 
experience of residents’ concerns about immigration. 
Observation of these key social sites and events presented experiential data of how local 
boundaries were experienced in daily life, for instance through varying levels of residential and 
educational integration, through different uses of public spaces, etc.  I recorded field notes during 
events or as soon as possible thereafter.  Sometimes, after having met through the interview 
process, I was invited by respondents to subsequent meals with friends or with family, to regular 
gatherings of small groups, or to meetings of associations to which they belonged.  When 
possible, I attended these events to better understand the experience of daily life in these cities. 
3.3(b)(3) Archival Research 
Archival documents have the relative benefit of being “non-reactive,” that is unaffected 
by the presence of the researcher. Generally the person creating the documents does not see them 
as part of a particular research project and the results are not skewed to fit that project. Archival 





valuable source of data of the perspectives of individuals at that moment. Indeed archival 
documents “can be interesting precisely because of the biases they reveal” (Byrman 2001: 375).  
Archival sources should not necessarily be taken at face value but researchers must question the 
identity of the document’s author, the reason for the document’s production, and the document’s 
intended audience to understand how the context may have shaped the content (Berkin and 
Anderson 2003). 
The interviews and participant observation were supplemented with archival research, 
including the analysis of historical monographs, review of city council meeting minutes, and the 
examination of contemporary and historical media coverage.  The author also obtained and 
reviewed filings from the court cases filed against Hazleton, Pennsylvania and Fremont, 
Nebraska, including the transcripts of the trial held in Hazleton’s case. The archival research 
helped identify timelines of events and recreate the comments and perspectives of participants in 
relevant city council debates that I was not able to attend. 
 
3.4 Social Network Analysis 
To conduct the social network analysis, all of the IRS Form 990s required to be filed by 
non-profits (total 293) in each city were obtained (for the year in which the policy at issue was 
enacted—2006 in Hazleton and Easton, 2010 in Fremont and Grand Island).  Officers and 
directors for each organization were manually transcribed into a spreadsheet and a table was 
made of all listed officers and directors (2,588) for each non-profit organization.  Officers and 
directors who sat on the boards of multiple organizations were recorded as a tie between those 
organizations.  Organizations with Latino directors were identified using the list of Hispanic 





network in each city was then mapped and measures of network density, closure, and constraint 
were calculated. 
Network density measures the proportion of all of the possible ties between nodes in the 
network that actually exist.  It thus provides a way to measure the level of connections between 
nodes in the network.  The density calculation can be represented by the formula D = T/(N(N-
1))/2), where T equals the number of ties that exist in the network and N equals the number of 
nodes in the network. 
Clustering measures the degree to which nodes in a network tend to group themselves 
together in subnetworks.  To measure the degree of clustering, one can identify all of the actors 
who are connected to a particular node and then calculate the density of this local network when 
that node is removed.  The clustering calculation can be represented by the formula C = Σ 
2(Tu)/(Nu (Nu-1)), where Tu is the total ties for a given node and Nu is the number of nodes to 
which Tu is connected. Then average all of the local densities across the whole network.  So 
clustering is simultaneously a measure of the fragmentation of the network and the tightness of 
connections within the network’s subgroups.   
Constraint serves as a measure of brokerage across structural holes.  Constraint can be 
calculated with the formula S = Σ ((Σq piq)/Ti), where node i is connected to node q, the measure 
of constraint is the proportion of node i’s relations that are also connected with node q divided by 
the total number of direct ties for node I (see Burt 1992).  Higher values of constraint for a given 
node indicate network closure or social cohesion around that node and lower values indicate the 
presence of structural holes or brokerage opportunities. 
Once the network data was gathered, a T-Test was conducted comparing the sums of the 





seeking to determine how different one group is from another a T-Test is an appropriate method 
of estimating a confidence level that the difference is not zero.  A T-test can be defined as the 
ratio between the observed difference between groups (systematic variance) and the estimate of 







Chapter 4: Quantitative Analysis 
Existing research on local immigration ordinances has not arrived at a consensus on the 
factors related to passage of exclusionary and inclusionary local laws.  Some studies have 
advanced political partisanship as a primary factor (Ramakrishnan and Wong 2010), while others 
have suggested that the increase in the foreign born population is more salient (Hopkins 2010; 
Espenshade 2007).  Despite widespread discussion of job competition, the significance of labor 
market factors in the passage of local immigration policies has not been rigorously tested.  
Similarly, several studies have suggested the importance of housing as an area of local conflict 
over immigration (Light 2003; Brettell and Nibbs 2010; Walker and Leitner 2011; Harwood and 
Myers 2002), but quantitative study of the role of homeownership, home values, and homevoters 
has been limited.  
 
4.1 Introduction 
 As discussed in the methodology section, the sample consists of all cities, towns, and 
census designated places in the United States with populations greater than 500 (approximately 
16,370).  The dependent variable in the first series of regressions is the passage of a pro-
immigrant ordinance (N=127) while the dependent variable in the second series of regressions is 
the passage of an anti-immigrant ordinance (N=108). 
 Prior analysis has found three control variables to be consistently significant: the size of 
the city’s population (both inclusionary and exclusionary ordinances are associated with larger 
sizes than the sample mean), the mean educational attainment of a city’s residents (higher 
educational levels are associated with inclusionary ordinances and lower educational levels with 





(higher levels of agricultural employment are associated with inclusionary ordinances and lower 
levels of agricultural employment with exclusionary ordinances) (Ramakrishnan and Wong 
2010; Hopkins 2010; Walker and Leitner 2011). 
In the analysis presented here, I seek to test four main theories explaining the passage of 
local immigration laws: political opportunity structure; labor market competition; demographic 
threat; and a homevoter theory. 
4.1(a) Political opportunity structure 
Tarrow (1998: 19-20) has defined political opportunity structure broadly as the “consistent—
but not necessarily formal or permanent—dimensions of the political struggle that encourage 
people to engage in contentious politics.” Relevant aspects of a political opportunity structure 
include the distribution of power among state actors, the propensity of the state to respond to 
protest through accommodation or repression, the availability and effectiveness of political allies 
and supporters, and other similar factors that affect the costs and benefits of collective action 
(Meyer 2004; Meyer and Minkoff 2004). The configuration of political resources and 
opportunities is a fundamental factor in the ability of collective action to actually impact policy 
outcomes (Eisinger 1973; Jenkins and Perrow 1977; Kitschelt 1986; Amenta and Zylan 1991; 
McCammon 2001; Meyer 2004). The impact of political opportunity structure on outcomes is 
not “singular and deterministic,” however but varies depending on the characteristics of the issue 
or movement in question (Andrews 2001).  Indeed, movements are characterized by a dynamic 
and strategic interaction between the organizations that comprise the movement and the changing 
political environment in which they are working.   
Drawing on this literature on political opportunity structures, I hypothesize that the passage 





favorable to pro-immigrant policies (such as the presence of Latino elected officials, a relatively 
larger percentage of naturalized foreign-born residents, or a Republican minority), and the 
passage of anti-immigrant ordinances will be associated with a municipal political context 
favorable to anti-immigrant policies (such as a Republican majority or a relatively larger 
percentage of white, senior residents).  
The variables operationalizing political opportunity structure are described in detail in the 
methodology section above.  In sum, local political partisanship is measured as the percentage of 
votes for the Republican Party candidate during the 2004 elections.  Because whiteness and 
advanced age has been found to be associated with anti-immigration attitudes, the percentage of 
the local population that is white non-Hispanic and over 65 is included as another aspect of 
political opportunity.  The presence of elite allies for inclusionary measures and opponents for 
exclusionary measures is operationalized through an index calculating the strength of 
representation by Latino elected officials. To measure the strength of the potential immigrant 
electorate, the share of citizens who are foreign-born naturalized citizens is also included. 
4.1(a) Labor market competition 
Disagreement continues over both the effect of immigration on labor market outcomes for 
workers at different skill levels (e.g. Card 2001; Borjas 2003; Ottaviano and Peri 2008; Borjas, 
Grogger, Hanson 2008; Card 2009) and the effects of labor force status on individual attitudes 
towards immigration (e.g. Scheve and Slaughter 2011; Quillian 1995).   
In general, immigration is understood to create overall gains for native-born residents, as 
immigrants stimulate investment and promote specialization (Card 2009).  The efficiency gains 





has estimated that total immigration to the United States between 1990 and 2007 was associated 
with an increase of roughly $5,100 per worker in annual income (Peri 2010).   
Although these net gains from immigration are generally accepted, several scholars argue 
that distributional impacts of these gains are unequal, benefiting the higher skilled and hurting 
the lower skilled who may be displaced by immigrant workers (e.g. Borjas 2003; Borjas, 
Freeman, and Katz 1992).  Because immigration increases the supply of labor, there is concern 
that it depresses wages and drives native-born workers with similar skill levels from the 
workforce.  The central question is the extent to which immigrant and native born workers are 
“perfect substitutes” in employment who are in competition with each other, or “imperfect 
substitutes” such that immigrants complement native-born workers instead of replacing them and 
raise the marginal product of native-born labor, benefitting all (Borjas, Grogger, Hanson 2008; 
Card 2009).   
Regardless of the actual effect of immigration on labor market outcomes, of particular 
importance here is the extent to which changes in employment for native-born workers may be a 
catalyst for exclusionary local policies.  Recent research has found that lower-skilled native-born 
workers are significantly more likely to prefer limiting immigrant inflows, but that the 
relationship between skills and immigration opinions is not stronger in high-immigration 
locations (Scheve and Slaughter 2001).  The census does not make data available at the place 
level for native-born unemployment rates, but the existing literature on anti-immigrant 
movements and local policy has found that these efforts are dominated by white residents, and I 
accordingly hypothesize that increases in unemployment rates for white workers will be 
associated with the passage of exclusionary local laws, while decreases in unemployment rates 





To operationalize labor market competition between native born residents and immigrants, I 
include measures of the change in white unemployment between 1990 and 2010 and change in 
the median household income between 1990 and 2010. 
4.1(b) Demographic threat 
Sometimes described as “strain theory,” a focus on structural social conditions “offers 
one of the oldest and most persistent perspectives on the origins of collective action, dating back 
to at least the work of Emile Durkheim and even some of the work of Karl Marx” (Snow, Soule, 
and Cress 2005: 1187; see also Kornhauser 1959; Smelser 1962; Lipset 1963). Strain theory was 
validly criticized for assuming a simplistic relationship between strain and protest and for 
narrowly viewing collective action through an atomized, individualistic lens that overlooked the 
importance of dense social networks and a strong collective identity in facilitating collective 
action (McAdam 1982; McPhail 1994). Scholars in the resource mobilization school studying 
left-leaning social movements also found that mobilization generally occurs in response to 
increases in resources for collective mobilization, not strains on them (McCarthy and Zald 1977).  
Recently, however, the role of structural social changes in facilitating mobilization has 
come under renewed focus (Myers 1997; Useem 1998; Snow, Soule, and Cress 2005). Scholars 
of reactive movements in particular have reinvigorated interest in the role that structural social 
changes play in movement emergence (Olzak 1989; McVeigh 1999; Beck 2000; McVeigh, 
Myers, and Sikkink 2004; McVeigh 2009). For instance, Van Dyke and Soule (2002) found that 
even in situations in which available resources and political opportunities were declining, 
patriot/militia organizations were still able to mobilize supporters and that mobilization 
coincided with structural social changes such as declines in manufacturing or family farms. 





Western Europe drew on anti-immigrant sentiments and resentment of cultural pluralization in 
the context of a broader ideological setting combining authoritarian and neoliberal orientations. 
Kitschelt and McGann’s (1995) findings echo economic and political competition theories 
positing that the presence of an out-group in sufficient numbers can generate the perception of 
competition for scarce resources (Blumer 1958; Blalock 1967; Blau 1977; Olzak 1992), 
catalyzing political competition (Glaser 1994), triggering prejudice (Bobo and Hutchings 1996), 
or even precipitating violence (Tolnay and Beck 1995; Useem 1980).  
In examining how social structural changes actually impact collective action and 
movement outcomes, scholars have suggested that framing is crucial (McVeigh, Myers, and 
Sikkink 2004).  Movements do not simply reflect members’ grievances, they actively interpret 
and represent social conditions in ways that inspire potential supporters to believe that a 
particular change is necessary and possible, and that their participation will make a difference in 
accomplishing it (Snow et al. 1986, Gamson 1992, Klandermans 1997). In the context of the Ku 
Klux Klan in Indiana in the 1920s, McVeigh, Myers, and Sikkink (2004) found that Klan 
recruitment was successful in counties where structural conditions, specifically the presence of 
blacks and immigrants, resonated with the white-supremacist, anti-immigrant framing the Klan 
advanced. Similarly, Olzak (1989) has described how sharp increases in immigration were 
interpreted as a threat by many sectors of the U.S. labor movement at the end of the 19th century 
and beginning of the 20th century, raising rates of labor and ethnic conflict. Koopmans (1996) 
has also highlighted the elite framing of foreigners as a social and political problem as crucial in 
the rise of racist and right-wing violence in Western Europe in the 1980s and 1990s. This 
research suggests that the processes through which structural social changes are framed may 





examined how structural conditions may impact outcomes of collective action (as opposed to 
mobilization), nor whether structural social changes equally influence proactive and reactive 
movements.   
Based on the public statements of anti-immigrant activists, I identify two potential socio-
demographic changes that anti-immigrant leaders at the national level have constructed as 
threats, and that therefore may have contributed to the passage of anti-immigrant municipal 
ordinances. First, an increase in immigrants in general, and undocumented immigrants in 
particular, is often described as a threat to local quality of life. Anti-immigrant activists claim 
that undocumented immigrants pose a threat to the American way of life by arguing that they 
allegedly raise local expenditures on health care and education, take away jobs from citizens, and 
pose a threat to the dominance of the English language e.g. (DeWeese 2007). At times, however, 
the rhetoric around immigration is often conflated with rhetoric around the threat that Latinos in 
particular pose to the Anglo-Saxon heritage of the United States.  For instance, Samuel 
Huntington (2004: 247) argued that the growing Latino population is leading toward “cultural 
bifurcation” and “could produce a consolidation of the Mexican-dominant areas into an 
autonomous, culturally and linguistically distinct, economically self-reliant bloc within the 
United States.” Other noted spokespeople for immigration restriction have suggested that 
“[g]iven the unique coincidence of Hispanic ethnicity with specific regional territoriality and 
with an ideology of multiculturalism. . . we may be building toward the one thing that will choke 
the melting pot: an ethnic area and grouping so concentrated that it will not wish, or need, to 
undergo assimilation into the mainstream of American multi-ethnic English-speaking life” 
(Fuller 1992: 22).  Former presidential candidate Patrick Buchanan similarly argued that the 





southwest—culturally and linguistically, if not politically—to Mexico” (Buchanan 2006: 6). 
Accordingly, the second socio-demographic change that anti-immigrant leaders have constructed 
as a threat is the growth of the Latino population. 
I hypothesize that the passage of exclusionary ordinances will be associated with the growth 
of the immigrant and Latino populations, while the passage of inclusionary ordinances will not 
have a significant relationship to these demographic shifts. 
To operationalize demographic threat, variables measuring the change in the foreign-born 
population and the change in the Latino population between 1990 and 2010 are included. 
4.1(c) Homeownership 
Ivan Light (2003) has argued that housing is a particular source of local conflict over 
immigration and that lowered levels of affordable housing production in cities with rising foreign 
born populations are conscious efforts to force immigrants to spend more time searching for 
housing and in the process “deflect” immigrant settlement to other municipalities.  He suggests 
that “[w]hen municipal opposition curtails responsiveness to immigrants’ housing needs, many 
immigrants cannot find housing.  Lack of housing then deflects cumulatively caused immigration 
to other destinations” (Light 2003: 404).  In particular, Light argues that “Los Angeles County’s 
decentralized legal structure protects a suburban standard of living incompatible with the housing 
needs of Latinos” (Light 2003: 410). 
Relatedly, Brettell and Nibbs (2010) interpret the passage of an exclusionary local 
ordinance in Farmer’s Branch, Texas as a response inspired by a desire to protect a particular 
vision of an American middle class way of life that is perceived as being under threat.  They note 
that this is a particularly spatialized notion, associated with suburbia.  Walker and Leitner (2011: 





resistance to low-income or rental housing in communities experiencing an influx of 
immigrants.”  This suggestion fits to some extent with William Fischel’s (2001: 4) theorization 
of what he terms the “homevoter”: “homeowners, who are the most numerous and politically 
influential group within most localities, are guided by their concern for the value of their 
homes.”  Fischel (2001: 4) goes on to argue that this concern for home values leads homeowners 
“to make political decisions that are more efficient than those that would be made at a higher 
level of government.”  Without accepting that hypothesis, the recognition that homeowners are 
motivated primarily by concern about home values and are the dominant force in local politics 
means that homeowners’ perception that the arrival of lower-skilled Latino immigrants in a 
neighborhood could depress home values could lead to policies seeking to discourage immigrant 
settlement.  Accordingly, I hypothesize that higher homeownership rates will be associated with 
the passage of an exclusionary local law while lower homeownership rates will be associated 
with the passage of an inclusionary law.  
Variables relevant to the homevoter hypothesis are operationalized through the local 
homeownership rate and the change in local median home values between 1990 and 2010. 
 
4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4.1 presents descriptive statistics for the variables included in the analysis.  In 
general, cities nationwide that passed exclusionary laws bear more similarities to cities that 
passed inclusionary laws than to cities that took no action.  Nevertheless, there are dramatic 
differences between the mean characteristics of the inclusionary and exclusionary cities.  For 
instance, the cities that passed inclusionary laws are generally larger, more highly educated, and 





officials and a larger portion of their electorate comprised of naturalized citizens.  The average 
change in the median household income across inclusionary and exclusionary cities between 
1990 and 2000 was the same.  Cities that subsequently adopted exclusionary laws had greater 
increases in their foreign-born and Latino populations than inclusionary cities between 1990 and 
2000.  Exclusionary cities also experienced a decrease on average in white unemployment 
between 1990 and 2000, while cities that later enacted an inclusionary policy had experienced a 
small increase.  Inclusionary cities had much lower homeownership rates than exclusionary cities 
and experienced larger increases in home values.   
Table 4.1: Means and Standard Deviations of Variables in Analysis of Local Immigration 
Ordinances 





Mean Population 75,928 9,234 420,080 
 160,565 25,512 986,161 
% with BA 22.49 19.33 29.69 
 11.49 13.98 17.33 
% employed in agriculture 0.71 2.06 1.13 
 0.88 3.85 3.44 
% voting for Bush 2004 55.28 55.83 40.59 
 10.86 12.23 12.97 
% white and >65 11.99 14.16 8.35 
 6.54 7.69 5.44 
Latino elected officials index 0.46 0.18 1.59 
 1.84 1.30 4.66 
% naturalized citizens 4.39 2.43 7.78 
 4.27 4.02 6.65 
% change in white unemployment -0.0423 0.0033 0.0766 
 0.3346 0.9653 1.3432 
% change in median HH income 0.07 0.11 0.07 
 0.13 0.17 0.10 
% change foreign born 2.57 1.58 0.73 
 4.55 5.46 0.75 
% change Latino 3.52 2.06 0.79 
 5.58 7.00 0.90 
% owner occupied 66.22 70.58 51.79 





% change median home value 0.05 0.12 0.11 
 0.25 0.27 0.33 
Table 4.2 presents a correlation matrix of the included variables.  None of the variables 
have a correlation greater than 0.5, except for the change in the foreign-born and Latino 
populations which is correlated at 0.528. 













 Tables 4.3 and 4.4. present the results of the logistic regressions on ordinance passage.  
All results include fixed effects for city size and for state, essentially comparing cities that passed 
an ordinance with cities of a similar size in the same state that did not pass an ordinance. 
4.3(a) Correlates of exclusionary ordinance passage 
Results in Table 4.3 represent the results of logistics regressions testing hypotheses about the 
role of the political opportunity structure, labor market competition, demographic change, and 
homevoters on the passage of exclusionary local ordinances. All three control variables are 
significant and robust.  Large cities are more likely to adopt exclusionary ordinances than other 
cities in the sample.  Cities with higher levels of mean educational attainment are less likely to 
adopt exclusionary ordinances than other cities. A greater percentage of local workers employed 
in agriculture (representing local economic sensitivity to immigrant labor) is negatively 
correlated with the passage of an exclusionary ordinance. 
Political opportunity structure measured as the percentage of the local population voting for 
Bush in 2004 is highly significant in all models.  Other measures of political opportunity 
structure are not significant, but do have the expected direction of correlation, such that a higher 
score on the Latino elected officials index and larger immigrant electorate both evidence some 
negative association with the adoption of exclusionary ordinances.  
Labor market competition measured as the change in the white unemployment rate does not 
have a significant association with the passage of local exclusionary laws in either Model 1 or 
Model 7.  Alternative specifications were also tested, including the levels of white 
unemployment, levels of total unemployment, and the change in total unemployment.  None of 
these labor market competition measures had a significant relationship with the passage of 





indicate that change in median household income is not significantly correlated with the passage 
of exclusionary ordinances.  
Demographic shifts have a significant correlation with the passage of exclusionary 
ordinances. The passage of exclusionary ordinances is correlated with an increase in the foreign 
born population in Model 3 and an increase in the Latino population in Model 4, when the two 
variables are included separately.  When the variables are included together in Model 7, the 
change in the Latino population emerges as a stronger predictor of exclusionary ordinance 
passage than the change in the foreign-born population.  
Higher levels of owner occupancy are positively and significantly correlated with the passage 














4.3(b) Correlates of inclusionary ordinance passage 
 
The analyses reported in Table 4.4 test hypotheses about the role of the political 
opportunity structure, labor market competition, demographic change, and housing on the 
passage of inclusionary local ordinances.  Again, all three control variables are significant in the 
expected direction.  Larger cities, cities with higher levels of mean educational attainment, and 
cities with a larger share of employment in the agricultural sector are all more likely to pass 
inclusionary laws.  
Political opportunity structure, measured as the share of the population voting for the 





passage. Other measures of political opportunity, including Latino elected officials and the 
relative size of the immigrant electorate, are not significant, though again measures of Latino 
elected officials and the immigrant electorate show a positive association with inclusionary 
ordinance passage. 
Labor market competition, measured as an increase in the white unemployment rate, is 
significantly correlated with passage of inclusionary local laws in both Models 1 and 7.  
Increases in the local median household income are also significantly correlated with the passage 
of inclusionary ordinances in Models 2 and 7. 
Demographic shifts, measured as the change in the foreign born or Latino population are 
not significant when included separately in Models 3 and 4.  In Model 7, included together and 
with the full complement of independent variables, the increase in the Latino population is 
negatively correlated with inclusionary ordinance passage. 
Higher levels of homeownership are negatively correlated with the passage of an 
inclusionary ordinance in Models 5 and 7.  Increases in home value are positively correlated with 












In analyses not shown in the tables above, I used alternative measures to test the 
robustness of the findings.  I added other measures of labor market competition, including levels 
of total unemployment in 2000, changes in total unemployment, levels of white unemployment 
in 2000, and levels of median household income in 2000.  I also included additional control 
measures, such as the poverty rate, levels of employment in manufacturing, levels of 
employment in blue collar jobs more broadly. I also included demographic controls, such as the 
size of the Black, Latino, and Asian populations.  The results were similar and many of these 
additional variables had high levels of collinearity with included variables.  To reduce the effects 






4.4 Discussion and Conclusion 
The findings are generally consistent with existing research regarding the significance of 
relevant controls and the importance of political opportunity, particularly local partisanship in 
ordinance passage (Ramakrishnan and Wong 2010).  The findings make three primary additional 
contributions to the literature.  First, the findings suggest that labor market competition may not 
be the driving factor in the passage of exclusionary local ordinances.  At the same time, the 
results indicate that rising incomes and unemployment rates are associated with the passage of 
inclusionary local laws.  Second, the findings suggest that the framing of demographic changes 
as a threat may play a significant role in the passage of exclusionary ordinances.  Increases in the 
Latino population, in particular, are a stronger predictor of exclusionary ordinance passage than 
increases in the foreign born population, suggesting that the enactment of these local policies 
may have as much—or more—to do with race or ethnicity as with immigration.  Third, the 
results identify levels of homeownership as a significant factor associated with the passage of 
both inclusionary and exclusionary local laws, suggesting that the role of homeowners and 
concerns about property value in the context of demographic change may be an understudied 
factor in the study of these policies. 
Labor market competition has frequently been presented as a driving factor in anti-immigrant 
sentiment (Scheve and Slaughter 2011).  Changes in unemployment and income, however, are 
not significant predictors of the passage of exclusionary ordinances.  This finding may be 
explained in part because immigrants tend to settle in areas with low unemployment rates and 
high labor market demand.  Even if some local residents then see the arrival of immigrants as a 





unemployment.  Indeed, the descriptive statistics show that even as white unemployment 
increased marginally overall in the sample cities between 1990 and 2010, it decreased in cities 
that enacted exclusionary ordinances.  Although initially puzzling, the lack of significance for 
both unemployment and wages makes sense in light of the fact that immigrants are even more 
likely than the native born to respond to economic shifts by moving to areas with strong labor 
market demand and away from areas with weak employment prospects (Ostrovsky, Hou, and 
Picot 2011). 
For the passage of inclusionary ordinances, increasing income and home values exhibit 
positive correlations, suggesting that economic growth is associated with a willingness to support 
inclusionary local policies towards immigrants.  At the same time, however, inclusionary 
ordinance passage is also associated with increases in the white unemployment rate, suggesting 
that a growth in white unemployment in these cities is not framed as an immigration issue and 
does not impede the enactment of pro-immigrant policies. 
Indeed, one way to interpret the findings regarding demographic shifts is that the framing of 
structural social changes may be an important mechanism that mediates between local level 
social factors and policy outcomes. The quantitative analysis found that even more than an 
increase in the foreign-born population, an increase in the Latino population is associated with 
the passage of exclusionary policies.  The anti-immigrant movement at the national level has 
consistently framed rising Latino populations as a threat to law and order and to a middle class 
way of life (Chavez 2008).  
Finally, the results suggest that homeownership rates are related to the passage of both 
inclusionary and exclusionary local policies towards immigrants.  Higher homeownership rates 





are associated with the passage of inclusionary ordinances.  This finding is consistent with 
Light’s (2003) theory that more suburban locations were using housing policy to deflect 
immigrant settlement and with Brettell and Nibbs’s (2010) articulation of the resonance of 
exclusionary policies particularly to a suburban middle-class way of life.  It also reinforces 
findings by Walker and Leitner (2011) that homeownership may be connected to exclusionary 
local policies.  
The research has several limitations.  To include as many cities that passed inclusionary and 
exclusionary ordinances as possible, Census data at the place level is used and changes are 
measured between 1990 and 2000—the time period before any ordinances at issue in the study 
were passed.  The majority of the exclusionary ordinances, however, were passed between 2006 
and 2010, and future research could explore measures of changes between 2000 and 2006 for a 
smaller sample of larger cities for which data is available. Population size remains a significant 
control in all models, even using fixed effects for city size.  To focus more closely on the 
significance of other variables in addition to city size, an alternative sample of control cities 
could be generated to more closely match the size of the cities that passed inclusionary and 
exclusionary ordinances and used in alternative estimations. Also, the included measures of labor 
market competition are somewhat coarse.  Were data available to measure wages and 
unemployment at the place level for workers by nativity status and educational attainment they 
could provide a stronger test of the hypotheses.  
Taken together, these findings provoke a number of questions for further research. Given that 
quantitative measures of labor market competition are not significant predictors of exclusionary 
ordinance passage, the research raises the question as to whether this is nevertheless a frame that 





not as resonant on the ground in particular localities experiencing immigration as they are in the 
national media.  The correlation between Latino population growth and ordinance passage 
suggests the importance of further research considering how this demographic shift is framed at 
the local level in both exclusionary and inclusionary cities. Finally, the significance of 
homeownership in both exclusionary and inclusionary contexts calls for further research on the 
role of “homevoters” (Fischel 2001) and concerns over property.  
 The findings broadly suggest that concerns over home values and neighborhoods in the 
context of demographic change may be as or more salient that concerns over wages or 
employment.  These findings highlight especially the continuing weight of homeownership as a 
political identification long after the post-war creation of primarily white suburbs that linked 
whiteness, property ownership, and status and elevated suburban homeowners to a powerful 
political and social class (Self 2003).  Indeed as poverty is increasingly suburbanized and 
suburbs become more racially and ethnically diverse, efforts to turn those suburbs into “citadels” 







Chapter 5: Hazleton, PA 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Hazleton is a city of approximately 25,000 people in Luzerne County, Pennsylvania on a 
plateau between the Delaware and Susquehanna watersheds.  Hazleton had its heyday around the 
turn of the last century, when the anthracite coal industry was booming and the mines 
surrounding the city employed tens of thousands of immigrants from England, Germany, Wales, 
Ireland, and Southern and Eastern Europe.  The City of Hazleton served as the local commercial 
and political center uniting a number of company towns that the coal mining industry had created 
to house and control their workforce (Deasy and Griess 1965).   
After the Second World War, as the regional coal industry collapsed and manufacturing 
jobs left, Hazleton began a long economic decline. Since the mid-1990s, however, increasing 
employment in manufacturing and logistics in industrial parks around the city have attracted 
thousands of Latinos from the New York region seeking work and a better quality of life. 
 
5.2 Economic and Demographic Background 
Hazleton’s population peaked in 1940 at 38,000 (U.S. Census 1940).  In the late 1940s, 
the anthracite coal industry began to decline as the use of other fuels grew.  Hazleton’s other 
main industry, textile production, shifted to the Sunbelt states and worsened the economic 
troubles.  By the mid-1950s, unemployment in the city reached 23 percent (Dublin and Licht 
2000).   
The decline of mining and textile industries not only led to a major exodus, it also 
reconfigured the age structure of the population in Hazleton.  From the 1950s onwards, young 





population of 23,300 was over 65 years old (U.S. Census 2000).  Until the recent influx of 
younger Latino residents, Hazleton was an aging town in profound economic decline. 
Although the share of the population working in manufacturing in 2010 was more than 
double the national rate, it still represented a dramatic fall since 1980.  At the same time, 
however, the share of employment in manufacturing in Hazleton actually increased between 
2000 and 2010 after decades of decline.  Representing the city’s declining role as a regional 
center, employment in the relatively higher paying finance, insurance, and real estate sector in 
Hazleton continued to fall reaching a level less than half of the statewide and nationwide 
averages. 
Table 5.1: Percent of Employed Persons 16 Years and Over: Agriculture, forestry, fisheries, 
mining 
 1980 1990 2000 2010 
U.S. 4.0 2.7 1.9 1.9 
PA 2.7 1.8 1.3 1.3 
Hazleton 1.8 0.4 0.8 0.8 
 
Table 5.2: Percentage of Employed Persons 16 Years and Over: Manufacturing 
 1980 1990 2000 2010 
US 22.4 17.7 14.1 10.5 
PA 28.6 20.0 16.0 12.5 
Hazleton  32.0 26.3 21.6 22.4 
 
Table 5.3: Percentage of Employed Persons 16 Years and Over: Retail trade 
 1980 1990 2000 2010 
US 16.1 16.8 11.7 11.6 
PA 15.7 17.2 12.1 11.7 
Hazleton  19.1 17.6 14.1 13.6 
 
Table 5.4: Percentage of Employed Persons 16 Years and Over: Finance, insurance, & real estate 
 1980 1990 2000 2010 
U.S. 6.0 6.9 6.9 6.7 
PA 5.2 6.5 6.6 6.5 






National discussions about resistance to immigration frequently revolve around job 
competition and the idea that unemployment or anxiety about one’s job security are the central 
source of opposition to immigration (Citrin et al. 1997; see Borjas 2003; Borjas and Katz 2005).  
On the surface, Hazleton would seem to fit this hypothesis, as it has had higher than average 
unemployment rates since the anthracite coal industry began collapsing in the 1950s.  But the 
years leading up to the passage of the city’s exclusionary ordinance were characterized by 
significant local job growth and considerable declines in unemployment, not the conditions one 
would imagine leading to a strong sense of ‘job threat’ or fear of displacement by newly arrived 
immigrant workers.  Between 1990 and 2000, unemployment in Hazleton declined by nearly 2.5 
percentage points, compared to relatively stable unemployment rates at the state level.  Looking 
at annual data for Luzerne County, where Hazleton is located, the time period between 2004 and 
2006 leading up to the ordinance passage witnessed a further 1.4 percentage point decline in 
unemployment (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2015).  
Further, concerns about economics or employment played a minimal role, if any, in the 
actual discussion leading up to the ordinance passage.  The transcript of the City Council 
meeting where the ordinance was introduced, including the Mayor’s speech and comments from 
the public, includes 65 references to ‘illegal aliens’, 27 references to speaking English, and 21 
references to ‘landlords’ but not a single one to the ‘economy’,  ‘jobs’, ‘employment’, or 
‘unemployment’ (City of Hazleton 2006b).  The significance of economic factors came not from 
job competition but from a more generalized sense of loss of economic control, which was 
exacerbated by a simultaneous sense of loss of social and spatial control.  Together, Barletta 





and social context, one has to look at the economic restructuring that took place in and around 
Hazleton after the Second World War. 
Table 5.5: National, State, and County Level Unemployment Rates 2000-2010 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
US 4.0 4.7 5.8 6.0 5.5 5.1 4.6 4.6 5.8 9.3 9.6 
PA 4.2 4.8 5.6 5.7 5.4 5.0 4.5 4.4 5.3 7.9 8.4 
Luzerne 
County 
5.2 5.6 6.5 6.5 6.7 5.8 5.3 5.0 6.3 8.9 9.8 
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics 
 
Table 5.6: Household Median Income as a Percentage of National Median Income 
1980 1990 2000 2010
Hazleton 76.81% 69.63% 66.87% 66.17%  
 
Table 5.7: Percent 25 years and over: Bachelor's degree or more 
 1990 2000 2010 
US 20.34 24.40 28.24 
PA 17.94 22.35 26.87 
Hazleton 10.31 11.52 12.07 
 
Despite declining unemployment in Hazleton prior to the ordinance passage, the city had 
long been experiencing a significant economic transformation related to the post-war national 
shift in investment to the suburbs.  Between the world wars, many of Hazleton’s Protestant elites 
moved out of the downtown core to create suburbs.   With the support of federally subsidized 
mortgages after World War II, many middle-class Hazleton residents followed.  As the mining 
industry declined, Hazleton’s Chamber of Commerce bought land outside of the city to create 
industrial parks in order to attract new businesses. While these efforts helped bring jobs back to 
the region, they encouraged businesses to leave the city and accelerated a growing divide 
between the city and the area’s suburbs.  
Between 1970 and 2000, the economic relationship between Hazleton and the larger 
region was reversed.  Median household incomes in the City of Hazleton were higher than the 





incomes increased.  Three decades later, the median income in the city had fallen to only 82 
percent of the regional median income (HUD 2008).   Compared to the national median income, 
local household incomes had also declined steadily (see Table 5.6). Similarly, median home 
values in the City of Hazleton in 1970 were greater than home values in the area’s surrounding 
region, but by 2000 the median home value in the city had fallen to just over three-fourths that of 
the regional median (HUD 2008). 
This decline in incomes and home values in comparison to the surrounding area turned 
the regional world upside down for city residents.  Hazleton had gone from being a prosperous 
regional economic center to a forgotten city with shuttered storefronts. Instead of a regional retail 
destination, Hazleton had become a town where lower wage workers lived and trucks rumbled 
past on their way from warehouses out of town.  This ‘class downgrading’, I argue led to a 
profound sense of economic insecurity.  But how did this economic insecurity come to be 
expressed through laws targeting illegal immigrants, especially when it does not appear to have 
been through direct competition over jobs? 
After 2000, the city experienced something of a resurgence.  After six straight decades of 
declining population in which the city lost almost half of its inhabitants, the population 
increased.  Latinos from the New York region, attracted by the low cost of housing and by the 
jobs available in the industrial parks surrounding the town, took advantage of Hazleton’s high 
vacancy rates and improving business climate and moved in.  Between 2000 and 2006, the town 
shifted from a population of 22,000 that was 93 percent white to a population of 25,000 or more 
that was more than one-third Latino.  The new residents bought, renovated, and rented houses, 
and opened grocery stores, restaurants, hair salons, and bakeries. The once declining area of 





Dominican, Puerto Rican, and Mexican communities.  Seventy Latino-owned businesses were 
opened in Hazleton between 2001 and 2005.1 
Table 5.8: White Non-Hispanic percentage of population 1980-2010 
1980 1990 2000 2010
US 79.57 75.64 69.13 63.75
PA 89.14 87.72 84.05 79.47
Hazleton 98.97 98.10 93.19 59.02  
 
Table 5.9: Hispanic percentage of population 1980-2010 
1980 1990 2000 2010
US 6.45 8.99 12.55 16.35
PA 1.30 1.95 3.21 5.67
Hazleton 0.51 1.01 4.85 37.31  
 
Table 5.10: Foreign-born percentage of population 1980-2010 
 1980 1990 2000 2010 
US 6.2 8.0 11.1 12.9 
PA 3.4 3.1 4.1 5.8 
Hazleton 3.1 2.5 3.7 22.1 
 
5.3 Housing 
Despite relative economic renewal and declining unemployment, changes in the social 
and economic geography of Hazleton led to a sense of loss and fear among many native born 
residents.  Concerns regarding housing and uncertainty over the control of shared spaces of the 
city became a crucial part of the Mayor’s justifications for the exclusionary ordinance.   By 
opening stores, playing in parks, and talking on street corners, Latinos came to be seen as 
‘occupying’ spaces that older, white residents had seen as their own.   In addition to feeling an 
anxious sense that Hazleton was increasingly marginalized in relation to the surrounding region, 
native-born residents felt that they were increasingly marginalized in their own city, as older 
                                                 





neighborhood based churches closed and new stores opened advertising goods and services in a 
language older residents did not understand. 
Differences in age, language, and race or ethnicity between long-term residents and 
newer arrivals exacerbated the distance between the two groups. Some white residents feared 
that clusters of young Latinos on the street corners might signal the rise of gangs and crime,2 
highlighting how the criminalization of immigrants has intersected with the criminalization of 
racialized youth (Williams 1991).  The representation of the city as a home itself and the 
intersection with anxieties about crime were evident when the then City Council President (and 
current Mayor) Joseph Yanuzzi described the arrival of undocumented immigrants as similar to 
coming home and finding a burglar in your house.3  These nascent and blurred divisions between 
younger, more recent Latino residents and older, more established white residents were hardened 
through debates over the passage of the ordinance, and the call to ‘defend small town life’ that 
accompanied it. 
According to Mayor Barletta, a sense that the spaces of the city had been taken over by 
others was at the forefront of people’s minds.4  This sense was expressed partially through 
concerns over housing.  Residents filed numerous complaints with the city regarding absentee 
landlords and properties that were in disrepair.5  Residents also filed complaints about 
overcrowded apartments.  At trial Mayor Barletta described housing issues as the way in which 
the ordinance first came to his mind: 
We were called to an apartment that was overcrowded and when we went in it, I 
could not believe what I was seeing in the City of Hazleton.  There were nine 
mattresses next to each other laid on the floor. The refrigerator was filled with 
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cockroaches. This apartment was not fit for animals, let alone human beings.  As 
it turned out, the nine men that were staying there were all illegal aliens.6 
 
Housing has a long association with morality and community character, and as such is a fertile 
site for racially coded assertions about cultural values (Boyer 1983; Thomas and Ritzdorf 1996; 
Wright 1981).  Barletta says that he was finally motivated to introduce the ordinance when an 
elderly, white resident approached him in the parking lot of City Hall, saying, “Listen, buster!  
You have got to do something.  I feel like I am a prisoner in my own home.”  Barletta says, “It 
was then I realized I had lost my town.”7   
 
5.4 Framing and Boundaries 
Sensing residents’ feelings of loss of control in the face of increasing economic 
marginalization and declining dominance of public spaces, Mayor Barletta then began to frame 
citizens’ diffuse feelings of insecurity on illegal immigration. Having positioned illegal 
immigrants as the cause of local economic and social tensions, he proposed to solve the problem 
by taking action against illegals. He was going to draw the line.  He found an ordinance that had 
been crafted by a right wing group in California called “Save Our State” and introduced in San 
Bernardino but never passed, and introduced it in Hazleton.  Barletta then emphasized the need 
for action, saying, “I will no longer sit back, waiting for someone else to fix this problem…. Let 
me be clear—this ordinance is intended to make Hazleton one of the most difficult places in the 
U.S. for illegal immigrants.”8 
Mayor Barletta sought to unify native born residents by emphasizing that “Hazleton is 
small town U.S.A.”9  Despite Hazleton’s official designation as a ‘city’, Mayor Barletta 
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repositioned it as a ‘small town’ with a particular ‘All-American’ quality of life and community 
character that contrasted with the dangerous and unwholesome cities from which Hazleton’s 
migrants were arriving.  Responding to residents’ sense of declining status and deflationary 
citizenship, this description of Hazleton served to bring it back from the margins to the center—it 
was no longer a declining rust-belt city with a collapsed mining economy and a host of Latino 
arrivals, but instead small town U.S.A.  Tying illegal immigration to a larger threat to the nation 
as a whole, Barletta further emphasized that “what we have is quality of life—for a person to just 
allow their children to go out and play—and if you take that away you are taking away a part of 
America.”10  Mayor Barletta continuously raised the issue of small town quality of life:  “This is 
a small town.  We don’t have a lot of cultural amenities as the big city, but what we do have is, it 
is safe and people feel safe, and neighbors can talk to neighbors without fear….”11  Barletta 
consistently tied the ordinance into a patriotic, nostalgic defense of an American way of life that 
he claimed Hazleton epitomized and that he asserted was threatened by unauthorized foreigners, 
whom he repeatedly implied were connected to crime.  
To the public assembled at City Hall for the second reading of the ordinance, Barletta 
presented this small town U.S.A. as a distinct, bounded entity comprised of citizens—“one 
community of legal, hardworking, law-abiding, taxpaying citizens.”12   By implication, this 
definition differentiates Hazleton’s rightful residents from those who are not citizens, who one 
can infer are instead illegal, undeserving, and criminal.  In this dialogue, authorized non-citizens 
are written out of membership.  In Hazleton, one is either a ‘legal citizen’ or an ‘illegal alien’ – 
there is suddenly no room for legal aliens. 
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The mayor evoked a small town version of the global “competitive city” rhetoric (Harvey 
1989), reading letters from current and former residents highlighting their potential mobility:  
“My wife and I used to do most of our business there.  However, over the past 15 years or so, we 
have since retreated from your once-safe city.”13  Another letter he quoted stated: “Just wanted to 
let you know how very proud we are of everything you are doing to keep us safe and change our 
city.  We were going to sell our house, but now we have reconsidered.”14  Instead of the threat of 
mobile global capital, however, the mayor presents the Tieboutian threat that local shoppers and 
residents will go elsewhere because of their fear about the arrival of global migrants.  The reality, 
though, was that most local jobs had left the city years before for the suburban malls, hospitals, 
schools and industrial parks because of the changing spatiality of capital investment and the 
search for larger tracts of undeveloped, inexpensive lands.  Indeed, Hazleton’s recent immigrants 
had been a source of economic growth, but as the mayor alluded to in his speech, their linguistic 
and cultural difference provoked fears that made them a convenient scapegoat for residents’ 
larger sense of a lack of control. 
Finally, the city is presented as the victim of both federal government power and cultural 
diversity.  As Barletta neared the conclusion of his speech presenting the ordinance, he said, “We 
all have cultures we embrace. But government cannot mandate diversity. Government cannot 
force diversity upon us.”15  This particular framing of the issues suggests that what the ordinance 
seeks to address is not so much issues of immigration status as concerns about cultural change.  
The statement that “government cannot force diversity upon us” seems to assert a right to 
exclude those who are culturally different and echoes the ‘freedom not to associate’ claimed by 
Southern political leaders in opposition to federal civil rights laws.  The statement further pits 
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Hazleton as a small town underdog facing off against the threat of big government meddling in 
social life. 
Ironically, supporters of the exclusionary ordinance were not the only ones talking about 
the significance of quality of life in Hazleton.  The lead plaintiff in the legal case against the city, 
Pedro Lozano, moved to Hazleton from Queens, New York, in April of 2005 because “That is 
the American dream—to own your own home.”16  Many of Hazleton’s newer residents had, to 
some extent, been driven out of New York City by the declining affordability of housing, spurred 
partially by Mayor Giuliani’s crackdown on ‘quality of life’ crimes in New York (see Smith 
1996).  Though many new arrivals to Hazleton were leaving New York in search of the 
American dream of homeownership in quieter neighborhoods, once they arrived they were 
represented as a threat to the very quality of life they were seeking.  
Through nostalgic discourses of small town citizenship, the Mayor was able to cover over 
historical differences in politics, class, and European ethnicities, mobilizing residents to defend 
their ‘small town’, and all American small towns, against those identified as bringing urban, 
foreign problems.  Through the discourse of small town quality of life, divisions between new, 
Latino immigrants and longer term residents were created and solidified, and a history that could 
have connected long-term residents with recent arrivals erased. 
 
5.5 Mobilization 
In introducing the ordinance, Mayor Barletta consistently constructed illegal immigrants 
as a threat to individuals, to the town overall, and to “small town U.S.A” more broadly.  He 
amplified the threat to be not just to Hazleton, but to the American way of life.  
                                                 





Housing, in Barletta’s view, gave undocumented immigrants a foothold from which they 
would begin to “destroy our neighborhoods and diminish our quality of life,” placing Hazleton 
and other small towns like it under siege.17  Decrying the accessibility of housing, in introducing 
the ordinance Barletta said, “Anyone can walk into the city right now, give the landlord $400, 
put their bags in a room, and go shoot somebody in the head tomorrow.”18 
In his speech to the City Council introducing the legislation, Barletta argued that the best 
way to deter undocumented immigrants was through control over residential space, by making it 
impossible for people to find shelter at night.  Barletta told the Council and the assembled 
audience: “Because people moving into the city naturally require a place to sleep, our landlords 
are our first line of defense.”19  Clarifying this strategy of controlling residential space, Barletta 
continued:  “Let me be clear—this ordinance is intended to make Hazleton one of the most 
difficult places in the U.S. for illegal immigrants.”20 
The proposed housing regulation in the exclusionary ordinance represents a seemingly 
race-neutral policy that would have a disproportionate effect on Latinos by requiring the constant 
production of various forms of documents in order to access the basic human need for shelter.  
The ordinance’s focus on denying access to housing parallels the widespread and longstanding 
policy of ‘sundown towns’, in which all non-whites had to be outside the jurisdictional 
boundaries by sunset on threat of publicly sanctioned, privately executed violence (Loewen 
2005). 
Because illegality has been associated with Latino migration (Calavita 1992; Ngai 2004; 
De Genova 2005) and the suspicions of police and residents will to some extent be directed 
                                                 
17 City of Hazleton, 2006c. 
18 City of Hazleton, 2006a. 
19 City of Hazleton, 2006a. 





against Latino residents overall, many feared the strategy represented by the ordinance will make 
Hazleton a difficult place for all Latinos.  A retired opthamologist who grew up in Puerto Rico 
before moving to Hazleton, Dr. Agapito Lopez, expressed this concern among Latino residents, 
saying, “It [the ordinance] raised a lot of fears, because there is not a simple way to identify an 
undocumented immigrant, and they [Latinos in Hazleton] felt that they may be unjustly evicted, 
or they feared that they may be unjustly denied to be in a rental property.”21  Latino residents 
argued that because some Latinos in Hazleton were present without authorization, the ordinance 
empowered residents to act as if all Latinos had forfeited the right to belong.  Not only have 
Latinos been racialized in the construction of illegality in Hazleton, but, paralleling the process 
Omi and Winant (1994) describe in their theorization of racial formation, ‘illegal’ in many ways 
has become a racial formation of its own. 
At the City Council meeting where the ordinance was introduced, Barletta called on 
“average citizens to do their part” to solve illegal immigration by requesting forms of 
identification so “people will know that Hazleton is not the place to come.”22  In effect, Mayor 
Barletta asked Hazleton’s residents to defend a particular conception of ‘quality of life’ by 
drawing a distinction between those they identified as belonging in Hazleton and those they felt 
did not belong and then make clear to the trespassers that they are not welcome.   
Efforts to involve the native born residents of Hazleton in immigration enforcement 
through the complaint processes for the ordinance penalties empowered Hazleton’s long-term 
residents to play a part in enforcing immigration laws by filing complaints about suspect 
individuals with City Hall.  It also sowed confusion and division among the city’s Latino 
residents about their moral and legal responsibilities.   
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This confusion, and the production of Latino identities as illegal and detrimental to 
quality of life, is evident in the cross-examination of one of the plaintiffs by the main attorney 
advising and representing the city, Kris Kobach of the Immigration Reform Law Institute and the 
Federation for American Immigration Reform.  Kobach asked the lead plaintiff, Pedro Lozano, 
“Sir, are you aware that it is a federal crime to harbor an illegal alien knowingly in your rental 
unit?”  Expressing confusion over the apparent conflict between his moral commitments and his 
legal obligations, Lozano replied, “Well, if that is the case, I wouldn’t harbor it in my home. It’s 
a difficult situation. If a person comes over and asks me to help, they say, I don’t have anywhere 
to stay, I don’t have anywhere to live, and then I find out later that they are undocumented, then I 
might have to go to jail because I was just trying to help my fellow brother. What you’re saying 
is I can’t help anyone at all just because they are undocumented. I don’t know.”23  The confusion 
is clear, as is the threat that the ordinance conveyed to immigrants in Hazleton.  If you rent an 
apartment to a friend, a family member, or a person in need, and it turns out that they are out of 
status, even if you did not know it, you may face legal consequences.  As the testimony reveals, 
the ordinance made the category of ‘citizen’ seem incompatible with the identity ‘Latino’, even 
to those who were both simultaneously, such as Lozano.   
Multiple interviewees recounted parallel stories contrasting relations in Hazleton before 
the ordinance and after. One described how “before the ordinance, we didn’t have a problem” 
and “a lot of Hispanics voted for the mayor, who made the City Hall open to us in our language.  
But when the ordinance came, those people who had been hiding…felt they had the right to open 
the doors wide and say to us, ‘I don’t like you. Go home.’  The ordinance created a hard line of 
division between the white community and the Hispanic community.”24  Another respondent 
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indicated that, “Before the ordinance, everything was quiet…  I had a parade with Latin 
American flags during Funfest [the local annual summer festival] and I didn’t have any 
problems.  People would cheer….We were welcomed by the mayor and the people….[But] the 
ordinance established a division between whites and Latinos that you could see the day the 
measure was passed.”25  Repeated comments like this suggest that the conflict that has emerged 
was not inevitable, but was related to how particular fears were conceptualized, specific 
boundaries drawn, and groups mobilized. 
By dividing Hazleton’s population into ‘citizens’ and ‘illegals’ and enlisting the native 
born in its enforcement, the Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance created new identities and 
transformed previously existing personal relationships. While some present conflict over 
immigration as inevitable (e.g. Light, 2003), interviewees reported that the ordinance did not 
reflect tensions in Hazleton as much as it created them. 
Jose Lechuga had moved from Mexico to California in 1982 and then to Hazleton in 
1990.  He worked in factories and cleaning companies outside the city until he and his wife 
opened their own grocery store in 2000 and later their own restaurant. One of the plaintiffs in the 
trial, Lechuga testified about a representative conversation he had with his native-born neighbor 
after the ordinance had passed, who expressed the divisions in the community in terms of 
language, telling him “If you spoke English, you were not a criminal.”   Confused, Lechuga 
continued the conversation: “I [Lechuga] asked her, ‘How long have you known me for now?’  
She said, ‘For a long time.’ I said, ‘What do you think of me?’  She said, ‘You're a very good 
person.’ So I responded – I said, ‘What would be the difference if I didn’t speak English and I 
only spoke Spanish?’ She said, ‘It is that when we walk through the streets, we don’t know what 
                                                 





they are saying about us.’”26  Similar conversations were reported in interviews with others in the 
city who suggested that the ordinance contributed to the creation of an ‘us’ and ‘them’ divide 
based on race, ethnicity, and language.27 
Interviews and trial testimony suggest that the message the mayor intended to send by 
saying that he wanted to make the city as difficult a place as possible for illegal immigrants did 
reach Hazleton’s recent arrivals, whether citizen, legal resident, or unauthorized entrant.  It had 
the effect of making Latino residents think that daily activities and basic needs, from housing to 
primary education, could become impossible to access for those without appropriate documents 
and very burdensome even for those who had permanent residence or citizenship and the 
documents to prove it.  A witness at the trial emphasized this fear and uncertainty, saying, 
“people were in fear because the police were stopping them on the sidewalks or stopping them 
on the driveway and asking for documentation just because of their looks….There were all kinds 
of fears….What is going to happen with our sons? Should we still send them to school? What is 
going to happen to our church? Should we still go to church?”28 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
The story of Hazleton’s Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance illuminates the 
processes through which local exclusionary citizenship is produced, particularly through the 
exercise of control over space.  The conflict over the ordinance made visible the normally unseen 
ways in which racialized social relations are naturalized by being represented in spatial terms.  
Mayor Barletta was able to generate support for the ordinance not because of fear of job 
competition, but because of the interaction of fears of loss of economic, social, and spatial 
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control.  As residents reeled from a sense of local class downgrading, the arrival of Latinos was 
seen as a further sign of the city’s marginalization within the region.  To many residents the 
demographic shift prompted the fear they were becoming marginalized within the city itself.  
Mayor Barletta’s representation of the space of Hazleton as an All-American town served 
to construct the social group of “legal, hard-working citizens” of the town in opposition to 
“illegal aliens” flooding in from big cities.  Positioning the ordinance as a defense of small town 
quality of life against the threats of foreigners and urban ills forged the descendants of diverse 
European immigrants with varied class backgrounds and interests into a singular identity as 
residents of this small town, intrinsically connected with all the other American small town 
residents.  It also masked the social and economic challenges that faced Hazleton long before the 
arrival of Latino residents, including a declining and aging population, rising unemployment, and 
a local tax base insufficient to meet the needs of its residents.  Housing emerged as a key form of 
spatial control by creating a location in which some could be defined as belonging and divided 
from those who were defined as not belonging. The original complaint based system proposed in 
the ordinance would have deputized local residents to enforce the policy, serving to mobilize and 
empower the native born and imbue their citizenship with new meaning, as well as entrenching 
boundaries between native born residents and newer arrivals. 
The anti-immigrant sentiment in Hazleton that supported the exclusionary ordinance was 
not simply the inevitable result of major demographic changes.  Latino residents spoke 
extensively about the tension that has arisen in Hazleton since the ordinance was passed, not 
before, and how people who used to be friendly to them now see them as strangers.  The 
ordinance was not simply a response to a preexisting political conflict, but also exacerbated 





citizenship. Local belonging and collective identity were reconfigured in the process, and the city 
itself was re-imagined and re-constituted, obscuring older histories of immigration, industrial 







Chapter 6: Easton, PA 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 Easton, Pennsylvania is a city of roughly 26,000 people located at the confluence of the 
Delaware and Lehigh Rivers, about 50 miles south of Hazleton.  Like Hazleton, Easton’s heyday 
was during the first half of the 20th century, when the anthracite coal, steel, and manufacturing 
industries were all flourishing.  Also like Hazleton, the city was settled initially primarily by 
English, Irish, Welsh, and German immigrants and subsequently by Southern and Eastern 
European immigrants.  The two rivers, combined with three canals, and subsequently five 
railroads made Easton an important location for moving coal from the region around Hazleton to 
the iron works in Allentown and Bethlehem.  Easton also became a manufacturing center in its 
own right, like Hazleton producing especially silks and other textiles.   
 Like Hazleton, Easton experienced an economic decline after World War II with the 
decline in local mining and manufacturing.  Also like Hazleton, the city experienced a moderate 
resurgence beginning in the 1990s and into the 2000s and its immigrant population grew, 
especially through Dominicans and Mexicans moving from New York to seek a better quality of 
life.  Unlike Hazleton, however, the residents and eventually elected officials worked to welcome 
immigrants and foster immigrant incorporation into local social and political life. 
 
6.2 Economic and Demographic Background 
In the first half of the 20th Century, Easton had a significant manufacturing base. 
Ingersoll-Sargeant (later Ingersoll-Rand) opened a factory in Easton in 1893, making 
compressors and vacuum pumps.  The Crayola crayon factory opened in 1903.  A major foundry, 





Cups. As transportation shifted from canals to rail in the late 19th Century, Easton continued to 
fare well, being home not only to three canals but also to major freight rail lines. But as 
transportation shifted to trucks after World War II, the city’s location became an obstacle to its 
growth instead of an asset.  As economic restructuring shifted manufacturing to the sunbelt and 
overseas, employment declined further. The Kuebler Foundry closed in the 1980s.  Layoffs at 
Bethlehem Steel in the 1980s and the closure of the Bethlehem plant in 1995 had a significant 
impact on the whole region.  By 2000, much of Easton’s downtown business district was 
abandoned.  The share of residents employed in manufacturing continued to fall through the end 
of the century, dropping by more than half between 1980 and 2010. 
 
Table 6.1: Percent Employed Persons 16 Years and Over: Agriculture, forestry, fisheries, mining 
 1980 1990 2000 2010 
U.S. 4.0 2.7 1.9 1.9 
PA 2.7 1.8 1.3 1.3 
Hazleton 1.8 0.4 0.8 0.8 
Easton 0.3 1.2 0.6 0.9 
 
Table 6.2: Percent Employed Persons 16 Years and Over: Manufacturing 
 1980 1990 2000 2010 
US 22.4 17.7 14.1 10.5 
PA 28.6 20.0 16.0 12.5 
Hazleton  32.0 26.3 21.6 22.4 
Easton  38.4 24.7 20.8 16.6 
 
Table 6.3: Percent Employed Persons 16 Years and Over: Retail trade 
 1980 1990 2000 2010 
US 16.1 16.8 11.7 11.6 
PA 15.7 17.2 12.1 11.7 
Hazleton  19.1 17.6 14.1 13.6 







Table 6.4: Percent Employed Persons 16 Years and Over: Finance, insurance, and real estate 
 1980 1990 2000 2010 
U.S. 6.0 6.9 6.9 6.7 
PA 5.2 6.5 6.6 6.5 
Hazleton 4.4 5.5 3.6 2.6 
Easton  3.6 4.5 4.0 5.3 
 
Unemployment in Easton continued to increase from 1980 through 1990, but declined 
between 1990 and 2000.  Between 2000 and 2010, unemployment in Northampton County, 
where Easton is located, was somewhat lower than in Luzerne County, where Hazleton is 
located, but generally moved in similar directions through the decade.     
 
Table 6.5: National, State, and County Level Unemployment Rates 2000-2010 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
US 4.0 4.7 5.8 6.0 5.5 5.1 4.6 4.6 5.8 9.3 9.6 
PA 4.2 4.8 5.6 5.7 5.4 5.0 4.5 4.4 5.3 7.9 8.4 
Luzerne 
County 
5.2 5.6 6.5 6.5 6.7 5.8 5.3 5.0 6.3 8.9 9.8 
Northampton 
County 
3.8 4.3 5.3 5.5 5.4 5.0 4.5 4.4 5.5 8.3 8.9 
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics 
 
Table 6.6: Median household income as a percentage of U.S. median income 
 1980 1990 2000 2010 
Hazleton 0.768 0.696 0.669 0.662 
Easton 0.759 0.877 0.790 0.754 
 
Table 6.7: Percent Persons 25 years and over: Bachelor's degree or more 
 1990 2000 2010 
US 20.34 24.40 28.24 
PA 17.94 22.35 26.87 
Hazleton 10.31 11.52 12.07 
Easton 12.75 14.86 16.57 
 
Like Hazleton, Easton has a history of immigration.  The area to the south of downtown 
where the old silk mill and railroad tracks are was, before and after World War II, a dense, 





some African-Americans. The close-knit neighborhood was filled with small businesses, bars, 
poolrooms, grocery stores, and different Catholic, Maronite, A.M.E. and other churches.   
As post-war suburbanization advanced, the city’s population began to decline and it lost 
fully ten percent of its residents between 1950 and 1960.  The city’s small African-American 
population grew from 1.5 percent of the total to 4 percent of the total.  The Joint Planning 
Commission of Lehigh and Northampton Counties, concerned about the city’s struggling 
economy and declining population, decided that in this dense neighborhood known as “Lebanese 
Town,” “mixed utilization of land fails to create an aesthetic appearance.”29  Planners also 
decided that parking downtown was inadequate to compete with increasing suburban shopping 
options.  The Director of the Easton Redevelopment Authority, Hugh Moore, Jr., declared that 
“[a]lthough I feel that diversity of national origins, beliefs, and cultures is an enrichment of 
American life, it hardly seems a healthy influence as it exists in the Lehigh-Washington Street 
section.”30  The diversity of residents and the age of buildings in Lebanese Town prevented the 
city from creating the “attractive urban environment” that was believed necessary to stop the 
city’s population decline. 
Over the opposition of neighborhood residents and the local NAACP, the neighborhood 
was slated for urban renewal, residents were relocated, and the buildings were razed.  Now, it is 
a McDonald’s, an old Quality Inn, an empty movie theater, and two large senior apartment 
complexes, all surrounded by large, relatively empty parking lots.  Although the city’s non-white 
population has historically been small, general regret over the effects of urban renewal continues 
to shape the experiences of older residents, Lebanese, African-American, or white.  As one 
elderly Lebanese American man stated, “Urban renewal was a disaster, very much a disaster and 
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it devastated our people; tore us apart.  We were forced to move out. . . What they wanted was to 
get rid of us, to integrate us into American society, but we were Americans anyway.”31 
The presence of some racial and ethnic diversity in Easton in the second half of the 20th 
Century and some residents’ memory of the negative consequences of urban renewal has helped 
shape responses to a new period of migration.32  The share of residents who were Latino in 
Easton increased from less than 5 percent in 1990 to nearly 20 percent in 2010.  These new 
Latino residents have played a part in filling in empty downtown storefronts and vacant 
apartments. 
 
Table 6.8: Percent White Non-Hispanic 
 1980 1990 2000 2010 
US 79.57 75.64 69.13 63.75 
PA 89.14 87.72 84.05 79.47 
Hazleton 98.97 98.10 93.19 59.02 
Easton 88.78 84.29 73.50 58.63 
 
Table 6.9: Percent Hispanic or Latino 
 1980 1990 2000 2010 
US 6.45 8.99 12.55 16.35 
PA 1.30 1.95 3.21 5.67 
Hazleton 0.51 1.01 4.85 37.31 
Easton 1.90 4.41 9.79 19.89 
 
Table 6.10: Percent Foreign born 
 1980 1990 2000 2010 
US 6.2 8.0 11.1 12.9 
PA 3.4 3.1 4.1 5.8 
Hazleton 3.1 2.5 3.7 22.1 
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6.3 Framing and Boundaries 
Unlike Hazleton, local leaders in Easton have framed the demographic change as an 
opportunity and a benefit. Asked publicly his thoughts about the rapidly growing Latino 
population, Mayor Sal Panto responded: “My position is it’s about time.”  He added, “For the 
longest time we didn’t have Hispanics. Being a multicultural city—I was kind of waiting for it to 
happen and it did.”33  Where Mayor Barletta in Hazleton framed changing demographics as an 
imposition and protested that the federal government could not force diversity upon the city, 
Easton’s Mayor Panto publicly identified the city as a multicultural one and celebrated its 
increasingly diverse makeup.   
This framing of changing demographics as an opportunity was reiterated in multiple 
interviews by civic leaders and local residents. For instance, one respondent stated, “I see the city 
as a big melting pot. It makes it interesting. Who wants to be the same all the time?  It makes life 
fun. Everybody has a value, and each culture that comes here brings a different kind of value. 
We all want the same thing, to be healthy, to live good lives.”34  Repeatedly public officials and 
local residents saw immigration as an opportunity that could benefit all, and that could create 
more resources for all residents, not as a threat that would siphon public goods away from more 
deserving to less deserving residents.  
The demographic shifts, nevertheless, were not free from controversy or tension.  The 
Northampton County District Attorney, for instance, has repeatedly spoken out publicly in 
opposition to city policies supporting immigrants and is known among local immigrants as a 
hostile figure.  But city officials and civic leaders have resolutely continued to emphasize the 
potential benefits of immigration.  This welcoming approach was exemplified by an exhibit 
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created by local college students in collaboration with local civic groups, called “Welcome, 
Neighbor.”  The exhibit featured photographs and excerpts from oral histories recorded by 
students of 16 men and women who had arrived to Easton from South Korea, the Ivory Coast, 
Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Mexico over the past decades. A freelance photographer and 
recent Mexican immigrant, Marco Calderon, took the portraits. 
 Connecting the experiences of current immigrants to the experiences of former 
generations of immigrants in Easton is a rhetorical strategy that city officials and civic leaders 
appear to unconsciously repeat.  For instance, asked about local changes over the decade, one 
local civic leader highlighted immigration, comments by some that recent immigrants are not 
learning English, and went on to report that: “My family immigrated from Sicily in 1956 and my 
grandmother and grandfather lived in this neighborhood.  My mom became a citizen and they 
always spoke Italian. In these neighborhoods there were a lot of ethnic families, and they didn’t 
have to speak English.  There was an Italian market and there were enough Italian people in the 
community that they could get along without speaking English. My grandmother’s English was 
broken until the day she died.”35 
Foreign-born residents were consistently referred to as residents in Easton and their right 
to be there, their contribution to the city was generally unquestioned.  At an event organized by 
Easton “Dreamers” (undocumented young people who came to the United States at a young age 
with their parents), Mayor Panto noted that companies like Google, e-Bay, and Yahoo were 
founded by immigrants and added that the “next Google” might come from a young immigrant 
in Easton.36 
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Public officials did describe concerns over housing and complaints from residents 
regarding neighborhood change. The mayor again linked these concerns to earlier generations of 
immigrants: “It’s the same types of problems we had when European immigrants came, you have 
maybe ten people living in one house. You have people still tied to a close family, not breaking 
out on their own, and with more people in the house, there are more cars on street. People get 
exasperated about these neighborhood problems.”37  The response, however, was not to blame 
recent immigrants but to ensure that neighborhoods felt that the city had the resources through 
code enforcement and rehabilitation to respond to any concerns about abandoned homes and 
properties that were being poorly maintained by absentee landlords. To address these issues, the 
city started a program called “Let’s Build Easton” to take ownership of abandoned buildings, 
hire residents to restore them, and then sell them to homeowners to simultaneously take care of 
abandoned properties, create affordable infill housing, and improve the city’s tax base.38 
 The repeated framing of immigration as an opportunity, the consistent connections made 
between current and previous generations of immigrants, and the drawing of local boundaries so 
as to include immigrants, whether documented or not, was reinforced by the actions of local 
officials and local civil society organizations and their members and leaders. 
 
6.4 Mobilization 
When the Easton City Council created a Human Relations Commission in 2006, it was 
acting partly as a result of advocacy by local civil society organizations that had mobilized 
residents to express immigrants’ concerns about potential discrimination. Explaining the 
decision, to co-sponsor the ordinance, a local city councilor said “We [the City Council] felt at 
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that time that there was a population out there that wasn’t being heard. We wanted to send the 
message that discrimination would not be tolerated. We also wanted to make sure everyone who 
did business in Easton knew that someone else was watching and to make sure that all residents 
in town had a place where they knew they could be heard.”39  
Significant to the city’s recognition of the importance of new protections against 
discrimination was the city’s one organization created to serve the Latino community, El Puente 
(“The Bridge”). The organization was founded by a young woman who moved to Easton from 
Guatemala with her parents when she was two. Highlighting the organization’s focus on 
connecting different communities, she described the goals of El Puente as being “to integrate a 
community that felt disenfranchised.”40 She said that “people from all backgrounds would come 
and seek our help, and because I have a lot of links in this city I can help be an advocate or a 
middle person, in meetings at the school district, at the social security office, wherever.”41 As its 
name suggests, El Puente serves an important role in Easton as a bridge between the Latino 
community and city officials—helping convey concerns arising among Latino residents to the 
city leadership and encouraging municipal officials to keep the Latino community in mind as 
they craft city policies.  The founder also emphasized, however, that the organization helps all 
residents, of any race or ethnicity, who are finding it difficult to be heard by local officials, 
whether in the school system or at City Hall.  The organization serves a crucial role as a broker 
between recently arrived Latino residents and more established civic and political leaders.   
Other agencies came up in interviews as serving similar roles as spaces for diverse 
residents to gather and participate in local social and political life.  The lowest-income and most 
ethnically diverse neighborhood in Easton is known as the West Ward.  In the West Ward, 
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residents and community leaders come together monthly to share current assessments of 
community needs and to meet in small groups about issues such as neighborhood restoration, 
public safety, and substance abuse prevention.  These regular meetings provide an important 
forum where leaders from the Latino community interact with more established white and black 
civic leaders and public officials to work on shared neighborhood problems.42  These meetings 
also lead to a productive network of agencies collaborating to meet individual residents’ needs.  
One respondent described how the relationships formed in these monthly meetings made it easy 
to refer parents of participants in her youth program to public agencies like the Easton Housing 
Authority, non-profits like the local food bank, and even private business, such as the Lehigh 
Valley Office Depot, that would donate some furniture for a new apartment to individuals 
referred by a qualifying agency.  The respondent added, “That’s how this is here, there’s this 
network of community agencies.”43   
The brokerage that local organizations create between previously disconnected groups 
can be both formal and informal. In the formal sense, advocates from these organizations often 
serve on advisory boards for city agencies or non-profit groups where they can help shape those 
activities to be more inclusive of immigrant communities. In the informal sense, the relationships 
that are formed between immigrant and native-born leaders are often crucial to creating 
awareness among elected officials of challenges immigrants face and opportunities to create 
more welcoming contexts.  
The leader of another Easton community organization recounted how the Mayor 
happened to come to the aid of an immigrant teacher and her students facing harassment: 
We were running a . . .  program teaching computer skills . . . . I was having a 
board meeting for the community center at the same time. It was the Spanish 
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speaking night, and this man came in and started questioning the students, 
demanding, “Let me see your green card! Let me see your social security card!” . . 
. This guy was in my facilitator’s face, and the now mayor of Easton was on my 
board, and he and the board president escorted this man out.44 
 
In this example, the organization serves as a formal broker by connecting local native-
born elected officials to immigrant residents through their membership on the boards of social 
service agencies and also serves to directly connect these officials to a greater awareness of 
immigrant experiences. 
This experience of tension over immigration highlights another theme that emerged from 
the interviews—the willingness of diverse residents to speak out publicly against anti-immigrant 
sentiment.  In the example above, the response to harassment of immigrant residents came 
directly from the mayor.  In other interviews, a wide range of white, black, and Latino 
individuals all recounted speaking up for the rights of immigrant residents at moments when they 
were questioned.  For instance, a local civic leader noted that:  
I haven’t met many people in the community that have really been exclusive, who 
have not included certain people into the community because of a language or 
other barrier. There is one person, though, who is pretty vocal, who does come to 
meetings,  who is pretty much a racist. But he gets squelched because everybody 
fights for the rights of people, not people who are documented or 
undocumented.45 
 
Continuing to describe the same individual, the civic leader described how this individual 
started coming to community meetings where “we would say, ‘Here’s our flyer. We need 
to get it translated into Spanish.’  And he would have a fit, and say, ‘They need to speak 
our language.’ And we would say, ‘We’re doing it in Spanish because we need to, we 
need to include everyone who lives here and needs our help.’”46  In the face of efforts by 
individuals to define some individuals as not belonging and not deserving on the basis of 
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language or immigration status, civic leaders and public officials consistently asserted 
that all residents were equally deserving and equally valued members of the city. 
 In this environment, Latino leaders have emerged, forged connections to 
established leaders in the city, and participated in local political life.  The founder of El 
Puente described connections between the experiences of Easton’s black and Latino 
residents and collaboration with African-American led organizations on registering voters 
and on making sure everyone was counted in the 2010 Census.47 In response to advocacy 
from these groups, for instance, the city has hired three bilingual police officers and sent 
19 officers to language training. 
Young undocumented Latinos have also gotten involved in politics, particularly through 
active groups of Dreamers in the region.  A graduate of Easton High School who was brought to 
the United States from Venezuela when she was three years old helped organize a rally in the 
city for comprehensive immigration reform in 2013.48  Easton’s mayor attended the rally, and the 
City Council approved a resolution calling on the U.S. House of Representatives to approve a 
comprehensive immigration reform bill.  
Another group of multiracial residents, led by undocumented immigrant Pablo Escobar, 
organized to press for a state law granting drivers licenses regardless of immigration status.  
After working with local elected officials and organizing residents to speak at the City Council 
meeting, this group succeeded in convincing the City Council in 2014 to unanimously pass a 
resolution urging state legislators to pass a law allowing immigrants to obtain driver’s licenses 
regardless of their immigration status with valid proof of identity.  
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The success of these two recent immigrant-led local policy initiatives is significant.  Even 
if the resolutions themselves were largely symbolic, the symbolism is important and speaks to 
the extent to which immigrant residents have become incorporated into local political life, even 
for those in the immigrant community who are neither naturalized nor even documented and 





 The success of recent immigrants in achieving local legislative victories builds on the 
longer term framing of immigration as an opportunity for the city and immigrants as making 
valued contributions.  These successes also emerge from a longer history of efforts by local 
Latino, African-American, and white community leaders to create forums for collaboration and 
to bridge the gaps separating recent immigrant arrivals from more established leaders.  The very 
public participation of undocumented immigrants in local politics, and their use of local politics 
as a platform for state and national political activism, highlights the strong local support for 
immigrants, regardless of their documentation status.  The significant role of undocumented 
immigrants in the local public sphere and the actions by local elected officials in furtherance of 
that visible role suggest the city was not just “ignoring or helping to hide immigrants’ ‘illegal’ 
documentation status” in order to maintain a “shadow context” of exploitation (Sandoval 2014: 
20), as in some cities, but was seeking to actively back the rights of all local residents as a step 





Chapter 7: Fremont, NE 
 
7.1 Introduction 
Fremont, Nebraska is a city of roughly 26,000 people located on the Platte River about a 
45-minute drive northwest of Omaha. The city grew in the late 1800s as a supply depot for the 
Union Pacific Railroad and a home of the Fremont stockyards.  By the early 1900s, the city was 
a small-scale manufacturing center with foundries, saw mills, breweries and other industries that 
used the city’s extensive rail connections to import materials and ship out finished products.  
After World War II, local entrepreneurs created a meatpacking factory which was subsequently 
sold to the Hormel Company, based in Austin, Minnesota.  Other major local employers included 
Archer Daniels Midland and Campbell Soup.  The city experienced some economic decline in 
the 1980s but continues to have two meatpacking plants (Hormel and Fremont Beef) and other 
light manufacturers in food processing, metal fabrication, and other sectors. Beginning in the 
1990s, the city’s Latino population began to grow as Latino residents from other parts of the U.S. 
and immigrants from Mexico and Central America came to work in manufacturing and 
meatpacking. 
 
7.2 Economic and Demographic Background 
 The share of Fremont’s population employed in manufacturing declined between 1980 
and 2000, but increased between 2000 and 2010. Fremont has more than double the national and 
statewide average of its population employed in manufacturing.  The two leading employers in 
the region are Valmont Industries, a manufacturer of agricultural equipment, and Hormel Foods, 





population is employed in agriculture, while employment in retail, and the finance, insurance, 
and real estate sector are similar to national and statewide averages. 
 
Table 7.1: Percent Employed Persons 16 Years and Over: Agriculture, forestry, fisheries, mining 
 1980 1990 2000 2010 
U.S. 4.0 2.7 1.9 1.9 
NE 11.0 8.3 5.6 4.7 
Fremont 1.7 1.7 1.4 1.8 
 
Table 7.2: Percent Employed Persons 16 Years and Over: Manufacturing 
 1980 1990 2000 2010 
US 22.4 17.7 14.1 10.5 
NE 13.8 12.7 12.3 10.5 
Fremont 26.9 21.9 20.4 22.5 
 
Table 7.3: Percent Employed Persons 16 Years and Over: Retail trade 
 1980 1990 2000 2010 
US 16.1 16.8 11.7 11.6 
NE 16.9 17.9 12.1 11.6 
Fremont 22.6 21.4 15.5 12.2 
 
Table 7.4: Percent Employed Persons 16 Years and Over: Finance, insurance, and real estate 
 1980 1990 2000 2010 
U.S. 6.0 6.9 6.9 6.7 
NE 6.1 6.8 7.7 7.6 
Fremont 5.4 6.0 5.2 6.7 
 
 The meatpacking industry is perhaps best known through Upton Sinclair’s 1906 novel, 
The Jungle, which exposed horrendous working conditions in Chicago’s meat processing plants 
and contributed to the passage of the 1906 Pure Food and Drug Act and the 1906 Federal Meat 
Inspection Act.  However, the federal statutes were more protective of consumers than of 
packing plant workers.  Nonetheless, with increased unionization beginning in the 1940s, 
working conditions and pay improved and by the mid-1970s the United Packinghouse Workers 
of America managed to gain contracts paying wages that today would equal about $20 per hour.  





workers in the industry belonged to unions and the average wage was 15 percent above the 
manufacturing sector average (Craypo 1994: 71). 
As more transportation shifted from rail to trucks, and companies developed the ability to 
pre-cut and vacuum pack meat parts for shipping, larger companies like Swift and Tyson bought 
up smaller competitors and shifted work from Midwestern cities, such as Chicago and Kansas 
City, to smaller cities closer to livestock feedlots, such as Fremont and Grand Island, that offered 
lower land and labor costs and less demanding environmental regulations. New competitors like 
Iowa Beef Processors increased the speed of the processing by adding power saws and 
mechanical knives.  These upstart companies also vigorously opposed unionization efforts and 
drastically cut labor costs, forcing widespread restructuring in the industry.  In the late 1970s, the 
major companies were facing intense pressure from their non-union competitors and were 
freezing or cutting wages. 
Hormel froze wages in 1977 and when the contract at its main plant in Austin was up for 
renewal in 1985 management demanded a 23 percent wage cut.  The “P-9” Local of the United 
Food and Commercial Workers Union voted to strike. After six months, the national union 
ordered the Local to call off the strike, but local members refused.  The conflict became 
increasingly bitter as Hormel threatened striking workers and brought in growing numbers of 
strikebreakers while union leaders organized national boycotts of Hormel products.  Tensions ran 
high and the National Guard was deployed to protect the plant, further increasing the acrimony. 
The Local organized roving pickets at other Hormel plants and was successful at temporarily 
shutting down Hormel plants in Ottumwa, Iowa and cutting production in Dubuque, Iowa.  After 
dragging on for ten painful months, the Austin Local conceded a devastating defeat that rippled 





  The recession in the 1980s led to widespread bankruptcies of the remaining smaller 
companies that enabled many of them to cut wages even further.  New, more mechanized plants 
employed fewer workers but required a much faster pace of work and injuries throughout the 
industry were on the rise. Through the 1980s and 1990s meatpacking was the most dangerous job 
in the United States, with an injury rate more than three times the average for the rest of the 
manufacturing sector (Bureau of Labor Statistics 1989).  In terms of injuries arising from 
repeated trauma and repetitive motions, workers in meatpacking plants experienced injuries at a 
rate 27 times greater than the national average (Bureau of Labor Statistics 1999).  The 
meatpacking industry continues to be one of the nation’s most dangerous occupations, with an 
injury rate of 10 per 100 equivalent full time workers, more than double the rate for 
manufacturing overall and triple the rate for all private sector employers. (Bureau of Labor 
Statistics 2011).  By 1990 meatpacking wages had fallen to 24 percent below the sector average 
and by 2010 they had plummeted to about half of the average manufacturing wage. 
Many native-born meatpacking workers were able to find other jobs in manufacturing or 
other sectors and increasingly left the meatpacking industry for safer positions with better wages.  
Consistent with Piore’s (1979) dual or segmented labor market theory, when native born workers 
rejected low-wage and low-status jobs, employers recruited workers from other social groups 
who were either indifferent to job status or unable to resist them, such as refugees from Asia in 
the 1980s, migrants from Latin America in the 1990s and 2000s, and increasing numbers of 
refugees from Africa today. 
This shift in the meatpacking industry is one of the main reasons for the rise in the Latino 
population in Fremont since 2000.  A Fremont resident described the shift: 
Growing up in Fremont, Hormel was the place where everybody’s father worked.  





college, they would work at Hormel, then go to college. There was a waiting list 
to apply to get in and work there, they had so many applicants.  But back in the 
80s, Hormel broke the union and they’ve reduced the benefits, they’ve reduced 
the pay—a lot of the people supporting families cannot support a family on a 
wage like that. So people are moving out of town, and getting different jobs.  To 
compete with the Tysons and the IBPs, Hormel just keeps dropping the wages.49 
 
What stands out in this narrative from a vocal exclusionary ordinance supporter is that 
local residents do not perceive recent immigrants as responsible for the decline in wages.  
Residents frequently described the history of the meatpacking industry in Fremont and 
the decline in working conditions and wages after Hormel broke the union.  Knowing that 
history first hand, residents do not see immigrants as responsible for the deterioration of 
labor market conditions that began long before immigrants’ arrival.  Nor do native-born 
residents see recent immigrants as taking jobs, because native-born residents have mostly 
found more remunerative employment elsewhere and are largely no longer interested in 
meatpacking employment.  In the words of a white, native-born former meatpacking 
plant worker: “all these white kids who went to work there, they just didn’t last, they 
didn’t want to do that kind of work. Go down and ask ‘em if they worked there, and 
everybody will say that they had worked there, but that they just didn’t last.”50 
 Similarly, unemployment was not an issue that ordinance supporters in Fremont 
seemed to see as salient.  The unemployment rate in Fremont was rising somewhat in the 
years leading up to the ordinance passage, but remained well below the U.S. average (see 
tables 7.5 and 7.6).  Fremont had experienced a decline in its relative economic status 
compared to the region, and a decline in the median household income compared to the 
national median between 1980 and 2000 (see Table 7.6), but the decline appeared to have 
stabilized in the period between 2000 and 2010. 
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Table 7.5: National, State, and County Level Unemployment Rates 2000-2010 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
US 4.0 4.7 5.8 6.0 5.5 5.1 4.6 4.6 5.8 9.3 9.6 
NE 2.8 3.1 3.7 4.0 3.9 3.9 3.0 3.0 3.3 4.7 4.7 
Dodge 
County 
3.1 3.8 4.5 4.8 .7 4.5 3.4 3.2 3.4 5.1 5.0 
 
Table 7.6: Median Household Income as Percentage of U.S. Median Household Income 
 1980 1990 2000 2010 
Fremont 97.62% 82.41% 87.39% 88.37% 
 
Table 7.7: Percent Persons 25 years and over: Bachelor's degree or more 
 1990 2000 2010 
US 20.3 24.4 28.2 
NE 18.9 23.7 28.1 
Fremont 14.8 15.8 18.9 
 
 Fremont’s population was 98 percent white, non-Hispanic in 1990.  Fremont’s 
demographics subsequently began to shift as white, native-born workers left the local 
meatpacking plants for higher-paying jobs and Latinos moved to the city to fill those 
empty positions. By 2010, Fremont was 85 percent white, non-Hispanic and 12 percent 
Latino (see Tables 7.7 and 7.8). In 1998, the Fremont Tribune ran a cover article on the 
rise of Spanish speaking residents, estimating that there were about 300 Latino families in 
the city and that the Catholic Church had recently decided to start holding weekly 
Spanish masses.51  Latino respondents reported that the city had been a relatively 
welcoming home, until discussion about an immigration ordinance began in 2007.52  
Table 7.8: Percent White Non-Hispanic 1980-2010 
 1980 1990 2000 2010 
US 79.57 75.64 69.13 63.75 
NE 93.98 92.51 87.33 82.12 
Fremont 98.71 98.23 93.63 85.33 
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Table 7.9: Percent Hispanic 1980-2010 
 1980 1990 2000 2010 
US 6.45 8.99 12.55 16.35 
NE 1.79 2.34 5.52 9.17 
Fremont 0.47 0.70 4.31 11.93 
 
Table 7.10: Percent Foreign born 1980-2010 
 1980 1990 2000 2010 
US 6.2 8.0 11.1 12.9 
NE 2.0 1.8 4.4 6.3 
Fremont 1.4 1.2 3.0 7.1 
 
Several Fremont residents saw the city’s increasing Latino population in light of the 
immigration debates raging at the national level between 2006 and 2008 and identified an 
opportunity to make a local statement.  To express their opposition to illegal immigration, these 
residents convinced a Fremont city councilor to introduce an ordinance modeled after the Illegal 
Immigration Relief Act ordinance passed in Hazleton, PA.  The Fremont City Council rejected 
the proposed law in a 5-4 vote in 2008, but the ordinance’s proponents mobilized a signature 
drive to place the proposal on the ballot for a city-wide referendum.  The debate over the 
ordinance quickly divided the town.  For most of those even tangentially involved in the debate, 
the energy of the mobilization, the level of conflict, and the severity of the tension were 
unprecedented. 
Four primary sets of actors engaged in the debates over the ordinance: 1) a grassroots 
group of ordinance proponents, with connections to regional conservative activists, who 
catalyzed the initial effort to introduce the ordinance; 2) an overlapping but distinct grassroots 
group of ordinance proponents, with connections to some local elected officials, who pushed for 
the subsequent referendum on the ordinance; 3) a grassroots group of ordinance opponents, 
including native-born and immigrant residents who worked to highlight the negative impact of 





mayor and city council, supported by city staff, who voted down the ordinance and sought to 
block the referendum.  Perhaps the most important set of actors, however, were those who did 
not engage in the debates over the ordinance. 
On June 21, 2010, Fremont voters approved the ordinance by a 57 to 43 percent margin.  
Fremont’s Ordinance 5165 makes it a crime to “harbor an illegal alien” in any dwelling unit and 
requires every individual seeking to rent an apartment to apply for an “occupancy license” from 
the Fremont Police Department.  The occupancy license requires applicants to detail their 
immigration status, and the ordinance fines landlords for every day they rent to an individual 
without an occupancy license.  The ordinance also requires all businesses in Fremont to use the 
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services E-Verify system to confirm the work 
authorization of all new hires, and it empowers the City Attorney to revoke the business license 
of any employer who does not comply. 
The various individuals involved in promoting and opposing the ordinance had generally 
not been previously active in local politics.  The process through which they began to mobilize 
each other and their supporters was a dynamic one, as leaders reframed initial setbacks in order 
to generate greater mobilization and strategically responded to counter-movement attacks.  
Crucial to the ordinance supporters’ success was a transfer of leadership, from more marginal 
actors to more mainstream ones, and a concomitant change in framing. 
 
 
7.3 Framing and Boundaries 
 The effort to pass an immigration ordinance in Fremont started with a few residents who 
had connections to a small statewide conservative organization, the “Nebraska Advisory Group” 





She said that it was the 2006 immigrants’ rights march in Omaha that motivated her to take 
action against illegal immigration.  After becoming frustrated with existing conservative groups, 
such as the Minutemen, because all they “wanted to do was talk and talk,” Smith founded NAG.  
In contrast to how she felt about the Minutemen, Smith described NAG members as highly 
active: 
we rally, we protest, send emails, make phone calls. . . .  We attend pro-illegal-
alien events [to protest them] . .  . and question their censorship and biasing the 
panel towards pro illegal immigration issues.  We’re involved in political 
campaigns for conservative candidates willing to speak out publicly about illegal 
immigration.53 
 
Describing his initial involvement in the group, Fremont resident Andy Schnatz recounted how 
he joined the group shortly after its founding:  
I had heard about the Nebraska Advisory Group in Omaha, it may have been in 
the newspaper or something around 2006. . . . I went to Omaha for the meetings 
about once a week for a year. You had things to do, contact senators, contact 
congressmen, contact the president, contact ICE.  And at each meeting we had to 
say what we did to help the immigration problem we had.  And I presented my 
ideas.  We had about 25 or 30 people who showed up to the meetings.  I had my 
own little address book to keep in touch and keep things rolling.54 
 
Schnatz ultimately decided to start meetings in Fremont: “I talked to her [Susan Smith] and said, 
‘Why don’t we start one up here in Fremont?  We’ve got a lot of Hispanics here and I’m 
assuming there’s a lot of illegals.’”55  At the initial meeting at the Fremont library in March of 
2007, Schnatz introduced the issue by saying, “These people are coming into this country 
illegally.  They’re criminals, and they want rights. They have no rights.  I’m a veteran.  I just 
want my country back.”56  Smith explained to the participants that the founding of NAG was 
rooted in anger over undocumented immigration, saying, “We have illegal aliens who would 
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rather spit on us and spit on our flag than follow our laws . . . I wanted to do something about it, 
not just sit around and complain.”57  
Smith described this initial group of activists as “all citizens, a lot of us retired, a lot of us 
disabled. All expenses are paid out of our own pockets and no one receives a paycheck. We are 
an unofficial local citizens grassroots organization.”58  The initial stalwarts were largely Fremont 
residents on the margins of local social life, often with extreme views.  For instance, Schnatz 
concludes all of his emails saying, “we shed blood to build this country and we will shed blood 
again to take it back.”59  Indeed, Schnatz predicted that “we’re going to have a civil war, we’re 
being pushed into it by Washington.”  Schnatz argued that President Obama “wants to declare 
martial law, and then remain permanently in office.”60  Schnatz reported that he tells his wife, “If 
anything happens, pack your bags and get out, and I’ll stay and fight.”  He explained: 
I don’t want it to happen, but I think the wheels are turning towards it. People are 
getting more and more fed up, when they hear what’s happening. . . .  They’re 
sending 2,100 troops to the border—that’s a joke.  Immigration is the key issue in 
this. If the government isn’t going to do anything about it, it’s up to the states and 
cities, and if they won’t, we’ll take it into our own hands.61 
 
The meetings of local conservative activists at the Fremont Library continued for almost a year 
and involved study sessions and the development of action plans at the local and state-wide level.  
As a result of the library meetings, participants contacted City Councilor Bob Warner, the 80-
year-old long-serving representative of the city’s Fourth Ward, to urge him to introduce a local 
law about illegal immigration. 
Although the local activists spoke publicly most often about their concerns regarding 
illegal immigration nationally, they often referred to anxiety over immigration’s impact locally 
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as well.  One ordinance supporter commented: “Some people who were against this [ordinance], 
they started changing their tune when there would be a house for rent down the street and they 
[Hispanics] move in and they see there’s a couple families living there and not taking care of 
their yard, and their neighborhood starts changing….  You don’t want your neighborhood to go 
down.”62  The sentiment that Latino neighbors would bring the neighborhood down was 
frequently expressed by ordinance supporters, though concrete examples were few and far 
between.  The most common complaints described in interviews were changes such as more cars 
on the street and more barbeques in front or back yards.   
Another ordinance supporter associated recent immigrants with unscrupulous landlords  
and bad renters, saying: “There’s nothing that can devalue property faster than bad renters…. 
They [landlords] get four families in one house, and they’re getting rent from each of them.”63  
Bob Warner, who introduced the ordinance described the impetus for introducing the 
exclusionary policy partly in terms of overcrowded housing.  He said, “We have laws about how 
many people can live in an R1 or R2 and they [the city] are not enforcing those. That’s one of the 
biggest complaints I got was about multiple families in single family dwellings.”64   
Comments about housing and neighborhood concerns frequently referred to the nearby 
town of Schuyler, a smaller, more working class community that had become predominantly 
Latino in the preceding decade.  One ordinance proponent warned, “Go to Schuyler, it’s like 
‘Little Mexico.’  People are trying to move out of Schuyler into Fremont, but they can’t sell their 
houses.”65  The frequent references to Schuyler seemed to evoke a larger fear among native-born 
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residents of the city’s potential economic downgrading and their own possible cultural 
marginalization. 
At the May 13, 2008 City Council meeting, Warner introduced a proposal directing city 
staff to draft an ordinance that would ban any resident or business from harboring, hiring, or 
transporting illegal immigrants.  He said that he introduced the ordinance in response to citizen 
complaints about unpaid hospital bills and growing numbers of Spanish-speaking students 
enrolled in Fremont schools.66  He added that he was generally suspicious of the number of 
adults in Fremont who seemed not to speak English.67  The motion passed 5 votes to 3. The City 
Attorney contacted Kris Kobach, who assisted in drafting a revised ordinance based on Kobach’s 
efforts to pass similar policies in other cities and states.  Fremont’s City Administrator, Bob 
Hartwig, acknowledged that the revised draft “was largely prepared by the Immigration Reform 
Law Institute,” the legal wing of the restrictionist national organization the Federation for 
American Immigration Reform.68  This revised ordinance was placed on the agenda for the July 
29, 2008 meeting.   
In a turnout unprecedented in Fremont City Council history, more than 1,000 people 
arrived for the meeting, which the council had moved from the municipal building to the 
Fremont High School auditorium.  Audience members testified for and against the ordinance for 
more than four hours.  The city council then voted 7-1 to suspend the rules requiring a third 
hearing for a local ordinance so that they could resolve the issue then and there. The vote on the 
ordinance resulted in a 4-4 split, which would have defeated the proposal.  Mayor Edwards then 
added his vote opposing the ordinance and read a brief statement, in which he emphasized that 
“control of illegal immigration is a federal issue.”  He explained, “I’m bound by the law, too. All 
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of us want something done to correct the situation. We can help best by pressuring the U.S. 
government to take action.”69    
The issue seemed resolved and the proposed ordinance dead.  At this point, however, 
leadership of the movement supporting the ordinance shifted from the somewhat socially 
marginal actors, who had catalyzed the effort by organizing the library meetings, to a new group 
of more mainstream leaders who had gotten to know each other through the library meetings and 
through the local veterans club, and who continued to push the effort forward.  Wanda Kotas, the 
manager of the Fremont Veterans Club, John Wiegert, a fifth grade teacher, and Jerry Hart, a 
retired Internal Revenue Service accountant, were all angered by the July 29, 2008 City Council 
meeting and decided to press for a popular referendum.  In September, they started gathering the 
required signatures to force a popular vote.  Although they continued to discuss what they saw as 
the costs of undocumented immigration, this new group reframed the issue in more local terms, 
as being about an injustice done to Bob Warner and unfairness within city leadership.  As 
Wiegert described it: 
They [the other city councilors] had promised Bob that it would go the full three 
readings.  They brought busloads of Hispanics from elsewhere, from Schuyler, 
from Columbus, they brought kids, and kids have no place being at a meeting like 
this, and they tried to fill the auditorium to keep citizens from it. . . .  They had 
promised Bob they were going to go three readings, and then they decided at the 
second one, saying they were going to suspend the rules and vote that night.  How 
can you listen to these 75 people and then decide right away?  You need to go 
home and think about it, and maybe you’ll get 100 calls saying, “We’re for this.”  
And maybe that would help them make a clear decision.  I was upset that they 
broke their promise to Bob and didn’t hear people speak.  It was a 4-4 tie, and 
then the mayor voted.  The mayor said he was going to read a prepared statement, 
and we looked at each other, and said how could he have a prepared a statement?  
That’s what really irritated a lot of people.70 
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This shift in leadership and framing marked a turning point for the ordinance supporters, 
extending the resonance of the movement.  Whereas the original catalysts were more 
fringe actors, such as Susan Smith and Andy Schnatz, the shift to Kotas, Hart, and 
Wiegert moved the face of the ordinance supporters more to the mainstream.  All three 
were long-time Fremont residents with deep roots in the city, with Wiegert working in 
nearby public schools and Kotas well-connected to residents through her role at the 
Veteran’s Club.  As a former accountant at the Internal Revenue Service, Hart brought 
legitimacy to claims about the local expenses of undocumented immigration and the 
dangers of identity theft. 
The framing also changed dramatically to highlight the local injustice.  Whereas 
the original study group had publicly emphasized what they saw as the problem of illegal 
immigration nationally and the need to make a local statement on this national issue, the 
new leadership suddenly had a concrete local injustice.  Although the demographics of 
Fremont were slowly shifting there were not any dramatic local changes that could be 
attributed to it.  There had been no high-profile crimes by undocumented immigrants that 
ordinance supporters could highlight, local residents knew that recent arrivals were not 
displacing residents from jobs, and the city budget was well-balanced—in short, despite 
anxieties about neighborhood change, there were no concrete negative local impacts of 
immigration to which ordinance advocates could point.  Instead, the new leadership 
capitalized on their position as underdogs after the City Council’s rejection of the 
proposal and repeatedly framed the issue in terms of the local injustice they felt that the 





appeal of the pro-ordinance movement to include those who were not so passionate about 
immigration but who generally felt alienated from local elites. 
Announcing the petition drive for a referendum, Kotas implicitly separated herself 
from those who could be seen as political gadflies by emphasizing how new this type of 
activism was for her, telling a reporter that “This is my first political issue I’ve gotten so 
passionate about.”71  Kotas did not highlight the national immigration statistics that had 
been discussed at the library meetings but instead framed the issue in terms of local 
democracy, saying “I think this is an issue the taxpayers should decide on and the citizens 
of Fremont should have the right to vote on.”72  Jerry Hart similarly explained that it was 
the city council’s handling of the vote that motivated him, and he framed the issue 
broadly in terms of local democracy: “I thought it wasn’t done fairly and that people 
deserve to have a vote.”73   
Relying on this highly local framing, Kotas, Hart, and Wiegert started gathering 
signatures.  They obtained lists of registered voters from Bob Warner, called to give 
potential supporters their pitch, and when they found someone willing to sign-on, rushed 
over to collect the signature in person.  By February 23, 2009, when they submitted their 
petition to the city, Kotas, Hart, and Wiegert had collected 3,343 valid signatures, more 
than 20 percent of the qualified voters in Fremont. 
The city sued, arguing that under Nebraska law the proposal could not be put on 
the ballot because the ordinance addressed more than one subject and also was preempted 
by federal law (City of Fremont v. Kotas, 279 Neb. 720, 721 (2010)).  The Nebraska 
Supreme Court rejected the city’s challenge and the ordinance was scheduled for a vote 
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on June 21, 2010 (City of Fremont, 279 Neb. at 725-28).  The ordinance supporters added 
the city’s suit to their list of grievances, pointing to it as another example of elected 
officials’ efforts to deny residents a vote on the issue. 
The Nebraska Political Accountability and Disclosure Act prohibits public 
officials and employees from using any public resources to support or oppose a ballot 
question.  City officials and staff felt they were thus largely constrained from effectively 
rebutting arguments put forth by ordinance supporters.  In the face of an onslaught of 
questionable data from ordinance supporters, the city put forward its best estimates of the 
minimal impacts that the unknown (and likely very small) number of local undocumented 
residents had on the city.  City officials also emphasized the potential costs that the city 
could incur in defending against litigation, highlighting the costly and unsuccessful legal 
defenses paid for by the cities of Hazleton, PA and Farmers Branch, TX, which had 
passed similar laws.  Several city leaders tried to minimize any vocal expressions of 
conflict and generally tried to silence debate on the issue, discouraging ordinance 
opponents from renting billboard space or speaking out publicly.  
The most vocal opponents of the ordinance were members of “One Fremont, One 
Future,” an organization founded by Fremont residents in response to the referendum 
drive.  The organization sought to bring together Anglo and Latino residents, to foster 
greater understanding of the realities of immigration in Fremont, and to defeat the 
ordinance.  Kristin Ostrom was a primary spokesperson for the organization and worked 
closely with life-long Fremont resident and long-time ESL teacher, Krista Kjeldgaard and 
her co-worker Michelle Knapp to reach out to the Latino community.  Young Latina 





having on the Latino community in general and young people in particular.  One 
Fremont, One Future catalyzed support from several other local groups—the Fremont 
Area Ministerial Association, the Fremont Chamber of Commerce, the United Food and 
Commercial Workers Local 22 (the union representing meatpacking workers), and 




From the contested council meeting where the ordinance was first voted down, tensions 
ran high.  As a local resident and former meatpacking plant worker pointed out: 
There’s a lot of boisterous people in this 57 percent [who voted for the ordinance] 
and they don’t have any problem at all with trying to embarrass you and make 
you feel intimidated or threatened and I think that’s a lot of it. . . .  [Plus], people 
were coming from Omaha, from all over, from skinheads, the Minutemen, they 
had Arizona flags waving, the Confederate flag, and this scares people from 
participating, from even going to the meetings.  People see this and say, “I ain’t 
going in there, I ain’t saying nothing.” You don’t want to get nose to nose with 
someone who might club you. It’s an intimidation thing. . . .  We’ve got good 
people here, but they’re intimidated.74 
 
Once mobilization of ordinance supporters and immigrant advocates had begun, there was a 
process of escalation as boundaries were drawn and new tactics and types of claims making were 
developed.  This mobilization, however, took very different forms for ordinance supporters and 
ordinance opponents. 
Ordinance opponents tried to hold events that would bring Latino and Anglo residents 
together, from picnics to dances to study sessions at churches.  One Fremont, One Future went 
door-to-door leafleting, discussing the ordinance with residents, and trying to build their 
                                                 





volunteer base.  They also sought to gather accurate local and national data to inject into the 
debate. 
But once the petition was approved and the election loomed, several of the core 
ordinance supporters increasingly began making personal attacks against those who spoke out 
against it.  The uncertainty surrounding the referendum and the consolidation of a vocal, 
organized opposition in One Fremont, One Future generated a heightened sense of threat that 
prompted ordinance supporters “to engage in reactive mobilization on an escalating basis” 
(McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001: 97). 
One of the ordinance proponents described the mindset that she brought to mobilizing 
Fremont residents in support of the ordinance: 
You have to have a thick skin. I was in sales, in outside sales for the security 
industry and I think that helped make me more outspoken.  I come from a large 
family so you learn to scrap around to get a chair at the table.  I just think a 
person’s experience, if you’ve been knocked around enough, you learn not to be 
afraid of anything or anyone.  And it takes a fearless kind of attitude to take on 
this issue and endure it, because there is a lot of abuse, but if you feel like you 
have nothing to lose, there’s nothing that anyone can say or do to you.75 
 
The emphasis on an almost militant, underdog mindset was common among ordinance 
supporters who reinforced in each other a sense of the rightness of their cause and a commitment 
to ignoring opposing viewpoints.   
 Ordinance supporters generally saw the issue as a zero-sum conflict.  As one of the 
sponsors of the referendum, John Weigert, said, “A lot of them are coming here for the American 
dream and they’re causing nothing but an American nightmare to me.”76  The possibility that 
new residents, documented or undocumented, and native-born residents could coexist was not 
tenable—newcomers’ dream was existing residents’ nightmare.  Similarly, mutual 
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accommodation was unacceptable. Another ordinance supporter explained: “They want to have 
their own heritage, speak their own language.  But if they want to come here, they should learn 
the language and participate in the things that we want.”77 
A local Latino resident, Luis Canahui described the shift that took place during the debate 
over the ordinance: “before the ordinance, people looked at us as the same [as they are], but 
since the ordinance, all you hear is the words ‘illegals,’ ‘illegals,’ ‘illegals,’ and when they see 
someone who isn’t white, someone who is Hispanic, it’s like we are surrounded by a cloud, that 
all who are Hispanic are illegal.”78  By contrast, ordinance supporters consistently described 
whites as “legal citizens.” As in Hazleton, the creation of these paired identities in opposition to 
one another (“illegal aliens” as opposed to “legal citizens”) effectively foreclosed the possibility 
of being seen as both “legal” and an “alien” or being both Latino and a citizen. 
The struggle over the ordinance redrew both the boundaries Fremont residents saw as 
delimiting their community from the outside and the boundaries dividing it internally.  The 
explicit narrative of ordinance supporters proclaimed that those who were in the country without 
legal authorization did not belong in the United States, and automatically therefore did not 
belong in Fremont either.  There was little room left in Fremont for civil dialogue, for legal 
immigrants, or, U.S. born Latinos felt, for them either. 
 
7.5 Conclusion 
Although the initial framing of the ordinance as a statement about immigration issues 
resonated with some residents who were concerned about the changes they were witnessing in 
Fremont, the transfer of leadership and the concomitant reframing in terms of local political 
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injustices and local class anxieties were crucial to the ordinance’s broader appeal by the time of 
the referendum.  Hart, Kotas, and Wiegert painted city officials as corrupt insiders and ordinance 
opponents as outside agitators, claiming for themselves the mantle of champions of local 
democracy.  They portrayed the referendum on the ordinance as much a referendum on local 
democracy as a vote on local immigration issues, and this reframing extended their base of 
support.  Reactive movements, such as the movement for Fremont’s ordinance, can gain initial 
momentum by appealing to fears or prejudices, but then often find that their extreme positions 
have constructed such a narrow collective identity that they limit the movement’s ability to grow 
(McVeigh, Myers, and Sikkink, 2004).  The shift of attention to what they portrayed as a 
concrete unfairness in local politics allowed the ordinance supporters to add to their initial 
mobilization based on fears and grievances an additional “injustice frame” that defined the 
actions of local authorities as unjust (Klandermans et al. 1999). 
The asymmetrical and escalating mobilization by ordinance supporters relied on the 
creation of paired categories in opposition to each other: legal citizens, and illegal aliens who had 
no place in Fremont.  The clearest boundaries drawn in the process of mobilization were between 
white residents who were presumed to be citizens and to belong and Latinos who were presumed 





Chapter 8: Grand Island, NE 
 
8.1 Introduction 
At first glance, Grand Island seems to be an unlikely champion of immigrants’ rights.  
Beginning during World War I and continuing through the 1920s, Grand Island was a hotbed of 
Ku Klux Klan activism and intimidation targeting foreign born residents.  A century later, 
however, public officials and local civic leaders in Grand Island have repeatedly created 
innovative programs to integrate the city’s rapidly growing immigrant population into social and 
civic life.   
Grand Island was settled on the banks of the Platte River in 1857 by German immigrants, 
funded by an Iowa bank, in anticipation of the arrival of the transcontinental railroad.  The Union 
Pacific Railroad arrived in 1866 and the city grew up around the railroad in the ensuing decades. 
During and after the First World War, the Ku Klux Klan was active attacking immigrant 
institutions and promoting “All-Americanism.”  In March 1918, hundreds of books in German 
were found burned in Grand Island Senior High School.  Yellow paint (representing traitors) was 
smeared across the offices of the Grand Island Independent, which had an editor in chief of 
German descent, and the Liederkranz auditorium, a German cultural society, where a note was 
left stating: 
We advise you to change the name of your society or we will change it for you. 
Also we suggest that you have a general cleanup of your pro-German members. 
We take this means of notifying you and expect immediate results. This is the 
beginning of the end.  By order of the K.K.K.”   
 
(Letheby 2007: 108; see also Chalmers 1981).  Stores in Grand Island posted signs 
saying, “Speak English Only.”  German Congregations in Grand Island were told that 





proceedings in English and keep English language records for inspection.  The local 
German language newspaper discontinued publication under the pressure (Letheby 2007).  
Even after the War, the Ku Klux Klan in Grand Island was undeterred and increasing in 
popularity.  In October 1924, the Klan signed a five year lease for the use of Harmony 
Hall as their local headquarters. By 1927, they were advertising a parade of “2,000 robed 
Klansmen, Klanswomen, Junior Klansmen, and Tri-K girls” culminating in “a nonradical 
American address” (Letheby 2007: 118). The Ku Klux Klan subsequently experienced a 
rapid decline as groups such as the NAACP created public education campaigns to 
expose the Klan’s abuses and the Midwest’s “Grand Dragon” was convicted of rape and 
second degree murder.  
Grand Island grew substantially during the Second World War, when it was the site of the 
Cornhusker Ordinance Plant, the Grand Island Army Airfield, and two sites housing German 
prisoners of war who worked in agriculture and construction.  After the war, the city returned to 
a more agriculturally based economy with one of the largest employers being the sugar beet 
industry. The sugar factory closed in 1964, but in the same year the Swift company opened a 
meat processing plant and New Holland opened a factory to produce combines, shifting Grand 
Island’s economy towards manufacturing linked to agriculture. 
One of the most significant events in Grand Island occurred on the night of June 3, 1980, 
when seven different tornadoes touched down in the city, killing five people, injuring more than 
200, and obliterating whole neighborhoods.  President Carter declared the city a disaster area and 
visited several days later as residents continued to pitch in to help their neighbors clean up and 
rebuild.  The fear, the devastation, and the widespread cooperation in rebuilding are widely 





The restructuring of the meatpacking industry in the 1980s drastically reduced wages at 
Grand Island’s meatpacking plant.  Increased productivity demands, reduced wages, and the 
health risks of meatpacking work led to high-rates of turnover in the plant and eventually an 
increasingly diverse workforce.  Immigrants from Africa, Asia, and Latin America increasingly 
filled the positions on the plant’s killing floor as white workers found higher paying jobs 
elsewhere.  Even after re-unionizing, improving safety, and rising wages, the plant’s workforce 
was overwhelmingly foreign born by the beginning of the 21st century.  
As the city’s immigrant population grew, Grand Island’s civic and political leaders 
developed a number of innovative policies to support new residents.  For instance, the school 
system created a Welcome Center to speed new students’ integration into classes, the city 
supported the creation of a non-profit designed to facilitate immigrant incorporation and forge 
bonds between native and foreign born residents, doctors formed a free clinic at which they 
volunteered their services to treat patients without insurance, and the Chamber of Commerce 
organized an entrepreneurship program to support immigrant business owners.  The changes in 
Grand Island were not without tension, but civic leaders and elected officials overwhelmingly 
adopted a welcoming stance and worked to turn inclusive words into action. 
The depth of the city’s commitment to its new residents was tested on December 12, 
2006 when Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) raided the Swift meatpacking plant.  
More than 1,000 ICE agents conducted simultaneous raids at six Swift plants nationwide, and 
ICE arrested 261 workers out of the 2,600 employed at Grand Island’s plant.  The raid struck 
fear into Grand Island’s recent arrivals, and also concern among civic leaders that it could lead to 
a backlash by native-born residents against the immigrant community.  Instead, residents 





whose parents had been arrested, clergy, city officials, non-profit staff, and union representatives 
gathering to support families who had had members detained and assure other residents that they 
were safe using city services.   
What factors contributed to Grand Island’s innovative, welcoming response to the rapid 
immigration that it experienced?  What can explain city residents’ unifying, positive response to 
the ICE raids?  After reviewing relevant economic and demographic history, this chapter 
describes the social processes that enabled Grand Island residents to welcome and support 
foreign-born neighbors despite both a history of nativism and controversial recent events, like the 
2006 raid.   
 
8.2 Economic and Demographic Background 
Grand Island is a largely working class city.  As in Fremont, more than 20 percent of its 
employed population worked in manufacturing in 2010—double the U.S. average.  The largest 
employers in the city are JBS Swift & Company, the U.S. subsidiary of the world’s largest beef 
and pork processor; Chief Industries, a locally based manufacturing company with roots in the 
construction industry; the Catholic non-profit St. Francis Medical Center; and Case New 
Holland, a manufacturer of agricultural and construction equipment.   In contrast to the U.S. 
economy as a whole, in which the percentage of workers employed in manufacturing has fallen 
by more than half since 1980, manufacturing has grown from 16 percent of Grand Island’s 







Table 8.1: Percent Employed Persons 16 Years and Over: Agriculture, forestry, fisheries, mining 
 1980 1990 2000 2010 
U.S. 4.0 2.7 1.9 1.9 
NE 11.0 8.3 5.6 4.7 
Fremont 1.7 1.7 1.4 1.8 
Grand Island 1.7 1.8 2.0 2.4 
 
Table 8.2: Percent Employed Persons 16 Years and Over: Manufacturing 
 1980 1990 2000 2010 
US 22.4 17.7 14.1 10.5 
NE 13.8 12.7 12.3 10.5 
Fremont 26.9 21.9 20.4 22.5 
Grand Island 16.6 17.8 18.9 21.8 
 
Table 8.3: Percent Employed Persons 16 Years and Over: Retail trade 
 1980 1990 2000 2010 
US 16.1 16.8 11.7 11.6 
NE 16.9 17.9 12.1 11.6 
Fremont 22.6 21.4 15.5 12.2 
Grand Island 22.7 22.2 15.8 16.0 
 
Table 8.4: Percent Employed Persons 16 Years and Over: Finance, insurance, and real estate 
 1980 1990 2000 2010 
U.S. 6.0 6.9 6.9 6.7 
NE 6.1 6.8 7.7 7.6 
Fremont 5.4 6.0 5.2 6.7 
Grand Island 5.1 4.7 6.5 4.5 
 
Nebraska historically has had one of the lowest levels of unemployment in the nation, 
and unemployment in Grand Island has roughly tracked the state’s average over the past decade 
(see Figure 8.5).  In 2010, unemployment in Hall County, where Grand Island is located, stood at 
4.5 percent, one-half of a percentage point below the rate in Fremont.   
 As in Fremont, respondents did not have a sense that immigrants were “taking” jobs from 
the native born.  Workers in the packing plant again framed the changes in terms of the union 





The plant used to be one of the better places to work—there was a waiting list to 
get hired. It was unionized back then, . . . and the union was strong.  But then 
when Monfort’s bought it [the plant], the . . . union didn’t last very long.  After 
that, the UFCW [United Food and Commercial Workers] came in and tried to 
organize, and they [Monfort’s] used to say, “if it’s unionized, we’ll close these 
doors.” It was a long fight. The wages were terrible. The Swift workers before 
Monfort were making good money, maybe $10.69 back then. . . .  But in ’88, 
when I came back, I was making $6.75.  Meatpacking really took a hit in the ‘80s. 
But by ’97, you felt you had a little backing after that union contract. The money 
wasn’t great—a dime increase a year for four years after the union.  But safety 
conditions, that was a big issue.  Five people were killed at the plant before there 
was a union, and since then, no deaths. That’s probably the biggest thing.79 
 
The respondent detailed the significant changes in wages and working conditions without 
reference to immigration or immigrant workers. When asked specifically about changes 
in the demographics of the workforce, the respondent added: 
I worked on the kill floor area, and if I remember right, there was about 45 
Caucasians and 2 Hispanics. That was in ‘88. Over the years, there were more and 
more Hispanics.  And a few Vietnamese . . .  [I]t really changed. Probably by the 
time we got the [union] contract in ‘97 it was near the opposite, maybe 80 percent 
Hispanic and 20 percent Caucasians on the kill floor. . . .80 
 
The dramatic change in the workforce was similarly noted without a sense that 
immigrants had taken jobs from native-born workers.  As in Fremont, there was a sense 
that whites had left jobs that immigrants were filling as opposed to immigrants 
undercutting whites for desired positions. 
Table 8.5: National, State, and County Level Unemployment Rates 2000-2010 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
US 4.0 4.7 5.8 6.0 5.5 5.1 4.6 4.6 5.8 9.3 9.6 
NE 2.8 3.1 3.7 4.0 3.9 3.9 3.0 3.0 3.3 4.7 4.7 
Dodge 
County 
3.1 3.8 4.5 4.8 .7 4.5 3.4 3.2 3.4 5.1 5.0 
Hall 
County 
2.9 3.3 4.0 4.4 4.9 3.9 3.0 2.7 3.1 4.3 4.5 
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics 
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Table 8.6: Median HH Income as Percentage of National Median HH Income 
 1980 1990 2000 2010 
Fremont 97.62% 82.41% 87.39% 88.37% 
Grand Island 93.18% 83.24% 85.83% 85.01% 
 
Table 8.7: Percent Persons 25 years and over: Bachelor's degree or more 
 1990 2000 2010 
US 20.3 24.4 28.2 
NE 18.9 23.7 28.1 
Fremont 14.8 15.8 18.9 
Grand Island 14.6 15.8 16.1 
 
A large manufacturing sector and low unemployment has not protected Grand Island 
from the stagnant or declining working- and middle-class wages characterizing U.S. economic 
development since the 1970s.  Adjusted for inflation, Grand Island’s median household income 
in 2009 was six percent less than it had been three decades earlier ($43,764 compared with 
$46,373 in 1979, in 2009 constant dollars).  The gap between incomes in Grand Island and the 
national median grew over the same period: Grand Island’s household income fell from 93 
percent to 85 percent of the national median (see Table 7.2).  The percentage of Grand Island’s 
population in poverty nearly doubled between 1980 and 2010, from 7 percent to 13 percent. 
Nonetheless, compared to Fremont, Grand Island’s economy looked somewhat more 
stable partially because it had always been a more working class community.  Fremont, once 
closer to the national median income, had fallen further.  Homeownership rates in Grand Island 
remained nearly constant from 1980 to 2010 (63 percent to 61 percent), while in Fremont they 
fell significantly from 67 percent in 1980 to 61 percent in 2010.  There was a sense that the 
economy in Grand Island was at least holding steady, despite the national recession.  As one 





we’ve lost some jobs and lost some benefits [with the recession], but people have found other 
jobs. We have a very low unemployment rate.”81  
Other respondents pointed to forward thinking investments by the city that diversified the 
local economy: “Economically Grand Island is very outward looking and progressive.  In things 
like infrastructure, out at Fonner Park they [city officials] took this huge leap of faith and built 
this events center, and then took this leap of faith and said we think the State Fair should be 
located in Grand Island. . . . The [state highway] 281 corridor is exploding with franchises, 
hotels, and big box stores. In 1980 that was all corn fields.  And now it is exploding.”82  After 
significant investment in infrastructure and lobbying by Grand Island’s leadership, the Nebraska 
State Legislature voted in 2008 to move the struggling State Fair to Grand Island’s Fonner Park 
after 109 years in Lincoln.  That move led to $42 million of investment in preparing the new fair 
grounds and creating expanded event facilities that draw events to Grand Island year round. 
Even though the economy remained relatively stable, what did change drastically in 
Grand Island in the two decades after 1990 was the demographic composition of its population.  
In 1980 and 1990, Grand Island’s population was more than 90 percent white non-Hispanic (see 
Table 8.7).  By 2010, Grand Island was only 69 percent white non-Hispanic and more than 25 
percent Latino (see Tables 8.7 and 8.8).  Over the same time period the percentage of its 
population that was foreign born rose from 1 percent to 14 percent (see Table 8.9). 
Table 8.8: Percent White Non-Hispanic 1980-2010 
 1980 1990 2000 2010 
US 79.57 75.64 69.13 63.75 
NE 93.98 92.51 87.33 82.12 
Fremont 98.71 98.23 93.63 85.33 
Grand Island 95.98 93.26 81.42 68.59 
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Table 8.9: Percent Hispanic 1980-2010 
 1980 1990 2000 2010 
US 6.45 8.99 12.55 16.35 
NE 1.79 2.34 5.52 9.17 
Fremont 0.47 0.70 4.31 11.93 
Grand Island 3.21 4.79 15.94 26.65 
 
Table 8.10: Percent Foreign born 1980-2010 
 1980 1990 2000 2010 
US 6.2 8.0 11.1 12.9 
NE 2.0 1.8 4.4 6.3 
Fremont 1.4 1.2 3.0 7.1 
Grand Island 1.2 2.4 9.6 13.8 
 
8.3 Framing and Boundaries 
The sense of economic stability, paired with a strong working-class identity created an 
opening for a more class-based sense of solidarity with recent immigrants and the construction of 
an inclusive local identity.  Respondents from all class backgrounds repeatedly described Grand 
Island as a “blue collar town.”83  A former mayor, Margaret Hornady, stated: “It’s a blue collar 
town—it’s taken me almost all my life to come to grips with that.  My daughter is a concert 
violinist and the other a painter, so you know where my tastes run. But that [manufacturing] is 
where the jobs are, and they [immigrant residents] are doing this work.”84  Referring to the blue-
collar identity, respondents frequently described recent immigrants as fitting in well with the 
community’s core values.   
The consistent implication of the reference to a “blue collar town” was that Grand Island 
is a humble, hard-working community that does not think it is better than anyone who wants to 
live there.  A local clergy member described the role that recent Latino arrivals played in Grand 
Island:  
                                                 
83 Interviews by author in Grand Island, NE, February 19, 23, and 24, 2011 and November 13, 2013.  Interview by 
author in Lincoln, NE, February 24, 2011.  





This is a very blue collar town. I come from Kearney [50 miles west of Grand 
Island] and Kearney has the university and the big regional hospital and Kearney 
operates on a white collar level and there are Hispanics in Kearney, but they are 
very invisible. It’s not as welcoming of a town.  But the people here just figure, 
“Hey we’re going about our lives doing our thing and so are these new 
immigrants, they may need to learn English, but fundamentally we’re doing the 
same thing.”85 
  
Respondents generally spoke with pride about the city, highlighting its working class character, 
its strong work ethic, and confidence that they could count on their neighbors to rise to their 
support in times of crisis or hardship.  A local public official recognized the city’s limitations, 
but like others, framed an inclusive identity that implicitly included more recent arrivals: “We’re 
blue collar, we’re high crime. We do have bigots, we do have racists.  We’ve got issues.  But 
we’re a thriving community, overall a caring community, a real good community.  When there’s 
a crisis, people step up.”86  The repeated framing of the city’s core values as hard work and 
caring consistently led people to proudly identify themselves with the city and to see that identity 
as including recent immigrants who they perceived as generally sharing the same commitments.  
 The rapid immigration that came with the meatpacking plants was recognized as a 
challenge, but also as an example of the welcoming spirit that residents identified with the city: 
[a] big challenge is that Grand Island is not only a community of immigration, but 
unlike other communities, it’s instantaneous with the meatpacking plant. . . . 
[T]hey’ll recruit workers and overnight we can go from no Somalis to 600, or no 
Cubans to 600.  Boom, overnight.  There’s a population dropped in our 
community, overnight, with no support system, with nothing. To cut meat you 
don’t have to read or write and you can make $13 to $17 with benefits.  The 
people who come here are not always well-educated—often there is not a lot of 
formal education. That’s a struggle for them.  And when you work as hard as they 
do to make a living, you don’t always have the energy after work to go and take 
ESL classes. . . . But if you did that in other communities—dropped that many 
people in there from another culture, without a social network or support—most 
communities wouldn’t adapt as well.  We adapt, we learn to live with them, we 
accept them, we move forward.87 
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The respondent here recognizes the challenges for the city, and the challenges for 
immigrant workers, with limited education, working long hours.  Instead of seeing new 
residents as needing to assimilate to what residents in Fremont wanted, the respondent in 
Grand Island notes that “we adapt,” “we accept them,” and implicitly, we move forward 
together.  Indeed, welcoming diversity was often described as part of what it means to be 
a contemporary resident of Grand Island. 
A Latino respondent, asked if there were tensions among native-born residents 
over immigration commented on the shared concerns that united native-born and 
immigrant residents:  
I think in Grand Island, the native people here are more worrying about the future 
of the children. And the future of the community. I’m going to mention again the 
United Way, they are very worried about how this community is going to turn out 
and that includes the immigrants, because senior high has a large number of 
immigrant students. They are including the immigrants in the plans they have for 
this community.88 
 
This Latino respondent had the sense that instead of seeking to exclude immigrants, residents are 
including immigrants in planning for the future.  
 Local residents expressed some concerns about older substandard housing in the city, but 
suggested that these concerns would be best addressed by holding landlords to higher standards 
not seeking to exclude certain tenants.  One respondent commented, “I look at our housing 
inspections and rental standards and landlord accountability, and although it is good, it could be 
greatly improved. . . . The housing inspectors are key for that, trying to get landlords to fix up 
their properties.”89  Reflecting on the changes the city had experienced, another respondent 
picked out housing as a concern, but again focused responsibility on landlords: “One thing I 
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don’t like. I don’t like that we have landlords in this town who rent outside the boundaries of the 
law, who take advantage of people because they know that people won’t complain.”90  A public 
official raised housing as priority, saying, “I wish we could do more. The city cares. There’s a 
monster in every community. Ours is substandard housing. . . . But boy it takes a lot of resources 
to go after that. . . . If we could, I would like to see better housing for everyone.”91  The city has 
focused on trying to improve the housing stock, for instance working with the Nebraska 
Investment Finance Authority and the Grand Island Community Redevelopment Authority to 
transform a former school into 88 units of affordable housing with Low Income Housing Tax 
Credit and Historic Tax Credit funding.  The redevelopment also included space for community 
organizations and became a site from which the Grand Island Public Schools and the 
Multicultural Coalition conducted outreach.  
 As in Easton, residents frequently connected current generations of immigrants to 
previous generations.  Acknowledging some discomfort, one respondent explicitly recognized 
parallels with the hostility that earlier generations of immigrants faced:  
We are still a country of immigrants, I think, and the fact that they are a little 
different from what we are comfortable with is not unusual either. . . . People look 
at Nebraska and say isn’t it quaint that we have Czech days in one place, St. 
Patty’s day in another place, that we have “Greek Towns.”  What they don’t 
recognize is that the reason they celebrate these holidays in those communities is 
because previous generations of immigrants gathered together for safety to avoid 
the treatment they got in other places.92 
 
This representation of the past complicates romantic notions of the melting pot, recognizing that 
current immigrants may face some hostility and this hostility parallels the discrimination against 
previous generations of immigrants that we now recognize as having been unjust.  He went on to 
describe discrimination against his grandparents’ generation of Irish Catholic immigrants and 
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suggested that Cinco de Mayo will soon be as widely and happily celebrated in Grand Island as 
St. Patrick’s Day. This sense of connection with earlier generations was evoked by a staff 
member at the hospital describing an event that was held reviewing a document listing former 
patients that had been embedded in the cornerstone of the hospital in 1911: “they were from all 
over the world, from all over Europe, from Turkey, from China, and it had you remembering that 
this hospital got its start taking care of immigrant populations, and you recognize that you have a 
legacy to do these things, and you talk about that, and recognize that the challenge back then was 
that these same populations then didn’t have any money either!”93  The connection to earlier 
generations of immigrants emerged as a motivating reminder of the importance of serving the 
city’s current immigrant community.  
 Framing the city as a “blue collar” town where people supported each other created a 
local identity that was not based on race, ethnicity, or nationality but that could expand to include 
new residents and, indeed, inspire support for those new residents.  Drawing connections to 
previous generations of immigrants, recognizing the challenges faced by previous generations, 
and highlighting the ways in which local institutions served prior generations of the foreign-born 
created another form in which new arrivals could be seen as already belonging.  This framing 
was matched by actions of both public and private local institutions to mobilize in support of 
local immigrant residents. 
 
8.4 Mobilization 
Multiple respondents described initial tension regarding the increased rate of Latino 
arrivals in the 1990s.  Two respondents specifically described a sentiment expressed by some 
local elites in the late 1990s that the city should move to close the packing plant because those 
                                                 





residents “thought it was a bad influence on the community, in bringing Hispanics in larger and 
larger amounts, and they thought it was going to make it unsafe to walk around, that there would 
be more crime.”94  The response among local civic and political leaders was to reach out to 
residents to counter this hostility.  
The response emerged in part from local civil society organizations. A large proportion of 
Grand Island’s voluntary organizations focus on community service and on youth development, 
including groups such as Habitat for Humanity, the United Way, the YWCA, YMCA, Big 
Brothers/Big Sisters, and the Boys and Girls Club.  The city also has a number of organizations 
focusing on celebrating Grand Island’s cultural heritage, including the Liederkranz, the German 
singing society founded by immigrants to Grand Island in 1871, and the Platt-Deutsche club 
founded in 1884 as a form of mutual support society, and the Ethnic Festival, organizing an 
annual celebration of Grand Island’s cultures.  
Several of these organizations started programs explicitly talking about the demographic 
changes the city was experiencing.  One program was called “Table Talk” and brought Grand 
Island residents together at each other’s homes to speak frankly about race and race relations in 
the city.  Another program, called “Cultural Connections,” convened members of the YWCA to 
learn about immigrant experiences in the city—about the countries immigrants were coming 
from, about their migration journey, and other relevant topics.  
Experiences such as these encouraged residents not to ignore negative comments about 
immigrants but to confront them.  For instance, a white Grand Island resident stated that, “When 
I hear nonsense at the post office, you know two old white men who are talking in line, saying, 
‘You know, why can’t they speak English?’, I say, ‘You know your grandfather spoke German 
                                                 





and I bet he couldn’t even sign his name.’  I know I’m not the only person here who does it.”95  
In this comment, the repeated framing of current generations as connected to previous 
generations makes it an easily available frame for the respondent that she expects will be widely 
understood.  The same respondent described keeping track of state legislation regarding 
immigration issues and knowing the local state senator from the church choir.  She noted that the 
senator “and I are very politically opposite, but we have cordial, respectful conversations. . . . It’s 
all about the relationships—if we dare to be in relationships in one another, we cease to see 
things in such a black or white, right or wrong way.”  Unlike in Fremont, where immigration 
issues divided even the native-born white residents, here there was a sense that differences of 
opinion could be respected and accepted. 
A local teacher described a similar sense of a widespread commitment among local 
institutions and local residents to do the right thing with regard to new neighbors: 
That’s the other thing that has helped in Grand Island is that there were people 
who were willing to stand up and make sure we do what’s best—from your 
classroom teachers all the way up to the ELL director and superintendent, to 
people in the community and all the different organizations with Latino leaders. I 
think of this board for the Youth Leadership Diversity conference—we have 
people from Central Community College, from the County Health Center, from 
St. Francis Medical Center, from Principal Financial, there’s a diverse group that 
wants to do something positive in the community, especially for the youth.96 
 
In this passage, the respondent highlights not only the commitment to standing up for immigrant 
residents but also the networks of local organizations that collaborate on shared priorities, such 
as youth development, and the importance of Latino leaders in these civil society organizations. 
 Public institutions in the city similarly sought to transform themselves to convey the 
message both internally and to the public that diversity was valued and new residents were 
welcomed.  The Grand Island Police Department created a bonus pay system for bilingual 
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officers and worked to recruit officers who can communicate with Grand Island’s immigrant 
communities.  Out of approximately 85 officers, 15 are bilingual in English and Spanish.  The 
department’s leadership also formalized the field training program to ensure that all officers had 
a consistent starting point in their training.  A central part of that training is the ethos that 
“everyone is treated well, with a spirit of service, with dignity. We don’t look down on people.  . 
. . We don’t ask questions about people who are here legally or illegally. We treat everyone the 
same.”97  The Police Chief emphasized that the department had a zero-tolerance policy for bias 
or bigotry.  “We don’t let it [bigotry] go on here in the department.  My captains, my sergeants 
know you don’t hear it in the briefing room. . . .[W]e just don’t allow it.  It’s just not right. I 
can’t say we’re perfect, but people know it’s not accepted.”  He added that he is quick to remind 
people making comments about limited English proficiency that “up until World War I, . . . you 
could do business in German on main street [in Grand Island] easier than in English.”    
The Police Chief made extensive and continuing efforts to reach out to local immigrant 
leaders and to make department staff available when requested.  The police chief emphasized 
that, “We always are willing to meet at any time with any of our communities. We have folks in 
our Latino community and our Sudanese community who will call us and say we need to talk 
about something.  They trust us and we keep that open.  We’ve done things on the Latino radio 
station.  They know they can talk with us and the same with us, we can go to them and say we 
need to talk with them.”  Local immigrant leaders emphasized the department’s openness and 
accessibility and the role that the police chief had in making immigrants feel that the police were 
in their communities to serve them, not surveil them.  For instance, one prominent immigrant 
leader stated, “The police chief, Steve Lamken, this is an incredible person.  Every time I come 
to him because there are rumors going around about the city or the police, he is always there—
                                                 





with respect, with honesty.”98  The Police Chief saw it in simple terms: “I think the most 
important thing is just being open when people come to you, and sitting down and talking with 
them, saying, ‘When do you want to meet? We will be there.’ If people ask to meet them at 
church on a Sunday afternoon, I say, ‘We’ll be there.’ The key is listening, being problem 
oriented, and not saying, ‘We can’t do that.’” 
Public officials and civil society groups in Grand Island did not shy away from 
confronting tensions over immigration as they emerged.  Local efforts to create a welcoming 
environment for new arrivals extended widely, and multiple respondents described individuals 
and organizations who stood up for immigrants’ rights in public and private forums. Coalitions 
among civil society organizations and public agencies, created an important space in which 
Anglo and Latino residents could collaborate on shared priorities in the city, such as youth 
development, creating connections that were valuable in other contexts as well.  
 
8.5 Conclusion 
Through local civil society organizations, Latino leaders began to play an increasingly 
important role in local political and social life.  As the Latino community grew, the one local 
soccer field was increasingly crowded and overused. The Parks and Recreation Director 
described it as “loved to death.”99  Local Latino residents who had met the Parks and Recreation 
Director through local civil society organizations approached him and proposed an underused 
piece of city owned land as a possible location for new fields.  The city agreed to invest in 
creating a new field.  In 2003, the city opened a new park with five soccer fields and signed an 
agreement with the local Latino soccer league, the Amistad League, to supervise the use of the 
fields.  
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Similarly, from 2008 through 2011, the city was faced with a decision about what to do 
with a 36 year old pool that was rapidly deteriorating in Lincoln Park, in a neighborhood with a 
large Latino community.  The state ordered that the pool be closed by 2012 if it weren’t 
renovated or replaced.  The City Council hesitated when faced with a potential bill of over $1 
million.  Local residents, both Anglo and Latino advocated for the pool, pointing out that the 
pool is a crucial resource for lower-income residents of the neighborhood, many without 
transportation. A leader in the neighborhood effort was high-school senior Andres Gamboa, who 
had come to Grand Island with his parents when he was six years old.  Gamboa was a member of 
the Community Youth Council that City Hall organized to involve young people in community 
affairs. Gamboa researched the neighborhood importance of the pool and testified to the City 
Council. The Council ultimately voted to support the pool’s redevelopment, and when it opened 
in 2013, Gamboa’s younger brother Rodrigo, now himself on the Community Youth Council, 
organized the ribbon cutting party.  
These investments in public space in Grand Island were investments that strongly favored 
those in Grand Island who were not already well off.  These investments were made possible by 
the efforts of local Latino leaders, young and old, working with Anglo residents, civic groups, 
and public agencies.  They were also facilitated by a consistent framing of a Grand Island 
identity as being an identity that welcomes and supports other residents.  New immigrant arrivals 
were consistently described as belonging in the city and contributing to it.  Both civil society 
organizations and public agencies worked to institutionalize inclusionary norms and to diffuse 






Chapter 9: Social Network Analysis 
9.1 Introduction 
 
The exclusionary laws at issue in Hazleton and Fremont are fundamentally a form of 
property regulation, seeking to exclude particular individuals from the use of local dwellings.  
The quantitative and qualitative research suggests that one factor in their passage is concern by 
some residents over the effects of new arrivals on property values and a corresponding desire to 
limit who can use local property.  By contrast, the qualitative research suggests that the 
immigrant-friendly policies at issue in Easton and Grand Island are enabled by the framing of an 
expansive local collective identity and the diffusion of inclusionary norms.  These inclusionary 
norms seek to welcome new neighbors and new users of local property and stand in contrast to 
the formal legal rules enacted in Hazleton and Fremont to limit property use. To better 
understand why these cities responded so differently, it is helpful to consider in more detail the 
role of social norms and social networks with regard to property conflicts.   
Conflicts over land use have been a repeated source of data to compare the role of formal 
laws and informal norms in shaping human action.  Ronald Coase’s (1960) famous Farmer-
Rancher parable emphasized how negotiations over property conflicts are shaped by the parties’ 
underlying legal entitlements.  Robert Ellickson’s work brought norms into the calculus by 
uncovering how some neighbors “achieve cooperative outcomes not by bargaining from legally 
established entitlements as the [Coase] parable supposes, but rather by developing and enforcing 
adaptive norms of neighborliness that trump formal legal entitlements” (Ellickson 1991: 281).  
Here, I explore how particular social structures can shape social norms and how those norms can 
in turn shape property entitlements. 





Social norms represent generally accepted behaviors that are held out to be emulated. 
Richard Posner has defined a norm as “a rule that is neither promulgated by an official source, 
such as a court or a legislature, nor enforced by the threat of legal sanctions, yet is regularly 
complied with” (Posner 1997: 87).  Norms can be largely internalized or can be socially 
enforced, through rewards for compliance or through expressions of disapproval for violations.  
The internalization and social enforcement of norms are related, in that the internal norms that an 
individual holds are strongly influenced by the shared norms that others with whom they interact 
hold.  In short, social norms, like social capital, inhere in social relations. 
Norms can be less costly and more efficient forms of rule enforcement than formal law.  
As Ellickson writes, “[i]ndeed, one reason people are frequently willing to ignore law is that they 
often possess more expeditious means for achieving order” (1991: 282).  Indeed the order of 
everyday life is established overwhelmingly through “social policing” as opposed to “state 
policing” (Pildes 1996: 2062).  Individuals often choose to rely on informal social norms instead 
of the law both because resort to the legal system involves large transaction costs and because 
informal norms or agreements often fit the needs of the parties more closely and are more 
welfare maximizing.  Studying ranchers’ reliance on norms instead of legal entitlements in rural 
Shasta County, California, Ellickson emphasized the importance of continuing relationships, 
reliable information about past behavior, and effective countervailing power.  Ellickson (1991: 
283) points out that “Hobbes was much too quick to equate anarchy with chaos.  Many 
entitlements, especially workaday entitlements can arise spontaneously.  People may 
supplement, and indeed preempt, the state’s rules with rules of their own.”  
Norms often give way to reliance on legal rules when “when the social distance between 





provides an opportunity for the disputants to externalize costs to third parties” (Ellickson 1991: 
283).  And where there is a wide social distance between groups, the norms of one group may 
give less than equal weight to outsiders.  Indeed, social norms are not always a positive force.  
Unquestioning acceptance of norms can reduce human freedom, when it is understood as the 
opportunity for reasoned choice.  And norms can facilitate group advantage while having 
negative effects on society overall.  Durable, categorical inequalities often emerge partially 
through norms, because those who control valuable resources resort to convenient markers such 
as race, religion, or caste to limit access to those resources and maintain control of group 
boundaries through norms.  In other words, norms can also be used to establish, justify, or 
enforce inequality. 
9.1(b) Civil society     
De Tocqueville famously noted that “Americans of all ages, all stations of life, and all types 
of disposition are forever forming associations” and suggested that “knowledge of how to 
combine is the mother of all other forms of knowledge” in a democracy (Tocqueville 1840: 104).  
Associations help create networks of civic engagement that establish reciprocal relationships, 
generate trust, support collective action, and establish shared social norms.  De Tocqueville 
highlighted particularly the significance of interests in property in spurring civic and political 
participation: 
It is difficult to draw a man out of his own circle to interest him in the destiny of 
the state, because he does not clearly understand what influence the destiny of the 
state can have upon his own lot.  But if it is proposed to make a road across the 
end of his estate, he will see at a glance that there is a connection between this 
small public affair and his greatest private affairs-this multiplies to an infinite 
extent opportunities of acting in concert for all the members of the community 
and makes them constantly feel their mutual dependence. 
 
(Tocqueville 1840: 104)  Concerns about property and neighborhood are a frequent 
catalyst for collective action.  And the various associations, organizations, and 





then play a significant role in structuring their lives and facilitating their connections to 
others (Marwell 2009; Small 2009). 
Neighborhood institutions, such as churches, recreational associations, or community 
organizations, have ties to other institutions.  Through those organizational ties, institutions 
connect individuals to each other.  Organizations act in many ways as brokers, connecting their 
members to each other and also to other organizations’ members and resources (Small 2009). 
Associations also create a physical and social space for interaction among city residents—both 
formal interaction aimed towards organizational goals and also informal interaction.  In these 
multiple forms, organizations and the networks of relationships that they create can inform our 
understanding of how social norms develop, are diffused, and have force. 
9.1(c) Networks   
 
Scholars in both social and natural sciences have increasingly drawn on graph theory from 
mathematics to model and analyze relations among objects or individuals in terms of networks.  
The formal and informal study of networks in relation to the exercise of power has a long and 
relevant history.  Louis Brandeis (1914) relied on networks in his critique of anti-competitive 
business practices set out in Other People’s Money.  Brandeis (1914: 51) argued that the 
interlocking networks of corporate boards were “the most potent instrument” for the suppression 
of competition and the violation of the Sherman Act.  Similarly, C. Wright Mills (1956: 254) in 
his conceptualization of “the power elite” highlighted the role of networks in explaining how the 
elite is not formally organized as an elite, yet “its members often seem to know one another, 
seem quite naturally to work together, and share many organizations in common.” More recent 
research has demonstrated that the structure of networks does indeed matter significantly for 
corporate governance, in addition to many other fields (e.g. Davis, Yoo, and Baker 2003; 





Some of the early research on networks focused on the phenomenon of social contagion and 
personal influence (e.g. Katz and Lazarsfeld 1955).  Because individuals pay attention to others’ 
actions, decisions can be transmitted from one person to another.  Social contagion processes are 
one example of the way in which networks mediate between individuals and large scale social 
processes.  Networks can thus help us understand both how individual actions aggregate into 
collective ones and also how larger social processes diffuse to individuals.   
Eric Klinenberg’s (2003) work on Chicago’s 1995 heat wave found that social networks and 
neighborhood institutions had a crucial role in affecting mortality—women were much less 
likely to die than men because they had stronger ties to friends and family, and Latinos had lower 
rates of mortality than other ethnic groups because in Chicago they were more likely to live with 
others in their apartment and in dense neighborhoods.  Residents of impoverished neighborhoods 
with active community organizations fared better than those with fewer institutions, wealthy or 
poor, because neighbors knew each other and checked in on each other.  In Chicago, individuals’ 
networks often saved their lives   
Different network structures, however, have differing strengths and weaknesses, depending 
on their levels of centralization, hierarchy, density, fragmentation or other factors.  Different 
“logics of attachment” at the level of individual nodes can translate into dramatic differences in 
overall network structures (Powell, White, Koput, and Owen-Smith 2005).  Even small 
preferences for ties with similar others—homophily—can create significant segregation in the 
overall network (Kossinetts and Watts 2009).  In social networks, similarity tends to increase the 
likelihood of connection, whether that connection is one of work, friendship, or marriage.  The 





and demographic characteristics shapes the information to which individuals are exposed, the 
interactions they experience, and the actions and attitudes that are reinforced. 
As the discussion of homophily suggests, social networks are dynamic and change in 
response to changes in the social and organizational environment.  The ties between individuals 
and organizations also are not all identical, but often vary in their strength, their formality, and 
their origin, which leads different ties to serve different functions. 
Mark Granovetter (1983: 202) explored the difference between strong and weak ties, 
suggesting that the relation between individuals and their acquaintances (most of whom are 
otherwise unconnected to each other) is as important as the relationship between individuals and 
their close friends (most of whom are tightly connected to each other) because “individuals with 
few weak ties will be deprived of information from distant parts of the social system and will be 
confined to the provincial news and views of their close friends.”  Given the principle of 
homophily and the general trend that “the stronger the tie connecting two individuals, the more 
similar they are,” weak ties are crucial for integration into contemporary society because they 
lead to “complex role sets and the need for cognitive flexibility” essential for modern life 
(Granovetter 1973: 1362). 
An example of the strength of weak ties in neighborhoods, Granovetter (1973) asserted, was 
the success of working-class Charlestown, Massachusetts in defeating urban renewal compared 
with the inability of Boston’s West End to hold off the bulldozer (see also Gans 1962; Gans 
1973). Granovetter (1973) suggests that because Charlestown had a rich organizational life and 
weak ties formed through local workplaces, residents were able to organize in opposition, while 
in the West End, there were few organizations or local workplaces and ties were mostly dense, 





connections among cliques that would facilitate mobilization, or ties to elected officials to 
exercise political influence. 
Weak ties are thus understood as important for integrating diverse groups and creating the 
possibility for connections among heterogeneous individuals.  Civic associations can create the 
conditions for diverse individuals to become acquaintances and form bridging weak ties.  The 
absence of weak ties, by contrast, can contribute to fragmentation and distrust, both among 
groups and between individuals and local leaders (Granovetter 1983; Friedkin 1980). 
Strong ties have value as well, of course. While weak ties “provide people with access to 
information and resources beyond those available in their own social circle,” “strong ties have 
greater motivation to be of assistance and are typically more easily available” (Granovetter 1983: 
209).  Based on these differing strengths and weaknesses of strong and weak ties, two 
contrasting views have emerged about network density.  On the one hand, dense networks may 
effectively diffuse norms, facilitate the enforcement of sanctions to enforce those norms, and 
thus support the creation of trust within the network and the mobilization of the resources that 
the network contains (Coleman 1988; Putnam 1993). 
On the other hand, many advantages of a network come not from the trust that exists in dense 
networks, but instead in the opportunity to bridge or broker gaps in the network.  These 
“structural holes,” or gaps in the social structure created by the boundaries between groups, 
create a competitive advantage for those who can span them and foster the development of new 
ideas out of disconnected pools of information (Burt 1995). 
All of this research confirms that networks and network structures must be understood within 
their social context.  Focusing on institutional structures for the management of common pool 





resources in all settings (Ostrom 2005).  So too for networks—various network structures have 
different strengths and weaknesses and the role that network structure plays varies with the 
context.  What is consistent, however, is that the organizational networks studied here do shape 
the networks that individuals have and that “[p]eople do not just interact: their interactions have 
consequences for the choices they, and others, make” (Watts 2007). 
9.1(c)(1) Measuring networks 
 
Networks can be measured in multiple ways, but those measures are generally divided into 
two groups—measures calculated from the perspective of each node and measures calculated 
from the perspective of the whole network overall.  Here, the focus is on the structure of the 
network overall.  Important whole network measures include  average density, levels of 
clustering, levels of closure, and structural holes. 
9.1(c)(1(A) Density 
Network density measures the proportion of all of the possible ties between nodes in the 
network that actually exist.  It thus provides a way to measure the level of connections between 
nodes in the network.  High levels of network density are often seen as beneficial, at least for 
network insiders (see e.g. Coleman 1988).  For instance, increased density increases the speed at 
which information spreads.  Dense networks of repeated interaction make reputation highly 
salient and also make it easy for groups within a network to constrain individual behavior by 
sanctioning the violation of group norms.  The reputation effects and ease of enforcing sanctions 
generally increase levels of trust within the network and makes it possible to draw on more of the 
network resources. 
At the same time, the salience of reputation and effectiveness of sanctions in dense networks 
can generate strong pressures to conform and penalize experimentation, innovation, and the 





associated with the maintenance of collective social capital and the reproduction of within group 
resources (Lin 1999).  
9.1(c)(1)(B) Clustering 
The average distance between actors in a network describes how close actors are to each 
other by measuring the average number of steps between pairs of actors in the network. This 
closeness is an example of what is often called the “small-world” phenomenon—the average 
distance between pairs of actors in real world social networks is generally much lower than a 
random graph of the same size would predict (Watts 1999).   
The connections between actors in a network, however, are not usually evenly distributed.  
Instead, actors often form dense local “neighborhoods” or clusters within the overall network, 
and a large portion of all connections in a network are found in clusters where actors are highly 
interconnected.  This can make the average distance seem even shorter and the world of friends 
and acquaintances even smaller.  The embedding of actors in these clusters or cliques gives 
“texture” to local social structures, by creating a level of differentiation among groups within the 
population.  To measure the degree of clustering, one can identify all of the actors who are 
connected to a particular node and then calculate the density of this local network when that node 
is removed.  An average of this density for all actors in the network produces a measure of the 
degree of clustering.  This clustering coefficient can then be adjusted to give weight to each local 
network density proportional to the size of that local network.  
While dense ties between organizations facilitate the exchange of information and ideas 
among the organizations in that particular network, tightly knit clusters of ties with few outside 
connections can fragment the local social structure (Anheier 2003).  When this fragmentation 
becomes extreme it can also pose an obstacle to effective democratic politics, because the 





actors within the clique while ties to others who might challenge those ideas are limited or non-
existent. 
9.1(c)(1(C) Closure 
Another way to think about a network is in terms of the extent to which each individual or 
organization is embedded in the group, which is often referred to as closure.  Networks with 
higher levels of closure reduce the cost of cooperation among network insiders because they 
make it easier to enforce meaningful sanctions against group members who violate the group’s 
norms (Putnam 1993).  Like network density, network closure increases trust “precisely because 
it is enforceable by means that transcend the individuals involved” (Portes and Sensenbrenner 
1993: 1332).  More open networks in which individuals have more connections outside of the 
group, by contrast, are less likely to be able to effectively sanction norm violations because 
individuals can bypass within group sanctions by accessing outside resources. 
By definition, closed networks also have stronger, more cohesive group boundaries than open 
networks characterized by porous borders.  Greater closure strengthens the solidarity of group 
members and can also reinforce the dominant positions of insiders, especially when the closure is 
based on a recognizable and durable category of inequality (Bourdieu 1986).  Because network 
closure facilitates the distribution of benefits to group members, a sense of solidarity is generally 
heightened in response to real or perceived threats to the group (Portes 1998). 
9.1(c)(1(D) Structural holes 
A structural hole is essentially the absence of a connection or tie between two nodes or 
clusters of nodes in a network.  A hole in the network functions as an obstacle to the flow of 
resources, but also provides a strategic benefit for an actor who bridges the gap and thus controls 
the resource flow (Burt 1992).  Those individuals or organizations that bridge structural holes 





otherwise disconnected actors called “brokerage” (Fernandez and Gould 1994).  By virtue of 
being in this bridging role in a network, brokers are exposed to ideas and information from 
which other network actors are isolated (Burt 2004).  
Structural holes can be measured at the level of individual nodes or at the overall network 
level.  At the node level, structural holes, like increased density and closure, also have 
implications for the level of constraint.  Where an individual’s connections are to others who are 
also independently connected to one other, then she is constrained by the reality that the others 
could cut her out and still be connected to each other.  By contrast where an individual is 
connected to others who are not independently connected to one another, those others have no 
alternative sources of resources, and thus their ability to exclude her in order to constrain her 
behavior are limited.   
Table 9.1 presents relevant demographic and economic characteristics of Hazleton and 
Easton, Pennsylvania, and Fremont and Grand Island, Nebraska obtained from the U.S. Census.  
Table 9.1 also presents mean measures of relevant characteristics of local civil society networks, 
modeled based on ties between non-profit board members measured as interlocking directors.  
The final column presents statistical significance levels of t-tests measuring variation among the 
grouped means for the inclusionary and exclusionary cities for each characteristic, and the 
likelihood that variation is random. 
None of the background economic or demographic measures are significant in the T-test.  







Table 9.1: T-tests of mean network measures 
 
 
To understand how these organizational networks influence social norms on the ground, it is 
helpful to turn to a detailed discussion of the social mechanisms at work in two of the case study 
cities. 
9.2 Clustering and Density in Fremont 
 
9.2(a) Clustering and self-reinforcing ideas  
The average distance in the cities’ civil society networks varies, ranging from a low of 2.6 in 
Fremont to a high of 3.5 in Grand Island (see Table 9.1).  These distances mean that on average 
any director in Fremont is connected to any other director through fewer than three steps and in 





significant.  The level of clustering or fragmentation within the network, however, is more than 
300 percent higher in Fremont than in Grand Island, and the mean differences are statistically 
significant (see Table 9.1).  The clustering coefficient of an actor is the density of its local 
network or neighborhood.  The overall weighted clustering coefficient discussed here weights 
each actor’s clustering coefficient by its degree (the number of ties that it has) and takes the 
mean for the whole network (for more information about measures of clustering and their 
meaning, see Watts 1999).   
The high levels of clustering in Fremont’s civil society networks contributed to the 
fragmentation of local social life.  As local social circles become more densely clustered, they 
increasingly came to reinforce existing predispositions or beliefs (Sunstein 2000; Burt 2001).  
And the more that beliefs about the right local response to changing demographics diverged, the 
more tightly clustered and isolated the cliques in Fremont became. 
Both the proponents and the opponents of the ordinance described political power in Fremont 
as concentrated within a local political and economic elite.  This sense of power as concentrated 
and inaccessible fostered a sense of alienation, especially among marginal white native-born 
residents who supported the ordinance and who described themselves as shut out of the decision-
making processes.  To ordinance proponents, Mayor Donald “Skip” Edwards, who had been in 
office for twenty years as Mayor and ten years prior to that as city-councilor, was representative 
of the domination of local political power by entrenched leaders. As one respondent put it, 
“People have been upset with Skip Edwards for a while. It’s just a good old boy network.” 
Participants in the initial library meeting where the idea for the ordinance originated were 





meeting expressed deep cynicism about local elites, dismissed local elected officials, and voiced 
strong skepticism about local and national mainstream media.100 
Most of the leaders on either side of the issue had never met and did not meet 
even as they continued to work in opposition to each other.  Indeed, as the conflict 
intensified, residents restructured their networks to align them with their beliefs.  New 
boundaries were drawn among native-born white residents who suddenly found 
themselves at odds with their neighbors because of disagreement over the ordinance.  
Ordinance supporters often declined to speak with those who held opposing 
viewpoints, seeing it as essentially a waste of time. A local government official recounted 
what happened when he reached out to one of the leaders of the pro-ordinance 
movement:  “I told him one night, ‘I’d like to sit down and have a cup of coffee, because 
we both believe in doing what is best for Fremont.’  He said, ‘I don’t like you.  I don’t 
want to talk with you. I don’t believe you are fit to serve.’”101  In another example of the 
same phenomenon, an ordinance supporter proudly recounted how he lived right across 
the street from a retired police officer who publicly expressed opposition to the ordinance 
and essentially refused to speak with him as a result:   
I had been invited to his daughter’s wedding.  . . .  But he voted against it.  We did 
not talk for quite a while. My brother and him got into it, my brother went after 
him pretty good. He [the neighbor] came across the street a few months later, and 
he said, ‘I want to be neighborly.’  And I said . . . I was pretty upset, . . . I didn’t 
give him much of a chance to say anything.102   
 
Ordinance supporters were uninterested in hearing opposing viewpoints, partially because their 
social networks were already so fragmented that they found strong support among like-minded 
individuals and felt no need for interaction with those with a different perspective. 
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Ordinance supporters often sought to convince their neighbors or friends to agree, and if 
they failed to win their support, then cut their ties.  This creation of internal boundaries was 
highly disruptive, for instance uprooting families from churches they had attended for 
generations to avoid hearing oppositional viewpoints:  
We haven’t been back there [to our church] since the public meeting at the 
auditorium, because the vicar there was very much for having all these illegals in 
town.  And she got up and spoke quite eloquently about how they’ve been 
mistreated.  And I disagreed, so I said, “OK, we’ll just stop going.”103  
 
Another ordinance supporter described a similar shift: 
That was my church for my whole life. . . .  My dad lived a block away.  He used 
to ring the bell for the church.  Our whole family has been associated with [the 
church].  But this pastor is a little more liberal in his thinking. . . . I just stopped 
going.  It’s tough to go to another church and start over.  But finally I did . . . .  
My folks now attend it and they basically are done with [our old church].  My 
Dad is 82.  It was tough for him.  He’s been a member there his whole life. But 
they won’t go back.104 
 
The abandonment of life-long churches was just one of many signs of a profound 
polarization and deep division that the conflict over the ordinance wrought on Fremont 
and the further division of local social networks into cliques that reinforced existing 
beliefs. 
A significant question in Fremont is what happened to all of the Fremont residents who 
didn’t say anything about the ordinance and to all of the Fremont institutions that took no 
position. The density of local networks can help explain why so many in Fremont who opposed 
the ordinance said little publicly. 
9.2(b) Density, mobilization, and sanctions  
Fremont has a markedly higher density score than Grand Island, and the difference is 
statistically significant (see Table 9.1).  The dense networks in Fremont made reputation 
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particularly salient and thus made efforts by ordinance supporters to sanction those who spoke 
out in opposition to the ordinance highly effective. 
Ordinance opponent Kristin Ostrom tried to hold events that would bring Latino and 
Anglo residents together and build bridges between these isolated communities, from picnics to 
dances to study sessions at churches.  But once the petition was approved and the election 
loomed, several of the core ordinance supporters increasingly began making personal attacks 
against anyone who spoke out against it. 
The attacks flourished through anonymous comments on the local newspaper’s web-page 
and escalated to include personal attacks on radio shows and even physical intimidation.  Elected 
officials were heckled, BBs were shot at the store window of an outspoken Latino business 
owner, and a rock was thrown through Kristin Ostrom’s window.105  The most effective weapons 
were efforts to personally discredit and embarrass ordinance opponents.  
As one respondent put it, what the proponents did “was personally attack in the blogs and 
in the paper, and just talking to people throughout town.  That’s the worst thing . . . .  It was like 
mob rule.”106  The intimidation was felt widely, extending to established, respected members of 
the community and even to those who expressed some sympathy for the goals of the ordinance 
supporters but raised questions about the ordinance’s potential impact.  One local business 
owner, who participated in public meetings about immigration, said, “I got phone calls at home, I 
had people show up at my house who were not happy with my stance.”  He even had a pair of 
strangers draw him out on to his porch where they started shouting at him to the point that his 
wife, fearing for the rest of the family’s safety, locked her husband outside and called the police, 
who arrived after the hecklers had left.  The consistent barrage of nasty letters, threatening phone 
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calls, and intimidating incidents led the business owner to stop publicly engaging with the issue, 
because, as he said, “my young boys didn’t need that.”107   
Ordinance supporters also threatened boycotts against those they identified as opposing 
the ordinance.  An active ordinance proponent proudly described an effort targeting one of the 
city councilors who worked at a bank, saying that “people were calling up the bank where he 
works and saying, either I want my money pulled out and put with someone else or I’m moving 
my money to another bank.… And if he was my financial advisor, I would be going to say I want 
my money switched to someone else too. Why should I be giving him commissions if he’s not 
for what I’m for?”108   
City employees and elected officials were common targets for personal attacks in the 
anonymous comments in the newspaper and for face-to-face verbal confrontations.109  Residents 
saw the vituperative comments directed at public officials and feared the consequences of 
speaking up themselves.  A local government official explained, “People who were rank and file 
everyday citizens were very worried to have anybody know they were going to vote against the 
ordinance because they thought they were going to get hit with what we faced publicly—that 
group is very capable of verbally attacking people.”110   
In a self-reinforcing cycle, the climate of intimidation increasingly silenced opportunities 
for public debate and statements of opposition from white, native-born residents.  Several 
business owners created “Centsible Citizens Say No” to try to rally support from other business 
leaders in opposition to the ordinance.  Few residents, however, were willing to publicly speak 
out or even show up at a meeting convened to discuss the issue.  After only seven business 
                                                 
107 Interview by author. Fremont, NE.  August 17, 2010. 
108 Interview by author. Fremont, NE.  August 13, 2010. 
109 Interview by author. Fremont, NE.  February 24, 2011. 





owners came to a widely publicized breakfast to discuss the ordinance, Jim Ebers, a local 
insurance agent, told the Omaha World-Herald, “I’m not surprised. People don’t want to offend 
their neighbors, they don’t want to stir anybody up.”111   
The conflict festered, and cowed by the threat of personal attacks or boycotts that were so 
effective because of the city’s dense social networks, “people opposed to the ordinance were 
afraid to speak out and do anything but make nice.”112  A leader of a local non-profit emphasized 
that since more than 90 percent of their funding came from local donations, she felt that she had 
no choice but to stay away from any public discussion of the ordinance for the future well-being 
of the organization.113  Another resident lamented that, “there are a lot of really outstanding 
people in this community who don’t want to step up to the plate because they are afraid it may 
hurt their business or because they don’t want the grief.”114   
9.2(c) Closure and boundary creation  
As Table 9.1 shows, Fremont scores significantly higher in measures of closure than Grand 
Island.  The closed network structures in Fremont are conducive to the formation of strong group 
boundaries with effective sanctions against those who might defect.  Those network boundaries 
also appear to coincide with the cities’ ethnic cleavages, as less than one percent of the directors 
of non-profit organizations in Fremont are Latino.     
In Fremont, there were very few Latinos involved in the city’s civic institutions and, in 
the debate over the ordinance, strong boundaries came to be drawn between those seen as 
belonging and those seen as illegals or as outsiders—although the prepared rhetoric was 
generally about illegal immigrants, quickly made distinctions often relied upon familiar 
categories of race, ethnicity, and language. 
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Ordinance supporters repeatedly stated that the ordinance did not have anything to do 
with race.  As one ordinance supporter put it, “If I truly in my heart felt that I was doing 
something racist or that wasn’t the right thing to do, I couldn’t do it. I hold my head up high 
when I’m out in town because I think it [the ordinance] is the right thing to do.”115  Race or 
ethnicity nonetheless came to serve as a convenient marker of the boundaries between those who 
were seen as belonging in Fremont and those who were identified as not belonging.  For 
example, one early ordinance supporter explained, “We’ve got a lot of Hispanics here and I’m 
assuming there’s a lot of illegals. I’m not racist. I just want people to be here by the rule of law. 
If you come here, be legal. But it just so happens that the majority of illegals are Hispanic, so we 
always refer to the illegals as Hispanic.”116   
Distinctions based on language also came to provide a convenient substitute for 
distinctions based on race.  For instance, the City Councilor who introduced the ordinance, Bob 
Warner, described citizen complaints about “people without insurance speaking Spanish in 
hospital emergency rooms,” and about the “need for interpreters at an annual kindergarten 
gathering where kids and parents meet teachers,” among additional reasons leading him to 
introduce the law.117   
Because the closed networks facilitated such a strong sense of group identity among 
long-term native-born residents and enabled such clear distinctions between white and Latino 
residents, white ordinance supporters were emboldened and the isolated Latino minority largely 
silenced.  Several ordinance supporters proudly described telling Latinos in public places to “go 
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back to Mexico” and to “speak English.”118  Latino residents equally described the frustration 
and anger at being forced to point out that they were born in Omaha, Lincoln, or Los Angeles.   
The climate of hostility and personal attack and the threats of violence were especially 
intimidating for Latino residents.  A Latina mother asked a store employee if her young child 
could use the restroom and was told there were “no restrooms for Mexicans.”119  A white former 
worker at the meatpacking plant described going to a local restaurant with a Latina co-worker 
and not being served, presumably because of her race: “You know what she says to me? ‘Calm 
down, this has happened to me before.’  It makes tears come to your eyes.”120  Perhaps the most 
vocal Latino critic of the ordinance, Alfredo Velez, received threatening, anonymous letters 
accusing him of harboring undocumented immigrants and had the front window of his store shot 
out with a BB gun.  Velez’s daughter, Lesley, a young Latina college student, born and raised in 
Fremont and a graduate of Fremont High School had the courage to speak out at a City Council 
meeting against the ordinance shortly before the referendum—the first Latino resident to speak 
at a council meeting since the packed vote at the auditorium two years earlier—and she was 
greeted with audible groans from the ordinance supporters at the meeting.  For Latino residents, 
the harsh public attacks on ordinance opponents merged with the increasingly frequent incidence 
of graffiti saying “Go back to Mexico” and of shouted racist comments in public places to 
generate widespread fear, and to silence all but the most courageous few.  
 Ordinance supporters, however, had a very different experience, generally describing it as 
an empowering one.  In one supporter’s words, “I’ve enjoyed it, I’ve learned a lot, met a lot of 
nice people.”121  Particularly exciting for ordinance supporters was the opportunity to have 
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appeared on various news shows from CNN to FOX and in newspapers from the Omaha World-
Herald to the New York Times.  Similarly, another ordinance supporter expressed the affirmation 
that he felt came from his participation and described himself as “the snowflake that started the 
avalanche and proud of it.”122  The very different experiences of white ordinance supporters and 
of both white and Latino ordinance opponents relate at least in part to the closed network 
structure that created clear group boundaries between those on the inside of local social networks 
and those excluded. 
9.2(d) Impacts   
In March of 2010, shortly before the vote on the ordinance, Immigration and Custom’s 
Enforcement raided a local meatpacking plant, Fremont Beef, arresting 17 workers.  Latino 
residents described a feeling of terror, of not knowing who could be trusted.  They described 
friends who, “they won’t open their windows, they won’t open their curtains, and the glass 
kitchen doors are covered with plastic so no one can see in. They are living in fear, with even the 
lights off.”123   To ordinance supporters, the raid was perceived as vindication of their worst fears 
and proof of the need for the ordinance.  To ordinance opponents, the raid was believed to have 
been the result of lobbying by the ordinance supporters and was perceived as just one more way 
to silence Latino residents and send the message that they were not welcome.  As with the rest of 
the conflict over neighborhood change in Fremont, the interpretation of the same events was very 
different depending on to which dense cluster of relationships the individual belonged.  
The conflict over the ordinance took a tremendous toll on local civic and political leadership.  
After the ordinance’s passage the City Council President resigned.  He was followed by the City 
Attorney.  The City Administrator then abruptly left for a job in Colorado.  The local Catholic 
priest who spoke against the ordinance had a heart attack, many said because of the stress created 
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by the responses to his statements against the ordinance, and had to resign.  Friends of the Mayor 
said that he became gravely ill because of the anxiety resulting from the hostile climate that the 
conflict created, and he resigned just a few months after the ordinance was passed.  He died 
several months later.  The most vocal opponent of the ordinance, Kristin Ostrom, and her 
husband moved to another part of the state.  After graduating from Nebraska Wesleyan 
University, Lesley Velez decided to remain in Omaha, saying: “I don’t see myself living there 
[in Fremont] any time in the future . . . I don’t see raising a family in that environment.”124  The 
list of additional resignations that followed within two years of the passage of the ordinance is 
lengthy—ranging from the director of the Chamber of Commerce to the director of Habitat for 
Humanity, from the Police Chief to the Library Director.  Although it is not clear that all of the 
turnover directly resulted from the conflict, respondents suggest that the stress from the struggle 
over the ordinance was at least a contributing factor in many of the resignations.125 
Ordinance supporters proclaimed that those who were in the country without legal 
authorization should be forced out of the city.  As one public official recounted, “I was in a 
grocery store one day and a woman I knew socially . . . she raised her voice and she just started 
yelling at me, and she shouted at me, ‘You know where the Hispanics are and you need to go 
down there and knock down their doors and line them up and march them out of town!’”126  The 
official continued: 
if there is such a thing as normal she was a normal person.  And that is what I 
struggle with trying to understand. . . we’re not talking about people who are 
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hateful, nasty, and mean—these are people I go to church with every week.  It 
would be easier to understand if it was somebody in combat boots and a shaved 
head, but this is Mr. and Mrs. everyday middle-America. . . .  The closest I can 
come to an answer is that this belief has been established through lots of talking 
back and forth to each other among the same group of people that the town as 
they knew it is going to be forever changed.127 
 
As this official suggested, each set of actors active in relation to the ordinance consisted of a 
network of increasingly closely connected individuals who accumulated a shared history and 
developed a common perspective, and who grew largely more isolated from the other sets of 
actors.   
 
9.3 Bridging Structural Holes in Grand Island 
One of the most striking things about Grand Island in comparison to Fremont is the vibrancy 
and diversity of Grand Island’s civil society, and these civil society organizations are crucial to 
understanding how Grand Island came to adopt such progressive policies towards immigrants.  
In 2010, 88 civil society organizations filed Form 990s with the IRS.  More than 900 different 
Grand Island residents served as board members on those organizations.  Perhaps most 
significantly, more than one-quarter of the non-profit organizations in Grand Island had at least 
one Latino board member.  Altogether, 36 different Latino residents served as board members. 
The mean levels of indirect constraint for organizations in Grand Island are less than half 
those for Fremont (see Table 9.1).  This indicates not only that organizations in Grand Island are 
less constrained, but also that their networks bridge structural holes, connecting otherwise 
isolated organizations.   
Dividing the case study cities’ civil society networks into those organizations with and 
without a Latino director and applying measures of brokerage reveals notable differences 
between the inclusionary and exclusionary cities (Fernandez and Gould 1994).  Grand Island has 
                                                 





24 different organizations with Latino directors. Not only does it have many organizations with 
Latino directors, however, but those organizations are also highly connected within the overall 
network and play important bridging roles.  Several central organizations with Latino directors 
score particularly highly on multiple brokering functions, including the Medical Center, the 
United Way, and the Community Foundation.  Additionally, many key organizations in Grand 
Island, such as the Chamber of Commerce or the YMCA, that do not themselves have Latino 
board members are closely connected to organizations that do.  In Fremont, by contrast, there are 
only five organizations with a Latino director.  Further, three out of those five are totally 
isolated.  It is especially noteworthy that all but two of the organizations with Latino directors 
lack a connection to any other organization given the high level of density within Fremont’s civil 
society overall.   
 Through their roles as non-profit officers or directors, Latino residents had a significant 
role in shaping the central institutions of civic life in Grand Island.  Latinos serve on boards 
ranging from the Boys & Girls Club to the bowling league, from the Knights of Columbus to the 
Community Clinic, the softball program to the St. Francis Medical Center.  Through these city 
institutions, Latino residents have found a path to participate meaningfully in local civic and 
political decision-making.  But it was not always so easy.  
As immigrants from Latin America and Asia began moving to Grand Island in greater 
numbers in the 1990s and early 2000s, their arrival generated some anxiety among some Grand 
Island residents.  One respondent recalled that as migration began increasing, there were “dust 
ups about immigration and ‘all these Mexicans’” and letters to the editor “to the effect that we 
shouldn’t be spending our tax dollars to educate the children of these illegal immigrants.”128   
                                                 





Local non-profit organizations and municipal officials responded proactively to these 
tensions over neighborhood character and quality of life, however.  The proactive response 
began with a staff person at the non-profit medical center, a local institution experiencing Grand 
Island’s rapid demographic change first hand.  In considering how the medical center could 
better meet the city’s changing needs, that staff person presented data on the changing local labor 
force dynamics to another non-profit, the Chamber of Commerce.  He emphasized that, given the 
low unemployment rate and the aging of the local native-born population, “without migration, 
we’re not going to be able to stay open, but if we do this right, we’ll encourage the growth of 
new businesses. . . . and can integrate substantive changes in demographics.”129  That presenter 
from the medical center knew the mayor from their prior shared service on the board of another 
local non-profit.  The mayor then drew on knowledge about other cities experiencing similar 
changes that he had acquired through his former role as a board member of the Chamber of 
Commerce.  The mayor thought that the appropriate response to the changing demographics was 
to convene leaders from the public, private, non-profit, and religious sectors to learn more about 
best practices and discuss ways forward.  The cross-sector leaders advanced a two-part agenda: 
1) public efforts to create a one-stop resource center, which resulted in the school system’s 
Welcome Center; and 2) support for a private non-profit “multicultural coalition” to facilitate 
collaboration and understanding among the increasingly diverse residents of Grand Island. 
The broad, vibrant civil society sector in Grand Island was crucial in forming the 
relationships and facilitating the flow of information that led to this collaborative, cross-sector 
response.  The relationships created through the city’s civil society networks helped local leaders 
recognize the significance of the demographic change, conceive of these initiatives to respond 
positively to emerging tensions, and bring the initiatives to fruition.   Several specific 
                                                 





mechanisms were at work in the process. First, bridging organizations—non-profits connecting 
otherwise disconnected groups—served a crucial role connecting individuals who otherwise 
would not have known each other or worked together.  Second, bridging coalitions—formal 
networks of organizations connecting independent non-profits and city agencies—provided a 
larger scale arena in which formerly isolated individuals and organizations could collaborate on 
shared city-wide initiatives. Third, the ability to work together on shared boards or coalitions 
created a context in which residents from formerly isolated groups worked together as equals on 
common, superordinate goals that required collaboration and created the opportunity for new 
inclusive identities to be formed.  Finally, crucial local institutions diffused norms of inclusion 
and framed the changes in Grand Island as an opportunity.  
9.3(a) Bridging organizations and coalitions   
 The first crucial mechanism that spanned the gaps that existed between native-born and 
recent-immigrant communities were bridging organizations, such as the Medical Center or the 
Multicultural Coalition.  The boards of these organizations included Latino residents, front line 
service providers working closely with the immigrant community, and native born residents 
active in Grand Island’s social and political life.  The fact that board members came from 
somewhat isolated communities meant that they were unlikely to be close friends, but more 
likely to have different sets of personal and professional connections and different areas of 
knowledge and expertise.  Serving on the same board together created direct routes for 
information to travel from those embedded in or connected to the recent immigrant community 
to those connected to the native born community and vice versa.  Indeed, it is these types of 
weak ties that are vital for both individuals and larger communities that are socially 





The Multicultural Coalition actively sought to create crosscutting ties between recent 
immigrant communities and the native-born, not just through its board of directors but through 
its programs as well.  For instance, it created a 10 week Grassroots Leadership Development 
Program designed to build the capacities of emerging leaders in recent immigrant communities. 
The program included three sessions each on city and county government and on the school 
system where public officials explained how their respective municipal agency works and how 
immigrants can have input into improving it.  The program also provided a unique opportunity 
for public officials to introduce themselves to immigrant community leaders and better 
understand their experiences and needs.  Numerous respondents described the significance of 
meeting the Mayor, Police Chief, Chamber of Commerce President, and other local leaders at 
these sessions.   
The second crucial mechanism that helped bring native-born and recent-immigrant 
communities into productive discussions were coalitions that brought together multiple 
organizations to work on shared projects with common goals, such as the regular meetings of 
Grand Island social service organizations convened by the United Way, the collaboration among 
organizations for the annual Youth Leadership Diversity Conference, the advisory committee 
convened to plan a new vocational high-school, or the broad effort to bring the state fair to Grand 
Island from Lincoln.  
For example, through the coalition convened by the United Way, organizations that 
worked on domestic violence issues or substance abuse issues joined with organizations focused 
on serving the immigrant community to work on shared priorities like high-school graduation 
rates.  In the process of these ongoing collaborations, relationships were formed between 





as partners and contributors and helped recent arrivals see a path to participate in local decision 
making. 
9.3(b) Collaboration on superordinate goals   
 Whether as members of the same board cooperating to direct a local non-profit or as 
representatives of different organizations collaborating to arrange a conference for local youth, 
Grand Island’s civil society gave residents from different backgrounds a sphere in which to work 
together in a sustained manner on superordinate goals (Sherif 1958; Steele 1997).  Even if these 
individuals were seen as unequal in some dimensions, such as income or local social status, in 
the context of bridging organizations and coalitions they were sitting around the same table as 
representatives of organizations, working together on shared problems, such as teen pregnancy, 
and emphasizing shared values, such as a commitment to education.  When the focus of local 
efforts was on a widely shared goal, such as increasing opportunities for youth, it was obvious 
that a lack of inclusion would hold all children back.   
The multiple superordinate goals that local coalitions pursued presented compelling 
objectives that would be largely impossible to achieve without cooperation among both long-
term residents and recent arrivals.  The compelling value of these goals and the fact that working 
in these coalitions involved repeated interactions among the same individuals over long periods 
of time created a context in which group boundaries came to be blurred and a shared local 
identity was reinforced.  The collaboration on shared projects rested on a belief that recent 
arrivals had the potential to contribute to civic leadership, that the city was benefiting from their 
presence, and that its resources can and would expand with its population. 





 How was all of the learning that individuals gained from bridges in the networks 
diffused to the rest of Grand Island?  To share this learning and diffuse these inclusive norms, 
local institutions such as the medical center and the school system played the central role. 
At the medical center, efforts to strengthen translation services, hire bilingual staff, and 
reach out to immigrant residents were framed not as something that was being forced on them by 
the arrival of outsiders, but as something necessary because of the institution’s commitment to 
providing the best quality care to all Grand Island residents.  Recognizing that many new 
immigrants with health issues were not coming to the hospital, the medical center decided to go 
to the immigrant community instead.  After conducting focus groups, it saw that the local mall 
served in some ways as a town square and that many immigrant families spent time there over 
the weekends.  To create a welcoming clinic in an accessible setting, the hospital opened 
“Wellness Works/Por Su Salud” in the mall providing prenatal classes, education about diabetes, 
immunizations, cooking classes, and other public health education.  Recognizing the seriousness 
of the diabetes epidemic among immigrant communities experiencing dramatic changes in 
lifestyle and diet, the medical center also created the “Cuidese Bien” (“Take Good Care of 
Yourself”) outreach project to teach nutrition and to encourage families to participate in blood 
glucose screenings.  From this program, a network of bilingual health advocates called 
“promotoras” was formed to attend health classes and become resources for their family and 
friends.  In addition, doctors concerned about patients they saw in the emergency room who 
lacked insurance but could have been better served earlier by primary care physicians decided to 
volunteer their time to create a free clinic for the uninsured.  The Third City Community Clinic 
built a wide network of doctors and dentists willing to volunteer their time outside of work and 





without insurance.  Instead of seeing translation or new clinics as an extra expense that was 
imposed from the outside, these increased levels of services were framed as  part of the core 
mission of supporting community health and these norms were diffused widely to staff and to 
patients.  
The schools took a similar proactive approach that set out inclusionary norms. 
Recognizing that it was challenging for recently arrived families to gather all of the documents 
they needed to enroll their children, from birth certificates to immunization records to transcripts, 
the school system created the Welcome Center as a central location to greet new students and 
their families and speed new students’ arrival in the classroom.  Having a dedicated Welcome 
Center benefits all students because it ensures consistency in how the nearly 500 new students 
from non-English speaking families are referred to the English language learner programs, it 
minimizes the time that newly arrived young people are out of school, it saves time for teachers 
who had previously conducted English language assessments in their classrooms, and it creates a 
parent liaison to be an ongoing contact person for and resource to families in the schools.  The 
Welcome Center also conducts regular family programs, such as parent education classes, 
English classes for adults, and an introduction to community organizations and support services, 
such as the Multicultural Coalition and the District Health Department. 
To enhance learning once students were in the classroom, the public schools worked hard 
to create a supportive environment for its growing population of English language learners.  
They hired instructors expert at teaching English as a second language and also hired bilingual 
para-educators to ensure that language is not a barrier for either students or for parents who want 





learners (16 of the 18 schools in the district) also hosts two bilingual family literacy events each 
year, to get families to the schools for events focusing on literacy.    
Other private and public institutions set the same inclusive tone.  For instance, the union 
at the meatpacking plant set up a multicultural fund that helps support members’ cultural 
celebrations.  The police department offers bonuses to multilingual officers and the chief has 
made clear that the department is committed to serving immigrant communities, not surveilling 
them.  A police officer described how through a connection made at the Multicultural Coalition 
he volunteered to help with citizenship classes:  
I help Maria with citizenship classes at Central Community College. Every now 
and then, she’ll contact me and say, “I have someone who is really timid and 
scared and I want you to come in with your uniform and help them prepare and 
then they’ll do ok when they have to take this test in front of the ICE 
agent.”…We know each other because we were on the Multicultural Coalition 
together and she knew that I like to help.130 
 
These institutions and their practices signal to all residents what the community norms 
are.  Unlike the intimidation in Fremont these norms reinforce people’s commitment to a sense 
of a shared identity.  As one public official noted: “I don’t think it [the tension over immigration] 
ever really goes away. But you deal with it in such a way that we are one community, sharing the 
same home, recognizing that we fundamentally share the same values, we need to be respectful 
of everyone who comes here, as we were all immigrants at one time. That was the message we 
have promoted, and that has made it the community we are proud of today.”131  
9.3(d) Impacts   
Grand Island also experienced a raid by Immigration and Customs Enforcement at a time 
when tensions over neighborhood change were running high.  As part of coordinated raids at 
meatpacking plants owned by Swift & Company in six different states, Immigration and 
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Customs Enforcement arrested 261 Grand Island workers.  A local Latino resident, Yolanda 
Nuncio, described the memory of the raids: “I don’t think I’ll ever get over that feeling in this 
community that day because you could see the helicopters, you were hearing stories, you saw the 
[federal] law enforcement, and by then people knew what was going on and people were 
fearful.”132 
In some cities, local police arrived in riot gear to assist in the raid but in Grand Island, 
Chief Lamken did not involve the city police, noting that 
“We have to police the entire community, and whether you’re legal or illegal, if 
you’re living in our community you’re a citizen of Grand Island. We have enough 
problems with crime and fear of crime in our community—as a police 
department, we don’t need people being fearful of the police as well. It’s not state 
law and it’s not local criminal law, and we don’t enforce federal laws.”133 
 
Within hours of the initiation of the raid, local non-profit organizations, churches, and the Grand 
Island school district coordinated efforts to make sure that no child was sent home from school to 
an empty house where both parents had been detained.  The groups also coordinated extensive 
outreach to local families to ensure them that their children would be safe when they returned to 
school the next day and to generally try to meet their needs in the aftermath of the raid.  Local 
churches and non-profits organized a prayer vigil for the detainees attended by hundreds of 
Grand Island residents.  
A Latino resident commented that the raid was traumatic for many, but that “at the time 
we had the Superintendent of Schools and the Chief of Police on the Multicultural Coalition and 
they were able to set the right tone.  The Superintendent was right there saying, ‘This is not our 
fight, our job is to hold our families together.’  And the Police Chief was saying, ‘ICE’s job is to 
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do this, our job is to keep the community going.’  They defused a lot of the tension.  The 
institutions set the tone and the fact that we had this [Multicultural] Coalition helped.”134 
Unlike in Fremont, local leaders worked hard to create inclusive norms and local 
identities and those efforts bore fruit. A white, former meatpacking plant worker described the 
experience of his friend as the raid was happening:  
It was terrible.  We went through a raid in Grand Island.  One of my union reps, 
Caucasian, you know they [ICE] are loading these folks up on the bus, and here’s 
this guy standing at the damn bus and these people come by giving him a great 
big hug and saying, “It’ll be all right Terry, it’ll be all right.” And the tears are 
just rolling down his face. These people being hauled off are comforting him. It 
makes me start [crying] again. … Him and his brother are the first two white guys 
who joined  the Latino club in Grand Island.135 
 
The norms that Grand Island’s institutions promoted largely succeeded in encouraging long-time 
residents to see recent arrivals as equally a part of the city and even began to blur some of 
entrenched boundaries of race, as seen by the membership of working-class white union 
members in Latino organizations.  
Similarly, a local school official described the reactions of his neighbor:  
My next door neighbor is a very successful businessman, he always used to beat 
me up socially when we were mowing our yards together, and he’d say to me, 
“How much money are you wasting on these illegal immigrants?” ... And he was 
the first person who came in to my office after the [ICE ] raid was announced, … 
and he handed me a check.  And I looked at him and I go, “I’m really confused 
right now.”  He said, “I don’t know that I’ve changed my opinion, but they 
attacked my community, and I’m a daddy too.”  And 60 teachers in the first 30 
minutes came forward and said we’ll take children home tonight if we’re not able 
to connect them with relatives.  The list got up to 300 by the end of the day.136 
 
Through the diffusion of inclusive social norms, some Grand Island residents came to see recent 
Latino arrivals as neighbors or even friends.  But even those who did not have Latino friends or 
acquaintances began to see the recent arrivals not as threatening outsiders but as members of the 
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local community who belonged in Grand Island.  And residents were willing to donate their 





 The qualitative and quantitative findings suggest that the architecture of local civil 
society networks is a significant factor in explaining how some cities come to enact exclusionary 
local laws while other, similar cities enact inclusionary ones.  The results reveal a potential “dark 
side” to network density, finding that it facilitates mobilization and sanctions in the exclusionary 
cities.  High-levels of clustering reflect the fragmented structure of local networks while high-
levels of closure facilitate the creation of rigid group boundaries.  In the inclusionary cities, 
multiple organizational bridges between immigrant and native-born communities facilitate social 
and political participation by new immigrant leaders.  The networks alone do not dictate a 
particular outcome in any city, but the findings suggest they are an important part of 









Chapter 10: Conclusion 
 
The experiences of Fremont and Grand Island suggest that local laws targeting 
undocumented immigrants are as much or more about property and about residents’ fears 
regarding neighborhood change as they are about immigration itself.  The quantitative and 
qualitative analyses together imply that although these laws are related to the arrival of 
immigrants and Latinos, they are a function primarily of the cities who are receiving the new 
arrivals, and specifically those cities’ social structure and civic capacity as well as the processes 
of framing and mobilization through which boundaries were drawn.  Indeed, Roger Waldinger 
(2003: 41) has suggested that “[w]e would do better if we conceptualized immigration as a 
characteristic of our society and its insiders, who interact with the newcomers in ways that 
enhance, rather than diminish, difference. . . .”   
These local immigration laws are the most recent iteration of a frequently repeated social and 
spatial process that has led to a variety of other exclusionary property laws and that helps create 
and perpetuate categorical inequality.  Efforts to limit access to neighborhoods and their 
amenities are one example of the way in which “inequality emerges from asymmetrical social 
interactions in which advantages accumulate on one side or the other, fortified by construction of 
social categories that justify and sustain unequal advantage” (Tilly 2005).  In Hazleton and in 
Fremont, citizenship, immigration status, and race and ethnicity provided convenient social 
categories that were used to hoard neighborhood opportunities.   
In Easton and in Grand Island, organizations helped blur the boundaries of these durable 
categories and create the potential for easing the inequality that these categories are used to 
justify.  Robert Putnam has stated that “immigration and ethnic diversity tend to reduce social 





tend to ‘hunker down,’” reducing altruism and community cooperation (2007: 137).  From a 
different analytical perspective, Robert Sampson has suggested that “rapid population change 
can undermine social organization” and that “rapid immigration flows . . . may weaken 
expectations for collective life” (2012:154).  Yet rapid immigration in Easton and Grand Island 
seemed to increase expectations for collective life and enhance community cooperation.  The 
findings presented here suggest that framing immigration as an opportunity, active immigrant 
and other civil society organizations mobilizing cooperation around shared local goals, and 
organizational networks that span structure holes between native born and immigrant 
communities can all support a broader sense of social solidarity that includes recently arrived 
residents of different races, ethnicities, and national origins. 
The heterogeneous outcomes in the cities examined demonstrate that local immigration 
policy is a rich arena for expanding research on categorical inequality, which has focused largely 
on the context of work and the persistence in disparities in pay on the basis of race and gender.  
In order to understand inequality in life chances more thoroughly, however, one must consider 
not only income but also wealth more broadly.  The current racial wealth gap is much larger than 
the current racial income gap.  These wide racial wealth gaps are as much or more the product of 
disparities in access to homes and neighborhoods as they are the product of disparities in income 
(Oliver and Shapiro 1995).  This suggests that spatial processes, such as those observed here, 
comprise an important and understudied part of the creation of categorical inequalities. 
 When rates of unionization were high and organized labor had strong collective 
bargaining positions, collective identities among industries and classes of workers made sense as 
the union fought “for categories of work to be rewarded, not for individuals to be singled out” 





is most closely intertwined with another’s has largely shifted to the realm of property and home-
ownership (Conley 1999).  The value of one’s house is highly dependent on the value of one’s 
neighbors’ houses and offer a “prepackaged measure of social worth” and “a quantification of 
social structure defined through the law” (Conley 1999: 16). 
Seeing houses as the primary source of household wealth and neighborhoods as a 
valuable measure of social status, the significance of homeownership rates in the quantitative 
analysis of predictors of these ordinances makes intuitive sense.  As the qualitative results 
demonstrated, residents of exclusionary cities experienced shared anxieties over the effects of a 
growing working-class Latino population on neighborhood character.  In Hazleton, white, native-
born residents felt that the use of public spaces such as parks and street corners by Latino 
residents represented a loss of control over the city and its destiny.  In Fremont, white, native-
born residents expressed fears that home values would decline as the Latino population grew and 
that they would be unable to sell their homes. 
Overall, immigration has consistently been found to have a positive impact on average 
home values at the metropolitan area level (Saiz 2003; Ottaviano and Peri 2006).  At the 
neighborhood level, however, research has shown that an increase in the share of immigrant 
residents is actually associated with lower increases in home values than in the surrounding 
metropolitan area (Saiz and Wachter 2011).  Saiz and Wachter (2011) find a significant negative 
causal impact of immigration on neighborhood home values and strong evidence that native-born 
residents are willing to pay more for housing that is segregated from foreign-born residents.  
They report that “in the vast majority of urban neighborhoods in America immigration was 
associated with native flight” and that the effects were strongest in the case of immigration by 





and Fremont arguably are reacting in some sense to these dynamics—fearing a negative effect on 
home values from immigrant arrival, white native-born residents are not fleeing, but fighting by 
trying to exclude immigrants and Latinos through housing regulations. 
Land use and housing regulations govern the relationships among neighbors by 
restricting what homeowners can do with their land and, in so doing, create a form of collective 
property right in the neighborhood that is subject to the regulation (Nelson 1977; Fischel 1985). 
In addition to privately owning the home, then, the homeowner possesses interests in common 
with other municipal residents that shape the community’s character (Harvey 1974; Fennell 
2002).  The Supreme Court implicitly acknowledged this collective property right in Village of 
Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974):  
A quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and motor vehicles restricted are 
legitimate guidelines in a land-use project addressed to family needs. . . . The 
police power is not confined to elimination of filth, stench, and unhealthy places. 
It is ample to lay out zones where family values, youth values, and the blessings 
of quiet seclusion and clean air make the area a sanctuary for people.  
 
These collective property rights are enforced formally through housing codes and land use laws, 
but also informally through social norms.  Both these formal property entitlements and informal 
property norms are shaped by local civil society institutions as well as the networks of 
relationships these institutions facilitate among residents.  The private and public enforcement of 
these common interests interact to shape the nature of the property right. 
Property theory and property law, it follows, are not concerned with resources or “things” 
themselves but instead with the relations between people with respect to those resources.  Rights 
to property can be held individually or collectively, and neighborhoods combine both individual 
property interests in the home with collective interests in the character of the neighborhood 





the context of homeowners’ associations, condominiums, or even corporations, where an 
individual owns a dwelling unit or a share and then has property interests in common with other 
unit owners or shareholders to common facilities and infrastructure, or profits and losses (Ostrom 
and Hess 2007). 
Reflecting its capacity to order social relations, the right to exclude has been described as 
the sine qua non of property (Merrill 1998).  Individual property owners’ rights to exclude a 
trespasser from their own property are well established and extensively discussed in case law and 
in scholarly literature, but to what extent do property owners have a collective right to exclude 
others from the neighborhood?  Homeowners associations and gated communities are well-
known property forms created in part so that homeowners can exclude outsiders from private 
neighborhoods.  But is it possible to exclude outsiders from a municipality?  Land use controls 
are often used to set the minimum amount of land that must be purchased to construct or acquire 
a home, and in so doing to specify the minimum cost of entry into the community (Fischel 2001).  
This use of zoning laws can then be understood as a means through which “existing homeowners 
control entry into their local-public-goods club” (Fischel 2004).   
Property practices such as exclusionary zoning or privatized residential associations 
express homeowners’ preferences about those with whom they want to share public goods and 
have significant impacts on patterns of residential segregation by race and income, and thus 
effects on racial wealth gaps as well.  Yet property theory has not engaged extensively with 
associational interests and rights.  Lee Fennell (2006) has suggested that this avoidance may be 
attributed “to property’s deep roots in an asocial, if not antisocial, construct” exemplified by 
Blackstone’s description of property as “that sole and despotic dominion that one man claims 





individual in the universe.”  If exclusion is central to property rights, so is inclusion, and both 
exclusion and inclusion are intertwined with decisions about association. 
Fennell (2006: 1254) has described property as being “presented as an associational 
envelope of sorts, with hard outer boundaries that exclude the uninvited outside world and 
protect an invitation-only enclave in which people may mingle at the owner’s pleasure.” Yet, 
Fennell (2006: 1230) adds, “defending the boundaries of individually owned parcels is not an 
effective strategy for obtaining the full complement of associational control that people often 
seek when they buy homes. Property’s response, of course, has been to expand the envelope, 
through both public and private land use controls.”  These efforts to “expand the envelope of 
exclusion” can be understood as one perspective on the origin of land use regulation.  Related 
efforts at spatial control are also the root of contemporary developments such as “common 
interest communities” and homeowners associations, and past experiments from race nuisance 
suits to racially restrictive covenants (Godsil 2006; Brooks and Rose 2013).   
The use of local laws to expand the envelope of protected association and 
correspondingly the envelope of exclusion is encouraged by our local government structure that 
authorizes cities “to wield their zoning and redevelopment authority to foster their own 
prosperity, even if it is won at the expense of their neighbors” (Frug 1999: 3).  As Gerald Frug 
(1999: 3) describes, “This pursuit of prosperity has usually involved trying to attract the ‘better 
kind’ of commercial life and the ‘better kind’ of people while, simultaneously, excluding the 
rest.”  The laws enacted in Hazleton and Fremont are examples of the extension of a private 
property logic focused on exclusion to collective property interests and even public spaces—a 
“growing tendency to equate property with exclusion rights that are good against the world” 





to rein in the expansion of exclusion and leverage local organizations towards inclusion and 
immigrant incorporation.   
10.1 Findings 
10.1(a) Housing 
 Regression analysis identified a higher homeownership rate and an increase in the local 
Latino population as significant predictors of the passage of local exclusionary laws.  This 
quantitative finding is reinforced in the qualitative research, which found that residents in 
exclusionary cities frequently expressed concerns over the impact of immigration on 
neighborhood character and on property values. One respondent in Fremont expressed a 
frequently repeated perception, stating that when Latinos move in, soon, “there’s a couple of 
families living there and not taking care of their yard, and their neighborhood starts 
changing….You don’t want your neighborhood to go down.”137  The declaration of purpose in 
Hazleton’s ordinance explicitly declared that it was enacted because “illegal immigration . . . 
destroys our neighborhoods.”  Concerns about housing and efforts to “defend” neighborhoods 
against demographic change were regularly cited by proponents of exclusionary ordinances in 
Hazleton and Fremont.  Housing, then, is an important factor in the passage of these local laws 
that has been understudied.  
 Cities that passed inclusionary laws were not without tensions over the uses of public 
space or concerns about housing, but those tensions and concerns were mediated by local civic 
and political leadership that encouraged residents to see new residents as contributing to the city 
and to see municipal resources and local neighborhoods as growing and improving with new 
residents, not harmed by them. 
 
                                                 






The quantitative and qualitative findings suggest that the framing of structural social 
changes, such as a notable increase in the Latino population, is an important mechanism that 
mediates how these changes affect policy outcomes. The quantitative analysis found that an 
increase in the Latino population was highly significant for the passage of exclusionary laws.  
The qualitative analysis found that local civic and political leaders in exclusionary cities 
consistently framed rising Latino populations as a threat, and that this framing was turned into 
legislative action at the local level.  By contrast, civic and political leaders in inclusionary cities 
repeatedly framed the arrival of immigrants as a benefit to all residents and a contribution by 
new neighbors to the future well-being of the city. This relation between local structural changes 
and both the local and national framing of those changes is supported by recent political science 
and sociology research examining the temporal dynamic of the passage of municipal anti-
immigrant laws (Hopkins 2010). 
In Hazleton, the most successful framing occurred from the top down.  Mayor Barletta 
recognized residents’ anxieties about new users of public spaces and their fears about changing 
neighborhood demographics and framed undocumented immigration as a threat to local “quality 
of life.”  As the ordinance gained momentum and national attention, Mayor Barletta shifted the 
frame slightly to emphasize the ordinance as a patriotic effort to defend “small town U.S.A.” all 
across the country.  In Fremont, the framing that resonated most strongly occurred from the 
bottom up.  An initial group of local activists wanted to make a local statement about 
undocumented immigration nationally and succeeded in getting an exclusionary ordinance 
introduced.  When the City Council rejected that ordinance, new grassroots activists reframed the 





The framing of demographic change was also important for the cities that passed 
inclusionary policies.  In both Easton and Grand Island, local political and civic leaders together 
presented consistent representations of the opportunities that immigration presented.  In Easton, 
local civic and political leaders repeatedly discussed the benefits of new residents and of 
increasing diversity and the positive aspects of being a “multicultural city.”  In Grand Island, 
local civic and political leaders emphasized the character of the city as a “working class city” and 
a “blue collar town” where people support each other and spoke of the need for additional 
residents to contribute to the city and move it forward.  In both Easton and Grand Island, 
residents drew frequent comparisons between current generations of immigrants and previous 
ones. This framing contributed to a sense that immigration could benefit all residents and that 
recent arrivals, despite differences in language, appearance, or culture, firmly belonged.   
 
10.1(c) Mobilization 
Understanding mobilization broadly as the process through which members of a group 
identify common interests, come to identify themselves as a group, and take some collective 
action to advance those perceived interests, mobilization in support of local policies was a 
process that reinforced the boundaries drawn in the local framing of demographic change. 
In Hazleton, Mayor Barletta sought to mobilize residents by engaging them in the 
complaint-driven enforcement of the housing portion of the local exclusionary ordinance. 
Barletta called on average citizens to “do their part” to defend Hazleton and “small town U.S.A.” 
by filing complaints with the city when they suspected that someone who did not belong, 
someone “illegal” had moved in to a local apartment.  This complaint-driven enforcement system 





between those they identified as belonging in Hazleton and those they identified as not 
belonging.  This form of mobilization also imbued local citizenship with a new patriotic and 
exclusionary meaning (Steil and Ridgley 2012). 
Ordinance proponents in Fremont engaged in an asymmetrical escalation of tactics that 
steeply raised the costs of participation for opponents and muted public opposition.  Ordinance 
proponents turned to more extreme tactics in part because they felt alienated from public officials 
and perceived local elected representatives as strongly opposed to their efforts.  As ordinance 
opponents sought to introduce more accurate facts to the debate and foster a public dialogue, 
core supporters of the ordinance turned to disparaging public comments, boycotts, and 
intimidation.  In a self-reinforcing cycle, the escalation of tactics further polarized the debate and 
reinforced the commitment of ordinance proponents by driving them closer together.  These 
tactics were effective partially because the core ordinance supporters had strong ties within their 
group, but few weak ties to city officials or to ordinance opponents.  As the conflict continued, 
core ordinance supporters largely cut those weak ties that had existed, limiting their social 
networks to those with whom they were ideologically aligned and thus minimizing the social 
costs to them of any frustration with their choice of tactics.  These findings echo research in 
other contexts where scholars have noted that tactics become the most extreme when movement 
activists believe that they face an exclusive, closed political system (della Porta 2008: 223).  
Indeed, research on right-wing anti-immigrant political movements in Europe has suggested that 
state exclusion is a more powerful catalyst for mobilization than sustained migration or 
economic decline (Koopmans 2005). The mobilization in support of the ordinance was 
successful in gaining passage of the local exclusionary policy, even as it had high costs for civic 





Mobilization in the inclusionary cities was somewhat less targeted and more diffuse.  The 
role of existing non-profit organizations in Easton and Grand Island was essential.  Organizations 
led by first or second-generation immigrants and organizations serving the immigrants served as 
crucial incubators for the emergence of indigenous leaders (Gramsci 1971) who were able to 
represent the interests of the immigrant community.  Through a focus on shared neighborhood or 
citywide issues, civil society organizations brought immigrant and native-born leaders together 
on a continuing, long-term basis in such a way that mobilization of both immigrant and native-
born constituencies together began to seem both necessary and unremarkable.  When hostility 
towards immigrants arose, public officials and private residents confronted it directly, standing 
up against skeptical or biased residents for equal treatment and inclusion of their new neighbors. 
Although some scholars of associational life have suggested that the vibrant associational life on 
which U.S. civil society once depended is in decline, resulting in diminished democratic life 
(Putnam 2000; Skocpol 2003), other scholars have shown that associations still play important 
roles for local mobilizations and civic participation (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Steil 
and Connolly 2011; Fisher, Svendsen, and Connolly 2015).  The findings presented here 
highlight the role of immigrant organizations in immigrant political participation (e.g. Espiritu 
1992; Okamoto 2003; Martinez 2011). Especially where access to citizenship is limited and 
traditional institutions of political incorporation have yet to include immigrant communities, 
immigrant organizations and other civil-society groups are central to immigrant political 
engagement (Wong 2006; de Graauw 2008; Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad 2008; Gleeson 2009; 
Okamato and Ebert 2010). 
 






The cities that enacted exclusionary ordinances had civil society networks with higher levels 
of density, clustering, and closure, and lower levels of brokerage across structural holes.  
Because the networks in these cities were highly clustered and reached shallowly into the city 
overall, the information exchanged was likely merely to reinforce existing predispositions or 
beliefs.  The high levels of closure and lack of bridging organizations across the cities’ 
demographic and economic divides facilitated the formation of rigid group boundaries.  The 
density of the network constrained innovation and enabled effective sanctions against insiders 
who might try to weaken group solidarity by creating relationships with those defined as 
outsiders.  In Hazleton, the exclusionary ordinance was advanced by a tight cluster of political 
elites, led by the mayor, that had few connections to recent immigrant arrivals and felt little 
responsibility to represent those new residents or their interests.  In Fremont, the exclusionary 
ordinance was advanced by tight-knit clusters of working and middle class white residents who 
were connected through the local veterans club, but isolated from local social and political elites.  
Because the local networks were so fragmented, elite opposition had little influence over the 
ordinance proponents.  In both cases, the isolation of the densely connected non-profit directors 
in the exclusionary cities was exacerbated by the fact that there was little diversity in the 
characteristics of the directors, at least with regard to the ethnic and racial cleavages in the town.  
Hazleton had one-third the number of Latino directors as Easton, while Fremont had just more 
than one-tenth the number of Latino directors as Grand Island.  
By contrast, the civil society networks in Easton and Grand Island were less dense and more 
open.  Ties were more evenly spread among groups and there were fewer cliques.  At the node 
level, more organizations bridged structural holes, and at the network level, there were more 





between organizations with Latino directors and the rest of the network were one way of 
connecting recent Latino arrivals to more long-term, primarily white residents in contexts where 
they could work on shared, superordinate goals.  The collaboration of diverse residents on the 
same non-profit boards and the cooperation among non-profits supported the creation of new 
collective identities based on shared local residence as opposed to fragmented identities based on 
citizenship, nationality, race, or language.  These boundary-spanning non-profit organizations 
also helped make local civil society a creative social sphere that can serve as a forum for 
discussion of local challenges.   
The results suggest that it was not purely the number of civil society organizations that 
mattered but the structure of their connections.  Indeed, the structure of the interorganizational 
and interpersonal relationships provided the institutional foundation on which actors in each city 
negotiated the tensions over property and resources that came with rapidly changing 
demographics. 
10.1(e) Boundary construction 
The exclusionary ordinances in Hazleton and Fremont were not just reactions to already 
existing conceptions of citizenship and belonging but were productive of them.  The debates over 
the ordinances served to frame new identities in response to feelings of declining social status 
and changing social geographies.  The framing and mobilization processes in exclusionary cities 
encouraged native-born residents to think of local resources as a zero-sum competition and to see 
undocumented, foreign-born, and, frequently, Latino residents altogether as a bounded category 
of individuals who did not belong in the community. The exclusionary ordinances themselves 
codified an exclusionary collective identity into local law and gave license to the widespread 





Latinos with statements such as “Go back to Mexico.”  The policies entrenched categorical 
inequalities based on race, ethnicity, and nationality, deepening local divisions and leading to a 
clear sense that Latino residents did not belong and were not deserving of equal treatment.  To 
the extent that these exclusionary policies are effective at discouraging Latino settlement, they 
also deepen categorical inequalities by denying Latinos access to jobs and to valued 
neighborhoods.   
In the inclusionary cities, rapid change was not without tension.  In both Easton and 
Grand Island respondents described individuals harassing Latino residents or expressing hostility 
to public expenditures on those perceived to be undocumented or their children.  But consistent 
framing of new residents as a benefit to the city and the creation of connections between native-
born and foreign-born residents through local civil society organizations led to the creation of 
more inclusive local identities.  Latinos came to be seen as “Grand Islanders” instead of 
“Mexicans,” working class white residents joined the local Latino club, and white 
businesspeople who had been hostile to undocumented immigrants made the first donation to 
support families of those detained in the immigration raid.  In short, local collective identities are 
malleable and an inclusive conception of who belongs, articulated by local leaders and put into 
practice by local public and private institutions, can have a meaningful impact on immigrant 
incorporation. 
 
10.2 Limitations  
 
Correlation, whether of quantitative or qualitative data, of course, does not equate causation.  
The research here does not involve a controlled or natural experiment and there is the potential 
that unobserved factors have a stronger causal effect than the factors discussed.  Without making 





local laws by identifying significant correlates of ordinance passage, the qualitative research 
identifies social processes that were associated with the policy divergence, and the network 
analysis identifies striking variation in organizational network structure related to the differing 
responses to demographic change in the four case study cities.  These contributions deepen our 
analysis of the factors involved and point the way towards more nuanced and focused study.  
Limitations of the quantitative research were described in Chapter 4.  In sum, the use of a 
sample of cities that more closely match the size of the cities that passed inclusionary and 
exclusionary ordinances could more precisely identify the significance of factors in addition to 
city population size.  More precise place level measures of unemployment and wages, 
particularly unemployment and wages for native-born workers at various skill levels could 
provide a more robust test of the labor market competition hypotheses. Finally, data at the place 
level for cities smaller than 20,000 between 2000 and 2006 could more precisely measure the 
changes that preceded the passage of the majority of the exclusionary local laws. 
Case study methods are limited in the strength of claims that can be made regarding causality 
and generalizability.  There are likely unobserved factors that could also help explain the 
processes that led to the passage of these divergent local laws, in addition to the framing of 
demographic change and the mobilization of more or less inclusionary collective identities.  
Nonetheless, framing and mobilization were important aspects of ways in which boundaries in 
exclusionary and inclusionary cities came to be drawn so differently.  One of the strengths of 
case study research is its ability to engage with the unique historical and social circumstances of 
particular locations.  At the same time, the restricted number of case study cities limits the extent 
to which one can generalize to claim that these specific mechanisms and processes were equally 





all four cities does suggest, however, that these are likely to be important factors elsewhere as 
well. 
The social network analysis presents a map of the structure of connections between board 
members of non-profit organizations in these four cities at one moment in time—the year in 
which the policy at issue was enacted (2006 in Hazleton and Easton, 2010 in Fremont and Grand 
Island).  More nuanced data about the nature and extent of the actual connections between 
organizations was unavailable given the existing data, but would significantly strengthen our 
understanding of how the network structures in each city had an effect.  The research also has 
only limited purchase at this point on the factors that led the structure of the networks to diverge.  
 
10.3 Directions for Future Research  
 The current research presents a number of directions for fruitful further research 
regarding the social processes and organizational structures identified in this study.  One 
question that emerges for future quantitative and qualitative analysis is a more fine-grained 
examination of how elites in the four cities may have differed.  Median demographic 
characteristics of the populations in the four cities are relatively similar, but the median values 
may hide differences in the distribution or extremes at the “tails” of the population that are 
significant.  More qualitative data on the structure of power relations in the four cities would also 
be illuminating.  The demographic bases of the case studies were relatively similar, but more 
intense examination of local economic elites and their relative involvement in local politics 
would contribute a richer understanding of the local contexts. Similarly, more detailed 





immigration, such as white seniors in Hazleton and white conservatives in Fremont, could help 
shed more light on the particular dynamics that motivated their actions.  
Regarding the social processes that facilitated ordinance passage, future research could 
explore the extent to which these same processes of framing and mobilization are relevant to the 
enactment of other contemporary exclusionary spatial processes, such as exclusionary zoning 
provisions or tenant registration ordinances.  Future research could also explore the extent to 
which mechanisms such as the shift in leadership and switch to framing about local political 
fairness observed in Fremont are shared by other grassroots conservative or right-wing municipal 
movements, such as the opposition to environmental policies considered pursuant to Agenda 21. 
The findings regarding organizational structure provoke multiple paths for future 
research.  Continuing to focus on these four case study cities, future research could explore in 
more detail the origins of the differences in network structure by mapping the structure of local 
networks historically to see whether there was a particular moment when the organizational 
network structures in different cities diverged and what contemporaneous social or political 
events could be responsible for the shift.  Future research could also explore the nature of the 
connections between organizations. Did organizations share resources, members, or staff in 
addition to board members?  How often and about what topics did organizations consult with 
each other?  What did these connections mean concretely for organizations’ members or clients 
and their own access to resources?  Looking to other cities and issues, mapping of organizational 
networks in other cities could help identify how widespread these differences in organizational 






The database of cities enacting these laws nationwide from the quantitative analysis could 
be a useful starting point for future research on the effects these local immigration policies have 
had.  To what extent have exclusionary or inclusionary policies affected immigrant settlement, 
economic growth, income inequality, and racial disparities in socio-economic outcomes?  These 
questions could be analyzed through an extension of the quantitative data already collected. 
The overall framework used here to analyze the social processes and structures that shape 
the enactment of local immigration laws could also be applied to other exclusionary spatial 
policies.  For instance, productive research could be conducted looking historically at racial 
zoning in the early 20th Century.  Who mobilized for and against these policies? How did 
proponents and opponents frame these policies and were their particular frames that were more 
or less successful at mobilizing supporters or opponents? How were these policies justified by 
political leaders and courts?   
 
10.4 Policy Recommendations 
 The research presented here suggests that local laws seeking to exclude undocumented 
immigrants should be understood not only as related to immigration but also as related to 
demographic change and concerns over homeownership.  From a policy perspective, these local 
laws targeting undocumented immigrants should be understood as exclusionary spatial policies 
that reinforce categorical boundaries of inequality.   
The findings regarding homeownership suggest that some of the negative aspects of 
homeownership for distributive justice should be considered more extensively in policymaking. 
The increasing reliance on housing as a primary source of savings and capital accumulation 





shape the identity of their future neighbors through land use and housing policy combined with 
the fragmented structure of local government in the United States exacerbates socio-economic 
inequality and leads to exclusionary policies that seek to push costs, and categories of individuals 
seen as costly, across jurisdictional boundaries.  The higher likelihood of homeowners to vote 
and participate in local politics to protect home values becomes especially problematic when we 
recognize that homeowners are not representative of the population overall, being more likely to 
be married, white, older, and higher-income.  Policies designed to increase the value of homes, 
such as the regressive mortgage interest tax deduction, also increase incentives for homeowner-
led exclusionary policymaking to protect the value of their largest asset.  Accordingly, placing so 
much emphasis on the importance of home values for national economic growth and for 
household capital accumulation should be balanced against negative externalities these goals 
have on segregation and racial disparities in wealth.  
The findings regarding framing, mobilization, and organizational structure can help guide 
policymakers in gaining support for integrative policies and facilitating the incorporation of 
immigrants into local social and political life.  Local leaders in cities experiencing rapid 
immigration can help create a supportive climate for immigrant incorporation by 1) seeking to 
create a local collective identity rooted in shared, inclusive values; 2) supporting local 
institutions such as schools, hospitals, and police departments in setting community-wide norms 
and fostering integration; and 3) recognizing the important role of both new and established non-
profits in developing immigrant leaders and creating a bridge between immigrant and native-
born communities. 
Local leaders in cities that adopted inclusionary policies consistently worked to inspire in 





immigrants like “caring about our young people.”  One way to facilitate that process is through a 
participatory analysis of community priorities, which can also then allow leaders to identify areas 
where those priorities and immigrant integrative policies converge.  For instance, improving 
school access through welcome centers that quickly orient and integrate new students into 
classes at the right level helps both new students and their already enrolled classmates by freeing 
up teachers’ time for teaching instead of testing new students and dealing with the paperwork to 
get them to the right class.  Similarly, improving healthcare access by opening up satellite clinics 
in malls or schools where recent immigrants in need of services can easily use them can make 
medical care more accessible for everyone. 
To help translate these shared, inclusive values into everyday life and disseminate 
welcoming norms, institutions such as schools, hospitals, and police departments are crucial.  
The policies these institutions set in terms of hiring diverse employees, providing bilingual 
services, and reaching out to immigrant communities, as well as the enthusiasm with which they 
adopt them, set a tone that the residents of the city will notice.  For instance, the main places 
where immigrant and native-born residents interact is often schools, and a local school system 
that invests in bilingual events for parents after school and generally ensures that immigrant 
parents feel welcome and involved in schools can set an example for other local institutions and 
residents. 
Local civil society can play a central role in facilitating immigrant integration through the 
programs they provide, the staff they hire, and the board members they select.  Local 
governments can support the creation of new civil society groups in immigrant communities and 
also encourage existing civil society groups to include members of immigrant communities on 





with one another (such as focusing on local youth development opportunities) create a context 
for long-term shared collaboration that builds meaningful bonds.  The relationships formed 
through vibrant civil society networks can be especially helpful in connecting immigrant 
community members to native-born leaders and creating good channels of communication to 
local governments as well.  Along these same lines, support for and use of immigrant 
newspapers, radio stations, and other forms of immigrant friendly media can help city officials 




“In an unequal society, democracy and justice are frequently at odds” (Fainstein 2010: 30).  
Indeed, the experiences of Hazleton and Fremont illustrate the danger of “illiberal social 
movements with a broad base of popular support,” especially “when the path to political power 
lies precisely in making emotional appeals” (Fainstein 2010: 31).  In addition to epitomizing this 
danger, the experiences of Hazleton and Fremont highlight the continuing salience of race or 
ethnicity and neighborhood change in urban politics.  Both anti-immigrant policies were 
democratically enacted, one by the City Council and the other by popular referendum, and 
highlight the dangers these social movements can create for a “discrete and insular minority” 
such as recent immigrants.  The experiences in the exclusionary cities also highlight a potential 
dark side of homeownership’s role as most families’ primary asset, especially when fixations on 
home value intersect with a fragmented local governance structure can facilitate discrimination. 
The specific goals of the Hazleton and Fremont ordinances are particularly provocative for 
urban theory.  The ordinances seek to exercise power through control over urban space by 
denying access to housing and employment in order to force undocumented immigrants out of 





and march them out of the city limits or force them out through the denial of basic needs evokes 
extreme historical examples of compulsory segregation and forced migration, such as the Trail of 
Tears, the Tulsa “Race Riot,”  or the internment of Japanese-Americans. 
Although the Third Circuit Court of Appeals struck down Hazleton’s law (Lozano v. City of 
Hazleton, 724 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 2013)), these policies were approved by the Eighth Circuit Court 
of Appeals, which concluded that Fremont’s immigration policies do not conflict with the federal 
government’s power over immigration because “[l]aws designed to deter, or even prohibit, 
unlawfully present aliens from residing within a particular locality are not tantamount to 
immigration laws establishing who may enter or remain in the country” (Keller v. Fremont, 2013 
WL 3242111 at *5 (8th Cir. 2013)).  Unaddressed in the decision are the implications of such a 
patchwork of local immigration policies.  It raises the specter of thousands of new borders 
around each municipality and multitudinous forms of local immigration enforcement.  It also 
indirectly sanctions the racial residential segregation that could follow as Latino mixed-status 
families, legal permanent residents, and citizens seek more welcoming locales.     
Although the ordinance has had dramatic consequences for Fremont, the success of the 
ordinance may have sown the seeds of a future countermovement. The experience of conflict 
over the ordinance fundamentally changed the perspective of many white residents who realized 
that proactive steps must be taken to welcome immigrant residents and confront prejudice. As 
the white former meatpacking plant worker who was denied restaurant service with his Latina 
colleague said:  
we’ve seen some bigotry and hatred, really bad things we never thought were here 
. . . this level of bigotry and hatred against someone that is a different color, from 
people I never thought would be like that. . . . What we’ve seen tears your heart 
out. I thought we had gotten by some of this. . . . You go home and cry when you 





matter what color they are, what language they speak. . . .  Your eyes are 
opened.138 
 
For many residents, the public expressions of racism revealed things about Fremont that they had 
not previously seen, and created the opportunity for the formation of new, if still emerging, 
collective identities welcoming to recent immigrants.   
In response to the discrimination they have faced, Latino residents have sought unity—as 
a Latino community member said in a community meeting: “Whether we like it or not, we are all 
Mexican now and we are all illegal now in the eyes of the people who are judging us.”139  Latino 
residents have formed an organization Un Fremont Con Dignidad—One Fremont With Dignity, 
to give voice to Latino concerns and engage more actively in local politics.  As one respondent 
said, “we have every right to be here as you do, and even though we may have lost this battle, we 
have an opportunity to win the war. . . not as us against them, but all of us together for the future 
of Fremont.”140   
Urban politics in many ways is a struggle over how the costs and benefits of capitalist 
growth are distributed across space and across social groups.  The study of urban planning 
similarly is the study of the continuing conflict over the power to control and organize space and 
municipal resources (Connolly and Steil 2009).  The ways in which categorical inequalities are 
created in part through spatial processes is an important area of research for planning 
scholarship.  These local exclusionary policies can be understood as efforts to exercise control 
over who belongs in Hazleton and Fremont and to hoard municipal resources on the basis of race 
or ethnicity and immigration status.  The inclusionary policies in Easton and Grand Island 
represent more equitable and more just distributions of municipal resources that have policy 
                                                 
138 Interview by author. Fremont, NE.  August 16, 2010. 
139 Interview by author. Fremont, NE.  August 14, 2010.  





relevance for cities nationally and globally as increasing international migration continues to 
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Appendix A: Supplementary Case Study Tables 
 
Table A1: National, State, and County Level Unemployment Rates 2000-2010 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
US 4.0 4.7 5.8 6.0 5.5 5.1 4.6 4.6 5.8 9.3 9.6 
PA 4.2 4.8 5.6 5.7 5.4 5.0 4.5 4.4 5.3 7.9 8.4 
Luzerne 
County 
5.2 5.6 6.5 6.5 6.7 5.8 5.3 5.0 6.3 8.9 9.8 
Northampton 
County 
3.8 4.3 5.3 5.5 5.4 5.0 4.5 4.4 5.5 8.3 8.9 
NE 2.8 3.1 3.7 4.0 3.9 3.9 3.0 3.0 3.3 4.7 4.7 
Dodge 
County 
3.1 3.8 4.5 4.8 .7 4.5 3.4 3.2 3.4 5.1 5.0 
Hall  
County 
2.9 3.3 4.0 4.4 4.9 3.9 3.0 2.7 3.1 4.3 4.5 
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics 
 
Table A2: Percent Employed Persons 16 Years and Over: Agriculture, forestry, fisheries, and 
mining 
 1980 1990 2000 2010 
U.S. 4.0 2.7 1.9 1.9 
PA 2.7 1.8 1.3 1.3 
Hazleton 1.8 0.4 0.8 0.8 
Easton 0.3 1.2 0.6 0.9 
NE 11.0 8.3 5.6 4.7 
Fremont 1.7 1.7 1.4 1.8 







Table A3: Percent Employed persons 16 years and over: Construction 
 1980 1990 2000 2010 
US 5.9 6.2 6.8 6.4 
PA 4.8 6.1 6.0 5.9 
Hazleton City 4.9 5.5 6.0 5.0 
Easton City 3.1 5.5 6.4 6.0 
NE 6.0 5.3 6.5 6.3 
Fremont 5.5 3.7 5.7 7.1 
Grand Island 7.6 5.1 6.5 6.1 
 
Table A4: Percent Employed Persons 16 Years and Over: Manufacturing 
 1980 1990 2000 2010 
US 22.4 17.7 14.1 10.5 
PA 28.6 20.0 16.0 12.5 
Hazleton  32.0 26.3 21.6 22.4 
Easton  38.4 24.7 20.8 16.6 
NE 13.8 12.7 12.3 10.5 
Fremont 26.9 21.9 20.4 22.5 
Grand Island 16.6 17.8 18.9 21.8 
 
Table A5: Percent Employed Persons 16 Years and Over: Retail trade 
 1980 1990 2000 2010 
US 16.1 16.8 11.7 11.6 
PA 15.7 17.2 12.1 11.7 
Hazleton  19.1 17.6 14.1 13.6 
Easton  14.4 18.8 11.5 11.8 
NE 16.9 17.9 12.1 11.6 
Fremont 22.6 21.4 15.5 12.2 
Grand Island 22.7 22.2 15.8 16.0 
 
Table A6: Percent Employed Persons 16 Years and Over: Finance, insurance, and real estate 
 1980 1990 2000 2010 
U.S. 6.0 6.9 6.9 6.7 
PA 5.2 6.5 6.6 6.5 
Hazleton 4.4 5.5 3.6 2.6 
Easton  3.6 4.5 4.0 5.3 
NE 6.1 6.8 7.7 7.6 
Fremont 5.4 6.0 5.2 6.7 







Table A7: Median HH Income as Percentage of National Median HH Income 
 1980 1990 2000 2010 
Hazleton 76.81% 69.63% 66.87% 66.17% 
Easton 75.92% 87.72% 78.97% 75.35% 
     
Fremont 97.62% 82.41% 87.39% 88.37% 
Grand Island 93.18% 83.24% 85.83% 85.01% 
 
Table A8: Percent White Non-
Hispanic 
  
 1980 1990 2000 2010 
US 79.57 75.64 69.13 63.75 
PA 89.14 87.72 84.05 79.47 
Hazleton 98.97 98.10 93.19 59.02 
Easton 88.78 84.29 73.50 58.63 
NE 93.98 92.51 87.33 82.12 
Fremont 98.71 98.23 93.63 85.33 
Grand Island 95.98 93.26 81.42 68.59 
 
Table A9: Percent Hispanic or 
Latino 
  
 1980 1990 2000 2010 
US 6.45 8.99 12.55 16.35 
PA 1.30 1.95 3.21 5.67 
Hazleton 0.51 1.01 4.85 37.31 
Easton 1.90 4.41 9.79 19.89 
NE 1.79 2.34 5.52 9.17 
Fremont 0.47 0.70 4.31 11.93 
Grand Island 3.21 4.79 15.94 26.65 
 
Table A10: Percent Foreign born 
 1980 1990 2000 2010 
US 6.2 8.0 11.1 12.9 
PA 3.4 3.1 4.1 5.8 
Hazleton 3.1 2.5 3.7 22.1 
Easton 5.6 5.7 8.6 12.4 
NE 2.0 1.8 4.4 6.3 
Fremont 1.4 1.2 3.0 7.1 







Table A11: Percent Year Of Entry For The Foreign-Born Population 








US 34 27 19 20 
PA 39 26 15 20 
Hazleton 51 26 14 8 
Easton 50 27 14 8 
NE 44 32 13 11 
Fremont 17 55 19 9 
Grand Island 51 23 19 8 
 
Table A12: Percent Persons 25 years and over: Bachelor's degree or more 
 1990 2000 2010 
US 20.3 24.4 28.2 
PA 17.9 22.4 26.9 
Hazleton 10.3 11.5 12.1 
Easton 12.8 14.9 16.6 
NE 18.9 23.7 28.1 
Fremont 14.8 15.8 18.9 
Grand Island 14.6 15.8 16.1 
 
Table A13: Percent Population Age 18 to 64 for whom poverty status is determined: Living in 
Poverty 
 1980 1990 2000 2010 
US 12.4 11.0 11.1 14.0 
PA 10.5 9.5 10.0 12.5 
Hazleton 9.7 10.0 12.7 18.5 
Easton 15.6 11.8 14.3 23.0 
NE 10.7 9.7 8.9 11.8 
Fremont 8.0 8.5 8.5 12.7 
Grand Island 6.9 9.3 11.9 12.8 
 
Table A14: Percent Occupied Housing Units: Owner Occupied 
 1980 1990 2000 2010 
US 64.4 64.2 66.2 65.1 
PA 69.9 70.7 71.3 69.6 
Hazleton 60.9 60.3 59.0 53.3 
Easton 53.9 52.1 48.5 46.5 
NE 68.4 66.5 67.5 67.2 
Fremont 67.1 63.8 63.4 61.1 






Table A15: Segregation measured as white-Latino dissimilarity 
 1980 1990 2000 2010 
Hazleton  8.83 25.42 31.73 24.22 
Easton 29.15 28.24 26.93 25.07 
Fremont 6.65 20.33 30.44 29.98 
Grand Island 21.62 31.93 36.53 38.56 
 
 
Table A16: Percentage reporting adherence to major religion in 2010 




Orthodox Jewish Muslim 
Hazleton 41.53 13.47 2.86 0.91 1.1 0.19 
Easton 35.85 25.74 2.53 1.83 1.59 0.23 
Fremont 21.56 29.93 17.49    
Grand Island 46.88 21.29 17.61 0.11 0.05  
 
 
Table A17: First ancestry reported (2010) 
 German Italian Irish Polish Slovak Czech Danish Dutch English Swedish 
Hazleton 8.27 28.45 8.75 9.31 8.23 0.10 0.04 3.25 2.17 0.14 
Easton 14.03 11.85 7.22 2.54 0.65 0.07 0.19 2.15 3.47 0.32 
Fremont 36.8 1.14 6.95 1.84 0 3.25 3.15 1.01 5.26 3.90 
Grand Is 30.31 0.58 5.49 3.90 0 2.31 2.31 0.61 4.67 2.71 
 














Appendix B: Sample Interview Protocols 
 
Sample Interview Protocol – Exclusionary City 
 
  Could you tell me about a personal event or relationship that made immigration 
issues important to you? When was that? 
  Could you tell me what you feel happened in Fremont that made immigration so 
important to residents here? 
  Where have you seen immigrants and native born residents in Fremont interact? 
Does that happen often? How would you describe those interactions? 
  How would you say Fremont has changed since 2000?  What exactly has changed 
since then? How have those changes occurred?  Population size, age, prosperity generally, 
economic opportunity, types of jobs,  
  How would you say Fremont has changed since the ordinance was introduced in 
2008?  Since it was passed in June?  Have you seen interactions between immigrant and native 
born residents change? 
 
 Power 
  Who would you describe as the most important leaders, groups or organizations in 
Fremont today? What do you feel is the source of their power? 
  Thinking back to 2000, who would you describe as the most important leaders, 
groups or organizations in Fremont then? 
  Are there others who may be less visible and that haven’t been mentioned but that 
you feel may be important behind the scenes? 
  Who would you describe as the key leaders around immigration issues in 
Fremont? 
 
 Political Opportunity 
  Could you describe the process that led to the defeat of the city council 
immigration ordinance, and what the key events or people that kept it from getting passed? 
  Could you describe the process that led to the passage of the referendum and what 
the key events or people that contributed to its passage? 
  Why now? Why Fremont? 
 
 Specifics/Strategy 
 For Pro-Ordinance 
  Could you tell me the 3 main objectives you hope that the immigration ordinance 
will achieve? 
  What are some the strengths you feel local governments (as opposed to the federal 
government) have in responding to immigration? What are some of the weaknesses?   
 For Anti-Ordinance 
  What are the main concerns or fears residents have about what the ordinance will 
do? How did people respond when they heard it was going to be introduced? What leadership 





Sample Interview Protocol – Inclusionary City 
 
Could you tell me about a personal event or relationship that made immigration issues 
important to you? When was that? 
 
Economic Insecurity/Boundary Creation 
How would you say Grand Island has changed since 2000?  What exactly has changed 
since then? How have those changes occurred?  Population size, age, prosperity 
generally, economic opportunity, types of jobs?  




Who would you describe as the most important leaders, groups or organizations in Grand 
Island today?  
What local organizations do you belong to?  Could you tell me about the role you have in 
each?  How often do you meet? What do you do?   
Are there places where conversations happen between recent immigrants, more 
established residents?  Groups trying to build those bridges? 
 
Mobilization and Political Opportunity 
 Why at that time? Why here? Why so different from Fremont? 
Seem to have had relatively forward thinking leadership in Steve Lamken, Steve Joel, 
Ken Gnadt, Jay Vavricek- is that coincidence? What contributed to that? 
How did it come to pass that police refused to cooperate with ICE?  Was there local 
pressure?  
How did support for immigration detainees and their children emerge?  Key organizers? 
 Role of more established Mexican American community? 
 Role of earlier migration?  More diverse immigrant streams? 
 School system? 
 
City Policies 
Are there particular city policies or programs that are particularly important to or helpful 
to recent immigrants?   
Are there policies you wish the city would implement that would be helpful? 
What are some the strengths you feel local governments (as opposed to the federal 
government) have in responding to immigration? What are some of the weaknesses?   
 
 
 
